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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
decided Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 2 in a way that places it in conflict
with a 1994 decision of the First Circuit, Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v.
Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England.3 The Sixth Circuit decision is
notable not only because of the conflict it creates, but also because it was a
closely decided en banc decision that reversed the holding of the three-judge
panel,4 affirmed the district court,5 and contained two dissents. The En Banc
Sixth Circuit's decision creates major threshold obstacles to the protections
afforded by the American's with Disabilities Act (ADA) 6 for people with
long-term, serious mental illnesses. Such people cannot pass the court's
threshold issues involving whether a totally disabled plaintiff has standing to
sue under Title I and whether an insurer who enters into a contract with an
employer is a public accommodation subject to the requirements of Title III.
Consequently, substantive issues such as whether a disparity in long-term
disability insurance coverage between mental and physical disabilities
constitutes illegal discrimination, or whether the disparity is a subterfuge to
evade the policy of the ADA, are not reached.
Using the Parker decisions as pivotal cases, this article will discuss whether
a person who receives employer-provided long-term disability insurance
which provides inferior benefits for a long-term mental disability, compared
with a physical disability, should be permitted to proceed against his employer
under Title I of the ADA and/or against the insurer under Title III of the ADA.
It will argue that, contrary to the weight of current authority, Title I allows
totally disabled employees to challenge the disparate terms of long-term
disability benefits. The article will also argue that currently conflicting
authority should be resolved to hold that an insurer who provides disparate
long-term disability benefits is in violation of Title III of the ADA, even if the
benefits are provided through the employer, rather than directly to the insured,
because the insurer is a public accommodation under the ADA.
Any discussion of the ADA presents an organizational challenge not only
because of the complex structure of the Act itself, but also because the ADA
implicates other complex federal remedial schemes such as the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)7 and the Rehabilitation Act.8 The
2121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
337 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
4 Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), rev'd in part, 121
F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
5 parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1995), rev'd, 99
F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), and rev'd in part, 121 F.3d 1006 (1997) (en banc) (affirming the
original district court decision).
642 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
729 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
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social policy implications of the issues under discussion in this article are
complex and at times even contradictory, as is perhaps unavoidable. 9
Part II outlines a typical case in which the employer provided inferior
long-term disability benefits to those with mental disabilities. The purpose of
Part II is to provide the reader with a map of the procedural and threshold
issues facing the typical claimant in such a situation. "
Part III provides brief summaries of other remedial statutes that are related
to, or that have an impact on, interpretation of the ADA. Part III includes
descriptions of two statutes passed in 1997 and discusses whether either offers
any assistance to the plaintiff in the typical case under discussion in this article.
Part III is not intended to provide exhaustive analysis of the ways in which
courts have construed the various statutes. It is only intended to provide a
glimpse of the complexity of the issues raised here.
Part IV provides information about background social, ethical and legal
issues that are implicated in the typical case. For example, the importance of
the fact that most people who have health or long-term disability insurance
receive it as a benefit of employment must not be underestimated. Access to
mental health care is being driven by workplace values and biases.
Part V addresses the Title I issues raised in the typical case. The various
opinions written in Parker will be explained, as will supporting and conflicting
decisions from other federal courts. Part V ends with an analysis of Title I issues
and argues that totally disabled employees should have standing to sue their
employers for discrimination in long-term disability insurance benefit matters.
Part VI traces Parker's ERISA claim through the courts. This brief section
demonstrates why ERISA has not been successful in providing employees with
meaningful review of discriminatory treatment in the context of insurance
benefits.
Part VII addresses the Title III issues raised in the typical case. The language
of the statute will be examined and prior cases, some interpreting Title III
broadly and some interpreting it narrowly, will be discussed. A detailed
discussion of the several Parker opinions will be followed by an analysis of Title
III issues which urges a broad reading of Title III.
II. TYPICAL AMERlIcANs wITH DISABILITIES ACT LONG-TERM DISABILITY
INSURANCE CASE
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination against
individuals on the basis of disability. Title I prohibits discrimination in
employment. Title III prohibits discrimination by public accommodations. Title
8The Rehabilitation Act amends several sections of Title 29 of the United States
Code. The sections relevant to employment of persons with disabilities are 29 U.S.C.
§§ 706, 791-95 (1973).
9See Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Ethics, Institutional Complexity and Health
Care Reform: The Struggle for Normative Balance, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTh L. & POL'Y 93(1993) (arguing competing ethical values are inherent in the complex area of health care
reform).
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V contains miscellaneous provisions, including one that provides a safe harbor
for disability-based disparities in insurance coverage that are based on
actuarial calculations and that are not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
the ADA.
While there are numerous ways in which facts can combine to produce
claims under Title I and Tile III of the ADA, this article focuses on one typical
fact pattern that has recently produced conflicting opinions in the federal
courts. The facts of such typical cases begin with a non-disabled employee who
receives long-term disability insurance as a benefit of employment. 10 The
disability insurance may be self-funded 11 or insured,12 and may be paid for
entirely by the employer, or the employee may make contributions.13
10Often, of course, the employee may also receive health insurance as a benefit of
employment. Coverage for mental illness in these policies is often limited by annual or
lifetime caps while coverage for physical illness is either unlimited or has far greater
coverage limits.
Several cases address the question of whether such disparate treatment of physical
and mental illnesses in health insurance contracts is a violation of the ADA. Generally,
inferior health insurance coverage of mental illness has been held not to be
discrimination under the ADA. EEOC regulations approve such disparities under
certain situations. EEOC: INTERIM PoLIcy GuIDANcE ON ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE,
June 8, 1993, reprinted in Americans with Disabilities Act Manual (BNA) at
70:1051-1056, Fair Empl. Prac. Manual, at 405:7115. For this reason, plaintiffs who have
a continuing mental illness, but limited health insurance coverage for mental illnesses,
argue their illnesses are organic in origin and so within the physical illness coverage
category. This argument usually fails.
The category of insurance at issue in a particular case (health or disability) does
not appear to be a decisive fact in the existing case law. What does make a difference is
whether the employee's mental disability is totally disabling. A totally disabled
employee is no longer a qualified individual with a disability entitled to protection
under Title I of the ADA.
This article shows that health insurance and disability insurance differ in
significant ways. The courts should take these differences into account.
11A plan is self-insured--sometimes called "self-funded"-when the
employer, rather than an insurance company, assumes total finan-
cial responsibility and risk for providing benefits.... Self-insuring
allows employers flexibility in designing and administering health
care plans because ERISA preempts such plans from state-imposed
benefit requirements.... In this way, state laws regulating the
insurance industry prohibiting such discrimination cannot reach
them.
Susan Nanovic Flannery, Employer Health-Care Plans: The Feasibility of Disability-Based
Distinctions Under ERISA and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 HoFsrRA LAB. L. J.
211 at 211-12 n.3 (1995) (citation omitted). The author elaborates the implications of
self-insuring in ADA and ERISA environments.
12
"An insured health insurance plan is one that is purchased from an insurance
company or other organization, such as an HMO.... Insured health insurance plans
are regulated by ERISA and state law while self-insured plans are typically subject only
to ERISA." Id. at 230 n.102.
13 Often the employee has the option to obtain expanded coverage by making
contributions to a basic plan paid for by the employer.
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The employer-provided disability insurance creates two classifications of
disabling conditions: physical disorders and mental (or mental/nervous)
disorders. It also creates two levels of coverage. Employees who are disabled
as a result of physical disorders receive disability benefits until age 65, at which
time social security takes over. Employees who are disabled as a result of
mental disorders receive disability benefits for a shorter period of time (often
two years). 14
The employee develops a mental illness that eventually becomes so
debilitating that the employee is no longer able to work.1 5 The long-term
disability insurance then begins to pay the employee under the terms of the
plan. The employee, who cannot work, who may no longer be covered by
health insurance,16 and who is eligible only for limited disability benefits,
exhausts administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the EEOC and
eventually sues the employer and the insurance company under Title I and
Title III of the ADA challenging the disparity of coverage between physical and
mental disability benefits17 in order to win the right to receive benefits until
age 65.
With respect to the Title I claim, the defendants file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss 18 arguing that the protections of Title I are available only to a qualified
individual with a disability. A person whose disability makes him unable to
work is not a qualified individual and thus is not entitled to the protections of
Title I. Though there is some authority to the contrary to date the weight of
authority is that the motion will be granted.
With respect to the Title III claim, the insurer 19 files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss on the ground that the insurer is not a public accommodation. The
14 See infra Parts V-VII for case examples and discussion.
15 Health insurance benefits may initially cover the employee for less severe,
non-disabling mental illness or even for a physical illness.
16Again, whether an employee who is receiving long-term disability benefits can also
receive health insurance benefits depends on the contracts provided by the employer.
Some employers offer both; in such cases the distinction between health insurance
(which is intended to cover medical expenses) and disability insurance ( which is
intended to provide wage-replacement) is illustrated. See infra Part IV(B) for discussion
of the differences between disability insurance and health insurance.
17The complaint will probably be filed in a United States District Court because the
ADA claims bring ERISA preemption into play. Some recent cases have been filed in
state courts, where plaintiffs have tried to avoid ERISA by alleging state claims such as
intentional and negligent infliction of mental distress. The cases which have been
reported have been removed to federal court by the defendants. The state tort claims
are usually found to be preempted by ERISA and dismissed. See, e.g., Carparts, 37 F.3d
12 (1st Cir. 1994); Schroeder v. Connecticut Gen'l. Life Ins. Co., Civ. Action No.
93-M-2433, 1994 WL 909636 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 1994).
18 Under some circumstances the motion to dismiss will be treated and disposed of
as though a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
19 The employer is probably not subject to Title III because only Title I addresses the
terms and conditions of employment. The insurer may be subject to Title I if it comes
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argument is that since a public accommodation is a physical place, an insurer
who provides a contract to an employer is not a public accommodation
vis-a-vis the employee. Authority is divided on this issue. Some courts have
extended Title III to cover insurers while others have limited it to physical
places.
These threshold issues have frequently barred disabled employees from the
opportunity to persuade courts that the disability-based disparity is
impermissible discrimination under either Title I or Title III. Only if the
employee gets past these thresholds can he proceed to prove that the disparity
in the insurance contract is an impermissible discrimination on the basis of
disability.
If these thresholds are crossed, an employee still faces hurdles on the
substance of the discrimination claim. Defendants argue that even if they are
subject to either Title I or Title Ill, the disparate treatment of mental and physical
illness is permitted by the safe harbor provisions of Title V of the Act so long
as the goal of the disparity is not a subterfuge to evade the Act. Defendants
argue that the term subterfuge should be defined consistently with the way in
which it has been interpreted in prior cases involving other remedial statutes
such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
In these earlier cases, subterfuge required a showing of specific intent to
subvert the Act's purpose. Employees will argue that the term subterfuge
should be defined consistently with Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and Department of Justice regulations which require an actuarial
demonstration of non-discriminatory consequences, but that intent is not
required.
As can be seen from this brief tracking of a typical case, an employee faces
difficult threshold issues to his claim for protection of the ADA. An employee
who has developed a mental disability often finds it impossible to address the
merits of the discrimination claim because (1) he does not qualify under Title I
as an employee and (2) the insurer does not qualify under Title III as a public
accommodation. The remainder of this article elaborates upon the problem
posed by this typical case.
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT REMEDIAL STATUTES
The ADA amends several pre-existing statutory schemes. When a claim is
made under the ADA some of these other statutes come into play through
statutory direction, similarity of statutory language, or by analogy to decisions
made in earlier cases addressing similar issues. Remedial statutes have recently
been enacted which address some of the same concerns as does the ADA.
Following are brief summaries of the ADA and some of the most relevant
prior statutes. Short descriptions of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act and the Mental Health Parity Act, which were enacted in
within the statutory definition of employer. See David Monoogian, With Suits Mounting,
Courts Face the Question of Whether a Managed Care Organization Can Be an Employer Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, NATL L. J. Mar. 17, 1997 at B6.
1997-981
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1997, are also included, together with projections of whether this new
legislation will assist people with serious long-term mental disabilities.
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
Congressional findings supporting enactment of the ADA recount the
substantial number of persons with a disability who experience discrimination
and the breadth of the discrimination they experience.
The Congress finds that some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the
population as a whole is growing older; historically, society has tended
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;...
individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to
make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to
lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities; [they] are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals... 20
The ADA proclaims "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals."21 In
pursuit of its purpose the Act is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;22 [and] to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities. "23
The ADA was intended to correct some of the disappointments of older
legislation such as ERISA,24 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
2042 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(1)-(7) (1990).
2 1See id. § 12101(a)(8).
22See id. § 12101(b)(1).
23See id. § 12101(b)(2).
24For example, the failure of ERISA to protect employees is noted by one
commentator who points out that today "Ithe EEOC, under the ADA rather than ERISA,
is attempting to address ERISA's flaws by claiming that disability-based distinctions in
health plans are prohibited unless the employer can prove that the distinctions are, in
fact, not discriminatory or that a legitimate business justification is the basis for such
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(ADEA), 25 and the Rehabilitation Act. For example, while the Rehabilitation
Act had taken some steps toward providing equality to those in
federally-funded employment, "[a] simple amendment of the Rehabilitation
Act could not suffice"26 because "[tihe drafters of the ADA recognized the need
for a more comprehensive bill to prohibit discrimination in all areas of life and
to send a clear message that this discrimination was no longer acceptable."27
At the time it was enacted, the intent of the ADA was considered a significant
advancement of the civil rights of disabled individuals.28 However, the
shortcomings of the Act were noted from the outset, particularly for those with
mental disabilities.29 It is clear that the ADA specifically protects those with
mental illnesses to the same extent that it protects those with physical
disabilities. 30 On the other hand,
distinction." Kathlynn Butler, Securing Employee Health Benefits through ERISA and the
ADA, 42 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1240 (1993).
25The conflict between the courts and Congress on the meaning of the word
subterfuge has been the subject of commentary. One commentator notes, "Although the
language of section 4(f)(2) [of the ADEA] is similar to the ADA's section 501(c), the plain
language of the ADA and Congressional reaction to the ADEA cases clearly indicate
that the standard articulated in these cases does not apply to section 501(c)." Monica E.
McFadden, Insurance Benefits Under the ADA: Discrimination or Business as Usual? 28
TORT & INS. L.J. 480,490 (1993).
261d. at 499.
271d.
28D. Todd Arney, Note, Survey of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title I: With the
Final Regulations In, Are the Criticisms Out? 31 WASHBURN L.J. 523 (1992). ("Without a
doubt the intentions underlying the ADA are noble." Id. at 524.); Neville M. Bilimoria,
No Relief in Sight: The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on AIDS Discrimination
in Employee Medical Plans, 1994 DET. C.L. REv. 1053 (1994). ("Many members of Congress
and many commentators believed that the passage of the ADA would end the
discrimination in employee welfare benefits." Id. at 1070.); Jonathan C. Drimmer,
Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social
Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341 (1993). (The ADA is a
'comprehensive civil rights bill affecting people with disabilities and the nation as a
whole [that] provides important new rights to people with disabilities in employment,
transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications." Id. at 1397).
29 For example, one commentator remarked, 'The passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) raised high hopes for some and deep concerns for others. Amid
the flurry of publicity and public attention to the ADA, very little has been said about
a significant portion of the beneficiaries of the act, those with mental disabilities."
Margaret Hart Edwards, The ADA and the Employment of Individuals with Mental
Disabilities: Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 347, 347 (1992-93).
Criticism of the regulations supporting the ADA was also prompt. See, e.g., Arney, supra
note 28 (proposed regulations offered little guidance in fulfilling the purpose of the
ADA).
30See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990). With respect to equality of benefits in
employer-provided health insurance plans, "the miscellaneous provisions set forth in
Title V of the ADA relating to insurance muddy the waters." Brian D. Shannon, Paving
the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good
1997-981
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Even though there is an enormous number of individuals with mental
disabilities, there is little legislative history discussing them, and
negligible guidance within the Act itself ... Employers-most of
whom are relatively unfamiliar with mental disabilities-now face the
task of avoiding discrimination and engaging in reasonable
accommodation of individuals with mental disabilities.
31
As it has been interpreted by the courts, it has become evident that the ADA
has been ineffective in eliminating discrimination against those with mental
illness in the area of insurance and disability benefits.32
Of particular interest are Titles I, III and V of the ADA.33 Title I prohibits
discrimination against disabled individuals in employment settings.34 It is
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
has promulgated regulations, interpretive guidance and technical assistance
manuals to accomplish that task. Title III prohibits discrimination against
disabled individuals by public accommodations.35 It is enforced by the
Department of Justice which also has issued regulations and technical
assistance manuals. Title V contains miscellaneous provisions related to
insurance that apply to Title I and Title 111.36
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Title I of the ADA specifically incorporates the powers, remedies, and
procedures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.37 Title VII's purpose of
eliminating discrimination in employment is very similar to the purpose of the
ADA. Both are intended to eliminate discrimination against individuals. The
two Acts have language and terms in common.38 It is generally held that Title
I ADA claimants must exhaust Title VII administrative remedies before filing
Intentions? 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 63, 79 (1997) [hereinafter Shannon, Parity in Health
Insurance].
3 1Edwards, supra note 29, at 347.
32 See, e.g., Shannon, Parity in Health Insurance, supra note 30.
33The ADA contains five titles. Title II prohibits discrimination against disabled
individuals by public services. Title IV is related to telecommunications services for
hearing impaired individuals.
3442 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
35 See id. § 12181.
36 See id. § 12201. Various sections of Title V also apply to Titles II and IV of the ADA.
37 See id. § 12117.
38 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1532-34 (1996)
(Anderson, J., dissenting) (The Title VII interpretation of the term "employee" should
apply to Title I claims).
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a complaint.39 These connections between Title VII and Title I of the ADA have
led to broad reliance on Title VII cases in interpreting terms used in Title 1.40
C. Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act of 197341 was intended to "develop and implement,
through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity,
comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and
independent living for individuals with handicaps in order to maximize their
employability, independence, and integration into the workplace and the
community."42 Section 504 prohibits discrimination against disabled persons
who are employed in programs which receive federal funds.43 While the
success of the Rehabilitation Act in achieving these goals has been described
39The procedure is summarized:
Individuals seeking redress under Title I of the ADA are required to
bring actions through the equal employment opportunity commission
administrative complaint resolution procedures. The EEOC will first
attempt conciliation after a complaint has been investigated. Only after
conciliation has failed will the EEOC pursue a civil action through the
courts. The EEOC may also provide the complainant with a "letter of
right to sue." Only after administrative remedies through the EEOC
have been exhausted may the complainant seek redress in the courts.
LAURA F. RommSIN, DISABILITY LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 198 (1995).
40 For example, there has been debate whether Title VII standards should be used to
determine whether discrimination has been established under Title I. See McFadden,
supra note 25. McFadden argues that application of Title VII standards would result in
unintended expansion of liability under the ADA.
Title VII is an absolute ban on discrimination, with no provisions on
insurance and no cost-justification test. The ADA has a specific provi-
sion on insurance and specifically allows cost-justification though its
business necessity and undue burden defenses. In addition, a complete
ban on statistical extrapolation in the manner of Title VII would fun-
damentally alter the nature of insurance or benefit administration.
The ADA cannot be interpreted to permit these consequences, given
both section 501(c) and the cost-justification test. Thus, the Title VII
standard cannot be the standard of review for the ADA.
Id. at 495.
41The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (amends several
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
4229 U.S.C. § 701 (1981). A summary of the legislative history of the Rehabilitation
Act can be found in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985).
43A detailed and interesting history of federal disability law, including the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, is recounted in
Drimmer, supra note 28.
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as "less than spectacular,' 44 it is recognized as the first step in guaranteeing the
civil rights of disabled employees.45
The Rehabilitation Act is important to an understanding of the ADA for at
least two reasons. First, the legislative history of the ADA shows that the
drafters expected the Rehabilitation Act to inform understanding of the ADA.
It also shows that the ADA was intended to remedy the Rehabilitation Act's
failure to address the problems of persons with a disability.46 Consequently,
sections of the ADA reflect or copy sections of the Rehabilitation Act. For
example Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in employment,
incorporates the concepts of qualified individuals with disabilities and of
undue hardship which were developed under the Rehabilitation Act. Some
degree of accommodation of qualified disabled employees, limited by financial
hardship on the employer, is required by both the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA. The Rehabilitation Act is enforced by the Department of Health and
Human Services, which has promulgated regulations interpreting the Act.
These regulations influenced the EEOC when it developed regulations for Title
I of the ADA. 47 Regulations interpreting Title III refer directly to the
Rehabilitation Act, stating that the ADA is not to be construed to apply a lesser
44 Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of The
Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARv. L. REv. 997 (1984). The author
of this note attributes the failing to be the Act's delegation of
responsibility for choice [to] courts and administrative agencies [leav-
ing] them to make ad hoc selections from among competing concep-
tions of discrimination... As a result of this congressional default,
handicapped persons and their actual or potential employers remain
without meaningful guidelines for interaction. In addition, by convey-
ing the false impression that it addresses the issues, the statute defuses
agitation and inhibits political debate.
Id. at 997.
45 0ne commentator elaborates upon the relationship between the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA:
The drafters of the ADA recognized the need for a more comprehen-
sive bill to prohibit discrimination in all areas of life and to send a clear
message that this discrimination was no longer acceptable. A simple
amendment of the Rehabilitation Act could not suffice, given the number
of arenas to be addressed. But the logic and language of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, which had been tested and interpreted by the courts and which
was effective in ending some discrimination against the disabled, pro-
vided excellent building blocks. The disabled community also believed
that codifying the logic of the Rehabilitation Act and the agency-created
cost-justification test in the ADA insured the gains made as a result of
the Rehabilitation Act would not be lost or called into question.
McFadden, supra note 25, at 497.
46 Drimmer, supra note 28.
47 Arney, supra note 28, at 526 n.34.
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standard than the earlier Act, and that the ADA does not affect the obligations
imposed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.48
Second, cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act have been relied upon
as authority for cases decided under the ADA. Perhaps the most important
Rehabilitation Act decision, for purposes of the issues considered in this article,
is Alexander v. Choate,49 which reversed a decision by the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth
Circuit had held that Tennessee's modification of Medicaid benefits, that
reduced the number of inpatient hospital days to be paid each year, was a
violation of the Rehabilitation Act because the modification would have a
disparate impact on disabled persons. The modification would have hurt
handicapped hospital users more than nonhandicapped users.50 The United
States Supreme Court rejected both the argument that the change was
discriminatory because it would have a disproportionate effect on the
handicapped and the argument that any annual limitation would be
discriminatory because it would be likely to disproportionately effect the
handicapped.
While under some circumstances disparate impact might result in violation
of the Rehabilitation Act, not every disparate impact is a violation. The
Supreme Court reasoned that:
The new limitation does not invoke criteria that have a particular
exclusionary effect on the handicapped; the reduction, neutral on its
face, does not distinguish between those whose coverage will be
reduced and those whose coverage will not on the basis of any test,
judgment, or trait that the handicapped as a class are less capable of
meeting or less likely of having.
5 1
In Alexander, the Court noted that most discrimination against the
handicapped was not intentional, but the result of neglect. "[M]uch of the
conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would
be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe only
conduct fueled by discriminatory intent."52 The Court also discussed the issue
of access of Tennessee Medicaid patients to medical care. It found that
"[Niothing in the record suggests that the handicapped in Tennessee will be
unable to benefit meaningfully from the coverage they will receive under the
14-day rule. . . .The reduction in inpatient coverage will leave both
4828 C.F.R. § 36.102 (1991).
49469 U.S. 287 (1985).
50
"Statistical evidence.., indicated that in the 1979-1980 fiscal year, 27.4% of all
handicapped users of hospital services who received Medicaid required more than 14
days of care, while only 7.8% of nonhandicapped users required more than 14 days of
inpatient care." Id. at 290.
51 d. at 302.
52 d. at 296-97.
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handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users with identical and effective
hospital services."53 The Court emphasized that:
To conclude otherwise would be to find that the Rehabilitation Act
requires States to view certain illnesses, i.e., those particularly affecting
the handicapped, as more important than others and more worthy of
cure through government subsidization. Nothing in the legislative
history of the Act supports such a conclusion.
54
This idea-that a rule or contract term does not amount to unlawful
discrimination if it affects disabled and non-disabled persons equally-has
been important in those ADA cases in which a plaintiff has been able to reach
the merits of the discrimination claim.
D. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)55 was
enacted to protect employees' rights to employer-provided pension plans and
welfare benefit plans by requiring uniformity in the administration of benefit
plans. While pension plans are comprehensively regulated under ERISA, "only
the reporting, disclosure, fiduciary duty, and continuation of coverage rules
apply to health plans."56 A significant feature of ERISA is a broad preemption
clause 57 which preempts all state law insofar as it relates to employee benefit
plans, including state tort law, which is often favorable to disabled claimants.58
531d. at 302.
54 Choate, 469 U.S. at 303-04.
5529 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
56Roxella T. Cavazos, The Application of ERISA and the ADA to Disability-Based
Distinctions in Health Insurance, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 1045, 1046 (1995).
5729 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974).
58[B]ecause ERISA exclusively governs almost any claim relating to an
employee benefit plan, workers are often denied the chance to seek
relief under more protective state, and in some cases, even federal,
laws. Preemption of pension issues makes sense, since states have no
clearly stated public policy interest in the development and protection
of deferred compensation. But wrongful discharge and discrimination
issues have become matters of great interest and mature reflection by
state courts and legislatures. The Congressional goal of having a uniform
body of law relating to those issues should not obviate the rights states
have given to their citizens.
Lorraine Schmall, Toward Full Participation and Protection of the Worker with Illness: The
Failure of Federal Health Law After McGann v. H & H Music Co., 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
781, 787 (1994).
See also, Robert L. Roth, Recent Developments Concerning the Effect of ERISA
Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan Administrators, Managed
Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents, 8 HEALTH LAW. No. 7 at 3 (1996); David Henry
Sculnick, HMO Liability and ERISA Preemption for Medical Malpractice, 8 HEALTH LAW.
No. 7 at 8 (1996).
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ERISAhas generally been applied to limit remedies available to employees who
have been wrongly denied benefits due under an employer-provided plan.
Thus, extra-contractual damages such as pain and suffering or punitive
damages are not available. 59
ERISA does not regulate the content of health or disability plans, though it
does prohibit discrimination in employee benefit plans. Its impact on health or
disability plans is limited to providing a cause of action based on retaliation
against the employee for exercising his rights to the benefit or for wrongful
denial of benefits under the terms of the plan.
Many commentators believe that ERISA, which was intended to be a
pro-employee measure, has become a tool through which employers have
successfully limited employees' access to courts and to meaningful remedies,
especially in the area of denial of health care benefits. 60 Insofar as the ADA was
intended as a modest cure for this result, failure was predicted. 6 1
59See cases collected at Robert Armand Perez, ERISA Preemption: Denying Employees'
Rights to Benefits, TRIAL, May 1997, at 72, 76 n.34.
Writing on the Employees Retirement Income Security Act has been voluminous.
One issue which has produced numerous articles tangentially related to the subject of
this article is the effect of ERISA on the liability of health insurers for injuries that result
from failure to provide health insurance coverage pursuant to contract. See, e.g., L. Frank
Coan, Jr., You Can't Get Therefrom Here--Questioning the Erosion of ERISA Preemption in
Medical Malpractice Actions Against HMOS, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023 (1996); Laurie Dechery,
Note, Prefrrential Treatment or Discriminatory Standards: Do Employer-Provided Insurance
Plans Violate Title VII When They Exclude Treatment for Breast Cancer? 80 MINN. L. REV.
945 (1996); Jack E. Morris, Small Employers and Group Health Insurance: Should ERISA
Apply? 52 LA. L. REv. 971 (1992); John M. Morrison, ERISA and the Loss ofJust Remedies,
TRIAL, Mar. 1995, at 18; Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health
Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1674 (1994); Linda A. Way, Protecting Medical Malpractice Claims
Against ERISA Preemption, TRIAL, Mar. 1997, at 34; F. Christopher Wethly, New York
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: Vicarious
Liability Malpractice Claims Against Managed Care Organizations Escaping ERISA's Grasp,
37 B.C. L. REV. 813 (1996); Denise S. Wolf, Who Should Payfor "Experimental" Treatments?
Breast Cancer Patients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2029 (1995).
60 Workers who rely on health benefits offered by their employers have
discovered they are often protected only until they get sick.. .[T]he
safeguards the drafters incorporated into ERISA have eroded over the
past 18 years through a series of Federal court decisions. Today's workers
... actually have fewer rights to their benefits than they had prior to the
enactment of ERISA.
Butler, supra note 24, at 1197 (citing 138 CONG. REC. E3049 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992)
(statement of Rep. Hughes)).
"ERISA has been less successful in dealing with . . . medical benefit
plans.. .. [F]ederal courts are fashioning rules that allow employers to reduce or
terminate health benefits to employees when the employees need these benefits the
most: after they have been diagnosed with a costly disease... "Id.
See also, Morrison, supra note 59. But see Flannery, supra note 11.
6 1See generally Flannery, supra note 11; Schmall, supra note 58; Butler, supra note 24.
1997-98]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
ERISA is implicated in the matters raised by this article in the following
ways. First, in the typical case proposed in Section II of this article, an employee
who is mentally disabled is denied long-term disability benefits equivalent to
those received by employees with physical disabilities. In a suit to secure equal
benefits, the employee may claim intentional or negligent infliction of mental
distress. Such claims are state tort claims related to an employee benefit plan
and are thus preempted by ERISA. These claims are dismissed by the courts or
even by the employee.
A second way ERISAis implicated is that sometimes the aggrieved employee
claims that his disability has been wrongly classified as a mental disability (for
which benefits are paid for only a limited period) when it should properly be
classified as physical disability (for which benefits are paid until age 65). The
employee here asserts the claim that the plan administrator wrongly denied
him benefits to which he was entitled. While wrongful denial of benefits is a
claim authorized by ERISA,62 if the terms of the employee benefit plan retain
discretion in the administrator to make determinations of eligibility for
benefits, the denial of eligibility will not be overturned unless the
administrator's decision is arbitrary and capricious.63 This high standard of
review may be insurmountable by the employee.
A third way ERISA is implicated in the ADA is by possible analogy to the
ERISA case, McGann v. H & H Music Co.64 McGann was an employee of the
defendant and received health insurance benefits as a benefit of employment.
The plan provided a one million dollar limitation on benefits for all illnesses.
McGann contracted AIDS and filed claims for benefits. Thereafter, his employer
modified the benefit plan to place a five thousand dollar limit on AIDS claims
while maintaining the million dollar maximum lifetime benefit for other
serious illnesses. McGann filed a complaint under Section 510 of ERISA which
makes it unlawful to "discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan,. . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any
right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan."65 Section
510 requires the employee to prove the employer had a specific intent to
deprive him of the benefits which he claims.
The Fifth Circuit held that the record failed to show that McGann's employer
was motivated other than by a desire to maintain financial stability The court
found that there was nothing to show a specific intent to discriminate against
McGann, even though McGann was the only employee with AIDS at the time
6229 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
63 FirestoneTire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (holding ERISA wrongful
denial of benefits claim will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard if the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
whether benefits are due under the plan).
64946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
6529 U.S.C. § 1140.
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of the plan's modification. The employer's modification of the benefit plan was
not discriminatory because the limitation it imposed affected all employees
equally. All employees-those who already had contracted AIDS and those
who in the future could contract AIDS-were subject to the five thousand
dollar cap on AIDS-related expenses.
McGann received extensive critical commentary,66 yet has been "universally
adopted as the definitive interpretation of the antidiscrimination provision"67
in ERISA. Thus, McGann approved the concept of disparity of benefits for
certain large classes of disabled individuals.
McGann demonstrates that, prior to the effective date of the ADA, the
law governing self-funded group health insurance freely permitted
sharp distinctions in coverage with no enforcement of a fair
discrimination principle (the McGann court regarded as insignificant
the fact that catastrophic illnesses other than AIDS continued to be
covered).... 68
It is unclear whether McGann is overruled by the ADA, or whether Title V,
which countenances risk classification in insurance benefits that is not a
subterfuge, endorses it.69 "Unfortunately, the Baroque structure of the ADA in
this regard precludes a definite answer."70 The issue has important implications
to those with mental illnesses whose long-term disability insurance provides
inferior benefits for mental illness.
66See, e.g., Butler, supra note 24. ("As McGann illustrates, ERISA has become a
pro-employer statute that provides little, if any, protection from reliance on illusory
benefits to the approximately 150 million people covered by ERISA health benefit plans."
Id. at 1227). See also Schmall, supra note 58.
67John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 311,351 (1997).
68Id.
69 0ne commentator reasons:
Had the ADA been drafted without section 501(c), the answer would
have been clear: the treatment suffered by McGann constituted dis-
parate treatment, "because of a disability," in the "terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." Therefore, McGann would be over-
ruled. Had section 501(c) been included, but without the final clause
forbidding its use "as a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of Title I,
the result would have been the opposite (McGann is upheld), but
equally clear. Under these circumstances, section 501(c)(3) would
have created a safe harbor for the ERISA-insulated, unreviewable
risk segmentation at issue in McGann. The inclusion of the final
clause in section 501(c), prohibiting "subterfuge," however, leaves
the issue unsettled.
Id. at 353-54.
701d. at 353.
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E. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 71 prohibits
discrimination "[a]gainst any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, condition or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age.' 72 Both the ADEA and the ADA apply to employee benefit plans.73 Both
prohibit subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.74 Both Acts allow an
employer to use actuarial defenses to justify disparate treatment in health
benefits.75
The meaning of the term subterfuge under the ADEA was interpreted in
Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts.76 In that case, the state
retirement system provided lower benefits for workers who were older than
sixty years who retired due to a disability than it provided for workers who
were older than sixty who retired due to a disability. Plaintiff and the EEOC
claimed that the distinction violated the ADEA.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the
employee could not show the specific intent required to prove an illegal
subterfuge because, at least in part, the benefit standards were in place before
the enactment of the ADEA. 77 Betts also affirmed the holding in United Air Lines
v. McMann,78 an earlier ADEA case, which defined subterfuge as "[a] scheme,
7129 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
7229 U.S.C. § 623(a).
73Compare, in the ADEA 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(1), and in the ADA 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(2) (1990).
74 See ADEA subterfuge provision at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) and ADA subterfuge
provision at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
7529 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1)(1988). "The ADEA allows an employer to justify
differentiation in health benefits that correspond to age if the lower benefits are
mandated by, and proportional to, the greater costs of providing such benefits to older
workers." Schmall, supra note 58, at 838.
76492 U.S. 158 (1989).
77The portion of the Betts decision which held that a plan is a subterfuge only if
adopted after the passage of ADEA and purposefully adopted with intent to
discriminate against workers because of age in a non-benefit aspect of the employment
relationship, was overturned by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 (1990) Congress
[D]isplayed its outrage with the Betts decision by enacting the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1988 ... [which] was created to era-
dicate the age discrimination in employee benefits. The OWBPA over-
turned Betts by eliminating the use of the term "subterfuge." It also
specified that the ADEA's prohibition against age discrimination ex-
tended to all employee benefits and benefit plans.
Bilimoria, supra note 28, at 1078.
78434 U.S. 192 (1977).
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plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.' 79 Thus, under the ADEA, the term
subterfuge has consistently been given its dictionary definition by the Supreme
Court, which requires plaintiff to prove intent.80
Whether Betts should govern subterfuge analysis in ADA cases involving
disparate insurance benefits is a matter of contention.
F. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 81
generally became effective for insurance plan years beginning on or after July
1,1997.82 The HIPAAwas enacted to assure continuity and portability of health
insurance. It applies to employer-provided or individually obtained group
health insurance plans83 and to employer-sponsored self-insured plans
covered by ERISA.84 The Act governs health insurance plans that are made
available as a benefit of employment or that are obtained individually.85 It
provides for the continued applicability of state law to the extent state law is
consistent with the Act's substantive requirements. 86 Enforcement of the Act
is authorized to proceed under state law.87
In general, the HIPAA prohibits discrimination against individual
participants and beneficiaries who wish to enroll in a health insurance plan
and/or to renew coverage under a plan when based on health status. The
HIPAA places limits on exclusions based on preexisting conditions and
791d. at 203.
80 A similar specific intent requirement was later required in an ERISA case, McGann
v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
81 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). This Act amended several existing
statutes, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Public
Health Services Act, and the Internal Revenue Code. For purposes of this article,
reference will be to amendments to the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 30 0gg-300gg-4 (1996).
82There are some variations on the effective date of the various parts of the Act. For
example: "In general, HIPAA's requirements become effective for plan years beginning
on or after July 1, 1997. Thus, group health plans following a calendar year must begin
compliance with the PCE and nondiscrimination rules as of January 1, 1998." Gary M.
Ford & Mary Ann D. Edgar, Enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 23, 1997, at 242. "[Clollectively
bargained plans will not be subject to these provisions until the expiration of the
agreement as they were in force on the date of enactment of HIPAA." Roberta C. Watson,
Employer-Sponsored Health Plans Under Recent Health Insurance Reform Legislation,
ALI/ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 13, 1997, at 850.
8342 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (a).
8429 U.S.C. §§ 1181-85 (1996).
8542 U.S.C. § 300gg-11.
8642 U.S.C. § 3 00 gg-23.
8742 U.S.C. § 300gg-22.
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prohibits discrimination based on an individual's health status.88 The Act
provides that a group health plan may not establish rules, including continuing
eligibility, based on eight specified factors: [h]ealth status, medical condition
(including physical and mental illnesses), claims experience, receipt of health
care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, and
disability.89
The purpose of the HIPAA is limited to assuring continued access to
insurance. 90 It does not mandate the terms of the available insurance.91 While
the HIPAA forbids discrimination on the basis of physical or mental disability,
8842 U.S.C. § 300gg-1.
8942 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(a)(1).
90The HIPAA was primarily intended to provide a safety net to assure that
employees who moved from one employer-sponsored health care plan to another
employer-sponsored health care plan would not lose coverage due to restrictions on
preexisting conditions, waiting periods, etc. It was recognized that employees were
sometimes "captive" to their present employment position because the new position
would not cover treatment-in-progress or because the new position had lengthy waiting
periods during which the employee and his family were not covered by any health
insurance.
But under some circumstances, when an employee leaves one job but does not
enter a second that offers health coverage, the safety net envisioned by the HIPAA does
not materialize. Under HIPAA, States may allow insurance providers to create high-risk
pools for people with serious and expensive health problems. Because the premiums
for coverage within such pools are significantly greater in such cases, people are often
shut out of the private insurance market. Those who can afford the premiums sometimes
are offered only limited annual or lifetime benefits. Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Some States
Choose Weak Safety Net Under Portable Health-Insurance Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997,
at Cl.
The philosophy behind between two competing views of the proper organization
of insurance pools (risk-based or community based) and the consequences of each view
are set out in Jacobi, supra note 67. Jacobi's interesting article questions what is meant
by insurance: is it intended to be an exercise of mutual aid and social pooling or is it a
self-centered calculation of a person's protection of himself against loss?
9 1The HIPAA was enacted shortly after the failure of President Clinton's Health
Security Act of 1993, which was designed to ensure that all citizens had health care
coverage.
The [HIPAA's] less stirring design aims to discretely modify the compe-
titive marketplace for health insurance.... [by] ... thoughtful, if limited,
injection of regulation into the world of insurance underwriting.... it re-
quires the private insurance market to protect the interests of "poor risks,"
even when rational actuarial judgment would reject their membership in
insurance pools.... reflect[ing] a judgment that insurance markets must
be structured to enhance the broad availability of coverage.
Jacobi, supra note 67, at 366-67.
For a summary of the legislative history of the HIPAA see id. at 367 n.234. It appears
that while the portability provisions were generally supported, the largest debate over
social pooling concerned the Medical Savings Accounts authorized by the Act.
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it does not require particular benefits to be provided nor does it prohibit
limitations on the amount or nature of benefits provided. 92
The HIPAA is directed to health insurance. Disability income insurance is
specifically exempted from the requirements of the Act.93 Consequently, this
Act offers no relief for those who claim discrimination in the level of benefits
available as a result of disability.
Implementation of HIPAA has been difficult and is being met with
resistance. Resistance came from (1) state legislatures which failed to enact
enabling statutes; (2) concerns that the cost of insuring high risk individuals
would be prohibitive; (3) lack of cooperation among insurers; and (4) carriers
which were using a variety of pricing and marketing tactics to discourage
people from applying for the health coverage HIPAA was supposed to
provide.94
G. Mental Health Parity Act
The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA)95 became effective on January
1, 1998 and has a sunset provision date of September 30, 2001. The Act applies
to employer-provided health insurance benefits whether insured or
self-insured. 96 It does not apply to individually acquired health insurance
benefits97 and does not preempt state law insofar as state law provides for more
favorable coverage than that provided by the MHPA.98
9 2 The Act
shall not be construed--(A) to require a group health plan, or group health
insurance coverage, to provide particular benefits other than those provided
under the terms of such plan or coverage, or (B) to prevent such a plan or
coverage from establishing limitations or restrictions on the amount, level,
extent, or nature of the benefits or coverage for similarly situated indivi-
duals enrolled in the plan or coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(a)(2).
9342 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(c)(1)(A).
9 4 See, e.g., Clinton Threatens to Punish Health Plans that Violate Insurance Portability
Statute, 67 U.S.L.W. 2027 (July 14, 1998); Federal, State Regulators Tell Congress of Early
Snags in Implementing HIPAA, 66 U.S.L.W. 2201 (October 7, 1997).
9542 U.S.C. § 300gg-5. The legislative history of this act, including the timing and
nature of the compromises that led to its adoption, are recounted in Shannon, Parity in
Health Insurance, supra note 30. Shannon concludes that "[a]lthough the bill represents a
hard-fought victory for advocates for persons with mental illness, the final version is
just a start toward insurance equality." Id. at 102.
9642 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(b)(2).
97As a result, employers ultimately bear the costs associated with this aspect of health
care reform.
9842 U.S.C. § 300gg-23(a) (1996).
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The MHPA does not require mental health benefits to be offered by the
plan.99 The Act requires only that if mental health benefits are offered by the
benefit plan, the plan must not impose annual or lifetime caps on mental
benefits that are less than annual or lifetime caps on physical or surgical
benefits.1 00
The MHPA also does not attempt to regulate the terms and conditions under
which mental health benefits may be offered. For example, cost sharing or
limits on the number of visits or days of coverage are not affected by the
IPA.101 It has been noted that the MHPA
will have no impact on such common insurance practices as the
requirement of substantially higher deductibles and higher
99 (b) Construction: Nothing in this section shall be construed-
(1) as requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage
offered in connection with such a plan) to provide any mental
health benefits;
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(b)(1).
10 0The Act provides:
(a) In general
(1) Aggregate lifetime limits
In the case of a group health plan (or health insurance coverage
offered in connection with such a plan) that provides both medical
and surgical benefits and mental benefits-
(A) No Lifetime limit
If the plan or coverage does not include an aggregate lifetime
limit on substantially all medical and surgical benefits, the plan
or coverage may not impose any aggregate lifetime limit on
mental health benefits.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(a)(1)(A).
(2) Annual limits
(A) In the case of a group health plan (or health insurance
coverage offered in connection with such a plan) that provides both
medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits-
(B) If the plan or coverage does not include an annual limit on sub-
stantially all medical and surgical benefits, the plan may not impose
any annual on mental health benefits.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(a)(2)(A).
The MHPA elaborates what is to be done under circumstances where there are
annual or aggregate caps on all or some of the medical or surgical benefits. Generally,
in such circumstances, yet-to-be-enacted regulations will direct some kind of averaging.
101(b) Construction: Nothing in this section shall be construed-
(2) in the case of a group health plan (or health insurance coverage
offered in connection with such a plan) that provides mental health
benefits, as affecting the terms and conditions (including cost shar-
ing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and require-
ments relating to medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration,
or scope of mental health benefits under the plan or coverage, except
as specifically provided in subsection (a) of this section (in regard to
parity in the imposition of aggregate lifetime limits and annual limits
for mental health benefits).
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(b)(2).
[Vol. 12:205
TITLE I AND TITLE III OF THE ADA
co-payments to coverage for mental health benefits than for those
provided for other ailments. Employers and health plans can also
continue to consider managed care alternatives. Moreover, employers
and health plans can now set even higher deductibles or co-payments
as a means of controlling the new costs, or they could drop mental
health coverage altogether. These entities can also comply with the
new requirements, but then establish an aggregate limit for health and
mental health benefits that falls below the amount previously
authorized just for physical health. 102
Additionally, the MHPA provides exemptions from its requirements for
small employers 103 and for any employer under circumstances where the cost
of the plan increases one percent. 104 The Act does not indicate how this figure
should be computed. Thus, the impact of the Act on those with serious mental
illnesses is open to debate. 10 5 More to the point, the MHPA excepts disability
income insurance from its scope.106
102 Shannon, Parity in Health Insurance, supra note 30, at 102-03. It is possible to take a
cynical view of the consequences of the Act: it might have the effect that coverage for
physical illness will simply be reduced, or that insurers and employers will collude in
developing a policy that "complies with the new law, but which 'conveniently' includes
a price that is greater than one percent over previous charges. The employer could then
decline the coverage. Congress, however, clearly did not intend such collusion." Id. at
103.
103The MHPA does not apply in any year in which the provider is a small employer.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(c)(1). A small employer is one who employs more than two but less
than fifty employees in any year. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(e)(2). A similar exemption
appears in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
104
"This section shall not apply ... if the application of this section to such a plan...
results in an increase in the cost under the plan . . . of at least 1%" 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-5(c)(2).
105In the opinion of one author: "Despite the final bill's shortcomings, the Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996 represents a huge step forward in overcoming years of
discrimination against persons with mental illness.... And, even though the bill is
substantially narrower than originally conceived, it is 'significant-both symbolically and
financially-for those who suffer from mental illness." Shannon, Parity in Health
Insurance, supra note 30, at 103-04.
10642 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(c)(1)(A) states:
(c) Excepted benefits. For purposes of this subchapter, the term
"excepted benefits" means benefits under one or more (or any com-
bination thereof) of the following:
(1) Benefits not subject to requirements
(A) Coverage only for accident, or disability income insurance,
or any combination thereof.
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IV. BACKGROUND SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES
A. Prevalence of Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Long-Term
Disability Insurance
Most Americans who have private health insurance receive it as a benefit of
employment, 107 The nature of benefits received depends in part upon whether
the employee works for a government entity or for a large or small private
employer. In 1994, state and local governments provided health insurance as a
benefit of employment to 87% of full-time employees. 108 Of that 87%, 99%
received inpatient mental health care insurance and 97% received outpatient
mental health insurance. 109 In contrast, only 30% of government employees
received long-term disability insurance.11 0
Of full-time employees in medium and large private businesses, 82%
received health insurance as a benefit of employment. Mental health insurance
was provided to 80% of those employees.11 1 Long-term disability insurance
was received by only 41% of these employees." 2 Full-time employees in small
private businesses are less likely to have any of these forms of insurance: 66%
received health care benefits; 20% received long-term disability insurance.11 3
Employers are the principle source of non-government funded health
insurance. Unlike many other western countries, "only the United States relies
on a competitive private marketplace and voluntary coverage to provide health
insurance to the majority of its citizens."11 4 It has been suggested that one of
the reasons health insurance remains a private, profit-driven benefit, rather
than an individual right assured by government, lies in the lingering spirit of
107Employer-sponsored health insurance protects not only the person employed, but
his dependents as well. "In 1991, just over half of all workers (55 percent) were covered
directly by their own employer; all other employer-insured workers were covered only
by another worker's plan. Nationally, for every ten workers insured by their own
employer, another three were covered only as dependents." Deborah Chollet,
Employer-Based Health Insurance in a Changing Work Force, 1994 HEALTH AFF. 315, 316.
108U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996, 321 (116th
ed. 1996) (Table 505. State and Local Government-Employee Benefits: 1994).
1091d. Obviously, the statistic does not reflect the extent of the benefits. Just by contrast,
it is interesting to note that 88% of all employees received parking benefits.
110Id.
111U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996, 431 (116th
ed. 1996) (Table 671. Employee Benefits in Private Establishments: 1993 2nd 1994).
112Id.
1131d.
114Jacobi, supra note 67, at 315. "[Mlost non-elderly Americans obtain health insurance
from non-governmental sources, and a substantial percentage have no health insurance
at all." Id.
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rugged individualism that has informed so much of American law and
character.115
Although most non-elderly people who have health and disability insurance
receive it as a benefit of employment, there is no requirement that employers
provide such insurance. Some believe that to require employers to provide
health insurance would have unacceptable consequences such as high cost,
disproportionate financial burdens on small firms, and a possibly negative
impact on the labor market. 116 Consequently, though some proposed
legislation and commentators have explored the idea,117 there has been little
support for a legislative requirement that employers must provide health
insurance. On the other hand, the inadequacy of employer-sponsored
insurance to provide for disabled, mentally ill, or high-risk employees is
well-recognized and was an element in the debate over national health
insurance. 118 Legislation that requires certain terms to be included in health
insurance contracts as regulations of the insurance industry (rather than
regulations of employers) has been more common, both on the state and on the
federal level. Some states require insurers to provide certain terms. 119 A few
states require minimum mental health coverage. 120 But to the large extent that
employer-provided insurance falls within the scope of ERISA, such state
legislation is an ineffective means to assure minimum contract terms insofar as
it appears to be common for employers to self-insure for the purpose of
avoiding state insurance mandates.121
115
"Health insurance in America is an odd thing. We are imbued with rugged
individualism and a preference for voluntary action. In health insurance, this manifests
in the peculiar American interest in individual responsibility, an interest that coexists
uncomfortably with the underlying goal in insurance law to pool risk." Id. at 314.
1l6Richard G. Frank & Thomas G. McGuire, Mandating Employer Coverage of Mental
Health Care, 1990 HEALTH AFr. 31,32. On the other hand, "[r]equiring employers to insure
workers is . . . attractive to legislatures because it requires few or no direct public
expenditures. Costs of insurance for the working poor or near-poor are kept 'off budget,'
requiring no new taxes." Id.
Another result of mandating employers to provide employees with health
insurance that might be attractive to legislatures would be the shifting of treatment costs
from the state to the private sector. Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Risk Classification
After McGann: Managing Risk Efficiently in the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 59,
76 (1995).
117Frank & McGuire, supra note 116, at 32.
118Hylton, supra note 116.
119See, e.g., id. "All fifty states, to one extent or another, now regulate the terms of
group health insurance contracts. Some states demand maternity coverage. Others
require benefits for mental health problems, prosthetic devices, and alcohol and drug
treatment." Id. at 75 (omitted footnotes that collect citations to state statutes).
120See, e.g., id. at n.56 (collecting state citations).
121 See, e.g., id. at 77-88; Schmall, supra note 58, at 820-21.
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Recent federal legislation addresses the problem of inadequate insurance in
a piecemeal way.122 It is clear that, however gradually, federal legislation may
be accomplishing a modest degree of health care reform. 123
Notwithstanding recent legislation, the importance of the fact that most
Americans who have private, non-government provided health insurance
obtain it as a benefit of employment mustnot be overlooked. 124 Bothemployers
and insurers are bound by the values and ethics of commerce which are in
dramatic contrast to the values and ethics of medicine or health care.
125
Employers who select the terms of health and disability insurance for their
employees are setting national policy for the quality and scope of health care.
B. Nature of Long-Term Disability Insurance
Both health insurance and long-term disability insurance tend to provide
inferior coverage for mental conditions compared with physical conditions.
Health insurance contracts may place annual or lifetime limits on mental health
care. Disability contracts may provide benefits for only about two years for
mental disabilities but benefits until age 65 for physical disabilities.126
Health insurance and disability insurance serve different functions. Health
insurance is intended to cover expenses incurred as a result of illness or acci-
122Recent federal legislation intended to provide essential insurance coverage
includes the Family Medical Leave Act, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996,
and the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996.
123For example, it has been reported that President Clinton will endorse a "Consumer
Bill of Rights and Responsibilities" designed to improve the quality of health care.
Matters such as coverage caps and inequality of treatment between physical and mental
illness may be addressed. Clinton Is Poised to Endorse Prescription by Panel on How to
Improve Health Care, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1997 at B5.
124Jacobi, supra note 67, at 314.
125The conflict between the ethics of medicine and the ethics of the marketplace have
been thoughtfully explored. See Daniel W. Brock, Commentary: Implications of New
Physician Payment Methods for Access to Health Care and Physician Fidelity to Patients'
Interests, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 760 (1986); Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health
Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 708 (1986); Edward H. Hirshfeld, Should Third-Party Payors of Health
Care Services Disclose Cost Control Mechanisms to Potential Beneficiaries? 14 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 115 (1990); John E. Kralewski, et al., The Physician Rebellion, 316 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 339 (1987); MaxwellJ. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era ofScarce
Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat? 25 CONN. L. REv. 349 (1993); Laura Athens Mellas,
Adapting the Judicial Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims Against Physicians to Reflect
Medicare Cost Containment Measures, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 287 (1991); E. Haavi Morreim,
Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1719 (1987); Wendy E.
Parmet, The Impact of Health Insurance Reform on the Law Governing the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 268 JAMA 3468 (1992).
126See infra Parts V-VII.
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dental injury.127 While there are many types of contracts, most commonly
health insurance pays for expenses such as physician fees and surgical costs,
medical testing, prosthetic devices, therapeutic treatment, medications, and
costs of hospitalization. It has been pointed out that health insurance policies
are "policies of indemnity... [which] try only to place the insured in a position
similar to that which he had before the loss."128 Only actual expenses will be
paid. An insured who incurs no expenses receives no benefits. 129
Disability insurance was first developed in association with life insurance.
At that time, disability insurance was intended to assure that the premiums on
the life insurance policy would be paid. It was not intended to protect against
loss of wages in employment.130 The remnants of this history remain. When
disability insurance is provided as a benefit of employment, it protects an
insured employee from suffering an "economic death.' 131
Generally, disability insurance 132 is intended to protect the income of an
insured who has suffered a disabling illness or accident and can no longer
work.133 "IT]he purpose of disability insurance is to protect against... a loss
of earning capacity."134 Sometimes called income replacement insurance, 135 it
12 7 DARWIN B. CLOSE, LFE INSURANCE INCLUDING HEALTH AND DISABILITY INSURANCE
§ 10.2, at 157 (2d ed. 1987). Generally health insurance will cover losses incurred from
accidental death, and life insurance will cover losses incurred by natural death. Id.
1281d. § 10.3, at 161. "Health insurance affords indemnity for expense and loss of time
resulting from illness..." 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 4, at 76 (1993).
129Indeed, often only a portion of expenses will be paid, for several reasons. The
now-familiar concept of cost-containment is one; the problem of moral hazard is
another.
13015 RONALD A. ANDERSON & MARK S. RHODES, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAW § 53:40, at 76 (Rev. 2d ed. 1983).
1311 HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, 2d § 1.27, at 139 (1996).
132 The term disability is a term of art and includes many subcategories such as total
disability, and temporary, permanent, and partial disability. These terms are not of
particular consequence to this discussion, which presumes total disability.
133 1n that way, disability insurance has the same goal as unemployment insurance.
However, "[w]hile unemployment insurance protects against loss of
income/employment due to a wide variety of causes, disability protects only against
such losses that are attributable to poor health." Lee Russ & Thomas F. Segalla,
Unemployment and Disability Ins., in COUCH ON INS., § 165, Folio Infobase (CD ROM
12-96).
13444 C.J.S. Insurance § 4 at 76-77 (1993).
135CLOSE, supra note 127, § 1.3, at 168-69. It can also be called Accident and Sickness,
Accident and Health or Disability Income Insurance.
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generally pays the insured a proportion of the insured's net income. 136 Rather
than easing the burden of excess medically related expenses, "[plolicies
providing total and permanent disability benefits are designed to provide a
substitute for earnings when the insured is deprived of capacity to earn by
bodily disease or injury."137 Disability insurance is not tied to the incurring of
additional expenses as a result of illness. Rather, it is tied to interruption of
wages from employment. 138 "[TIotal disability in an occupation is to be
measured by the absence of an individual earning capacity rather than the
absence of income." 139 To assure continuation of income most disability
payments pay over a period of years rather than in a lump sum, 140 usually until
age 65, when Social Security benefits generally become available. 141
There are two types of disability policies: occupational disability policies
and general disability policies. Occupational disability policies protect the
insured against inability to continue in the occupation in which he was
employed at the time the policy was issued. General disability policies protect
the insured against inability to continue in any occupation.142 Notably, "[tiotal
disability does not mean total absolute helplessness but rather ... [an] infirmity
or disability [that] renders the person unable to perform substantially all the
material acts of an occupation which his age, training, experience and physical
condition would suit him for .... "143 For this reason, disability insurance may
136Typically, an insured receives between sixty-six and eighty percent of his take
home pay. To pay one hundred percent would overcompensate the insured because he
is no longer incurring the expenses of participating in the workforce (work clothes,
transportation costs, etc.) and is thought to increase the moral hazard. See id. § 11.8, at
214.
13715 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note 130, § 53:40, at 75.
138Again, the details of this point are numerous. A person may be totally disabled
even if he continues to work due to a heroic constitution or out of economic necessity.
Taking a less demanding employment or a part-time position does not necessarily
disqualify one for disability benefits. Id. "[T]he term 'total disability' as used in general
disability clauses is a relative one depending in a large measure upon the character of
the occupation or employment and the capabilities of the insured..." Id. § 53:51 at 88.
1391C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrIcE § 691
at 357-58 (1981).
140HOLMES, supra note 131, § 1.27, at 139 (1996).
14lid. at 140.
1421d. at 142. Often occupational disability policies will have a fixed term, after which
the insured must demonstrate general disability. Id. Some courts do not recognize these
differences and will construe even a general disability policy to be an occupational
disability policy. Id. at 143.
14315 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note 130, § 53:40 at 76. It is a reasonable person test:
The test of total disability is satisfied when the circumstances are such
that a reasonable man would recognize that he should not engage in
a certain activity even though he literally is not physically unable to do
so. In other words, total disability does not mean absolute physical in-
ability to transact any kind of business pertaining to one's occupation,
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pay an insured even if the insured has substantial investment income or is
fabulously well-off and incurs no decrease in his standard of living as a result
of his disability. A disability may be deemed permanent, and benefits paid,
even if there is a possibility that the condition may be cured or improved. "ITIhe
fact of recovery, under this view, does not destroy the 'permanent' character of
the disability....,144 Instead, "it is sufficient under such clauses that total
disability shall have been uninterrupted for the period of time stipulated in the
policy... " and that it appears it will continue for an indeterminate time.145
Courts will take into account a variety of factors such as the insured's
occupation, age, education, and skills in order to determine whether he is
disabled. This type of insurance may present the problem of adverse selection
as well as a moral hazard for dissembling a serious injury146
Both health insurance and disability insurance can be obtained through
group insurance.147 Employers often obtain group insurance for their
employees. Generally, termination of employment will terminate the insurance
coverage. 148 The phrase termination of employment can be ambiguous. 149 For
example, "[1]eaving employment after an injury does not destroy the
but rather that there is a total disability if the insured's injuries are such
that common care and prudence require him to desist from his business
or occupation in order to effectuate a cure..."
Id. at § 53:118, at 165.
Obviously, the terms of the insurance contract control. Some provide benefits only
if the insured in unable to engage in any gainful occupation, in which case the insured
"must be disabled from doing and performing the substantial features of any gainful
occupation within the range of his mental and educational capacity, with the skill and
accuracy usual to any such occupation." Id. at § 53:52, at 90. Some states have statutes
which regulate or prohibit the terms of disability contracts.
1441d. at § 53:116, at 163.
14 51d. at 164. "[B]ut if recovery is reasonably certain after a fairly definite time, the
disability is not permanent." Id.
146HOLMES, supra note 131, § 1.27, at 138. The adverse selection problem occurs when
those who are aware of their tendency to particular illnesses or hazards elect to purchase
insurance while those in good health or relatively safe employment do not. The risk pool
thus is unbalanced with those prone to making claims. The moral hazard problem is
presented when the presence of insurance encourages the insured to take less care in
preventing or avoiding an insured loss than he would be in the absence of insurance.
14 7CLOSE, supra note 127, § 11.8, at 157.
14 8Federal law has extended the availability of group heath insurance through the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68
(1986).
149While it is clear that "[e]mployment ceases and group insurance is terminated when
the department in which the insured worker is discontinued, his name stricken from
the payroll, notice thereof given to the insurer, and the policy canceled," 19 ANDERSON
& RHODES, supra note 130, § 82:101, at 848, other events do not have such clear
consequences.
The related policy terms cease to be employed, while in the employ, and cease to
work, are also ambiguous. Id. at § 82:97, at 843-46.
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employee's rights under a group policy, 150 and group insurance "[cloverage
is not necessarily terminated by an inability to perform the task for which the
employee was hired."151 Temporary layoffs may or may not terminate the
insurance, depending upon the terms of the policy. Retirement is ordinarily
regarded as a termination of employment and of coverage. 152 On the other
hand, "[w]here termination of coverage under a group policy rests on cessation
of the status of employee, coverage does not terminate where the cessation is
due to permanent and total disability rendering a return to work impossible,
so long as the cessation of work was not voluntary."l5 3 It is clear that
"[tiermination of employment after rights have vested under a group policy
has no effect upon the insurer's liability."154
C. Prevalence of Mental Illness and Impact of Health and Disability Insurance
Restrictions on Treatment
Statistics on the prevalence of mental illness have been variously reported.
One commentator found that 15% of the American population has mental or
substance abuse disorders.155 Another determined that:
At any given time, one percent of the population of the United States
is being treated for severe mental illness. Schizophrenia affects from
one-half to one percent of the population of the United States during
any six-month period, and has a lifetime prevalence of nearly two
percent. The lifetime prevalence of mood disorders, such as bipolar
affective disorder, is around nine percent .... [Olver ten million
Americans will suffer some form of significant depression disorder at
least once in their lives. Although the majority of even the most severe
150 1d. § 82:100, at 848.
15 1 Id. § 82:104, at 851.
1521d. § 82:112, at 857.
15319 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note 130, § 82:115, at 859.
154Id. § 82:116, at 859.
So, a provision in a group policy which automatically cancels total disability
insurance on termination of employment precludes recovery of
benefits for total disability occurring after the termination of
employment, although the injury resulting in total disablement
was sustained before, but it does not preclude full recovery of
benefits where the termination of employment is after total dis-
ability has occurred.
46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1186 at 629 (1993).
155Edwards, supra note 29, at 392. This figure would seem to make the prospect of
providing insurance against mental illness prohibitively expensive and justify inferior
mental health coverage. However, the figure includes minor or temporary emotional
problems along with serious mental illnesses and organic brain diseases. It is the latter
which cause long-term disability and is the focus of this article. As the text indicates, the
incidence of serious mental illnesses is much lower than that of lesser problems.
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mental illnesses can be treated with some degree of success, as few as
one fifth of those with mental disorders actually receive care.
156
Whether medical care is received for mental illness depends to a large degree
on whether the person affected is covered by health insurance. In 1993, 16.8%
of non-elderly Americans had no health insurance. The number of Americans
who were without health care for at least one month during a 28 month period
between 1992 and 1994 was 27%, or 66 million people.' 57 Among those who
were without health care, the mentally ill were "disproportionately
represented."158 One figure places the number of uninsured mentally ill
persons at 300,000.159
Whether a person under sixty-five has health insurance is largely dependant
upon he whether he is employed. 160 While a person with a serious mental
illness often cannot work, even those who can work often find that health
insurance is not provided as a benefit of employment.161 A person who is
employed and receives health benefits usually finds that health coverage for
mental illness has many more restrictions and limitations than those for
physical illness.162 Typically, health insurance policies cover shorter durations
of hospitalization, impose lower caps on covered expenses, pay for fewer
outpatient visits per year, require larger copayments, and impose low annual
or lifetime maximum coverage. 163 It has been determined that 90% of
employer-provided health care plans impose severe limits on mental health
plans. 164
Policies that allow 365 days in-patient care for physical illness allow
only 45 days for in-patient psychiatric care. Policies that provide a
lifetime cap of $1 million for physical care have a $50,000 cap for mental
156Wayne Edward Ramage, Comment, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for
Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REv. 951, 953 (1992).
157Jacobi, supra note 67, at 315 n.16 (people over 65 are generally covered by
Medicare).
158Ramage, supra note 156, at 956.
1591d. (citing Agnes Rupp, Underinsurance for Severe Mental Illness, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 402 n.10 (1991)).
160Jacobi, supra note 67, at 315 n.16. (A large percentage of non-elderly persons who
have insurance receive it as a benefit of employment. "In 1993 61.1% of non-elderly
Americans were covered by employment-based health insurance." Id.
161Ramage, supra note 156, at 957. ("Employment . .. does not guarantee health
insurance coverage since approximately three quarters of the uninsured are employed
or are the dependents of employed persons.")
162See Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too-The Casefor Equal Insurance Coverage
for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 365,370-75 (1993) (hereinafter Shannon, The
Brain Gets Sick Too).
163 Ramage, supra note 156, at 957.
164Shannon, Parity in Health Insurance, supra note 30, at 68.
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illness. Policies providing unlimited outpatient visits for physical care
allow only 20 outpatient visits for mental illnesses.
165
Several interrelated explanations have been given for the disparate coverage
of mental illness and physical illness in employer-provided health insurance
contracts. There is a perception that successful treatment of mental illness is
difficult to measure. Also, it is thought that inferior insurance coverage for
mental illnesses is one area in which cost containment is needed because of the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, and the perception of the
vagueness of success of treatment of mental illnesses.
The problem of adverse selection is that those with "superior knowledge of
their-own circumstances switch in and out of plans in anticipation of particular
needs,' 166 leading to a distorted risk pool.167 Those who know in advance of
their need for such coverage may disproportionately enroll in a plan that
provides better mental care coverage. The result is an increase in costs beyond
levels that would normally be predicted.168 One consequence of this might be
that only those who do not need the coverage can afford it.
Studies have shown that demand for mental health services increases with
the availability of insurance and decreases with increased cost-sharing.169
165 1d. quoting 142 CONG. REc. 53591 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
166 ClarkC. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to Accept
Health Care Rationing Tomorrow? 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1755, 1774 n.45 (1992).
167 Adverse selection is an important problem from the perspective of
social risk spreading and increased access to coverage for three
reasons. First, the tendency of those who perceive themselves to be
low-risk to refuse to buy coverage is counter to the goal of full cov-
erage. Second it is argued that adverse selection can destabilize an
insurance market, leading to a "death spiral" of premiums. Third,
depending on the validity of the first two concerns, adverse selection
may suggest that the purchase of health insurance should be man-
dated-a politically problematic conclusion.
Jacobi, supra note 67, at 387-88.
168 [P]rivate firms may underprovide coverage for conditions like
mental illness. One reason for insufficient coverage arises from
insurers' fear of adverse selection. The insurers are concerned
that any plan offering better protection against mental health care
costs may attract a disproportionate number of persons who anticipate
using mental health care. Adverse selection will increase costs beyond
the initially predicted levels and make it difficult to price the policy.
Jeffrey Rubin, Paying for Care: Legal Developments in the Financing of Mental Health
Services, 28 Hous. L. REV. 143, 157 (1991).
169 Richard G. Frank &Thomas G. McGuire, A Review of Studies of the Impact of Insurance
on the Demand and Utilization of Specialty Mental Health Services, HEALTH SERv. REs. 21:2,
241 at 245 (June 1986, Part II); Carl A. Taube, The Economics of Mental Health Services
through 1986: Empirical Studies, Administration and Pol'y in MENTAL HEALTH 16:3, 115
(Spring, 1989) (collecting studies conducted to determine whether persons with mental
illnesses could predict their future needs for care.)
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Whether this means that the availability of insurance encourages treatment of
minor conditions or whether it means that the availability of insurance allows
people who are in genuine need of treatment to obtain it is not clearly
understood.170 On the other hand, what should be understood is that treatment
required by a person with a serious mental illness or organic brain disease
cannot be viewed as optional. Treatment in such a case can mean the difference
between a productive life and death.171 Adverse selection and resulting
uncontrollable costs is perhaps a more serious concern when the insured can
foresee a need for short-term care for minor emotional problems. It is difficult
to conceptualize the problem of adverse selection for one stricken by a
neurobiological disorder. Unfortunately, both types of care are classified as
mental illness subject to limited insurance coverage.172
The moral hazard problem occurs where insured individuals overuse
medical services or have no incentive to recover from illness when coverage is
too broadly available. 173 The moral hazard concern is particularly powerful in
regard to treatment for mental illness. "Potential insurers of mental health care
are especially concerned with moral hazard because ... many of the symptoms
of mental illness are part of a continuum with everyday forms of distress;
... [and] some forms of treatment-especially psychotherapy-seem similar to
non-professional forms of human support and interaction."174
170Frank & McGuire, supra note 169, at 245. Part of the problem in understanding the
consequences of insurance is the degree to which the mental health care provider may
influence the patient's increased use of insured services. It is known that the providers
influence demand in the general health area, but some studies have concluded that in
all cases such influence is limited. Id. at 243-44.
171Anne Marie O'Keefe, Reforming Insurance Law to Provide Equitable Coverage for
Persons with Neurobiological Disorders, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERV., No.
54, 101 at 102 (Summer 1992) [hereinafter, O'Keefe, Reforming Insurance Law].
1 72 It has been suggested that it is easier to treat people with transitory
adjustment problems than tackle the long-term problems of persons
with chronic brain disease. The increase in providers and consumers
of psychotherapy and the popular desire to have such services
covered by insurance policies have led to a trade-off made at the
expense of people with serious chronic [neurobio-logical brain diseases.]
Id.
173 [Insurers] fear that insureds will begin to act more like consumers
of such services if their "consumption" will be reimbursed by a
third party. Insurance companies would like to avoid this result.
To that end, insurance policies cover very small percentages of out-
patient mental services. This, in turn, acts as a disincentive to long-
term, regular psychiatric visits or therapy.
Youndy C. Cook, Comment, Messing with Our Minds: The Mental Illness Limitation in
Health Insurance, 50 U. IAMI L. REv. 345,361 (1996).
174James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining "Medical Necessity" in MENTAL
HEALTH PRACTICE, 1994 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 5 at 9-10. The authors continue:
Public support for mental health insurance coverage, historically ten-
uous at best, might be compromised further if the public believed that
third-party resources were subject to even more moral hazard than
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However, the term mental health care encompasses a broad range of
disorders, some of which are far more serious and threatening to the individual
than others. To "assume that all types of mental health services for all types of
patients with all types of mental disorders are subject to moral hazard to the
same degree... is contrary to clinical experience and common sense."175
There is a perception that successful treatment for mental illness is less
science than persuasion. A person who has a broken arm has a cast applied and
the bone mends, largely without conscious effort. But a person with a mental
illness must participate in the treatment. Insofar as it is believed that a person
is responsible for contracting his own mental illness, he is perceived to be
responsible for willing his own recovery from it.
Physical illness has objective symptoms and signs that indicate its
presence. When these are lessened, the patient improves. This model
implies that the illness, as an ontological entity, exists in an objective
sense.
Many mental disorders follow this model of physical illness, at least
to a degree, for example, schizophrenia and some depressions.
However, some disorders do not fit this model. Symptoms can be
vague, they shift frequently and they involve an element of volition
In physical illness subjective symptoms are expected to respond to
objective treatments without an observer effect. In mental illness the
effect of observation on the degree of symptoms reported can be
significant.
176
As a result of this perceived uncertainty in treatment, it is believed to be difficult
to predict the cost of treatment for mental illness where the duration of
treatment is seen to be indefinite and where treatment is dependent upon the
effort of the insured to recover. 177
exists at present. If the public believed that mental health interven-
tions replace reasonable efforts to modify one's attitudes and behav-
iors or to extend one's capacities through learning and practice, sup-
port would wane.
Id. at 11.
175Howard H. Goldman et al., Demand for Psychiatric Services: A Clinical Episode Model
for Specifying "The Product", 8 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH, 255,255-56 (Thomas G. McGuire & Richard M. Scheffler eds., 1987).
176 Douglas P. Olsen, Ethical Cautions in the Use of Outcomes for Resource Allocation in
the Managed Care Environment of Mental Health, 9 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING No.
4 at 173,174 (1995). One consequence of the widely-held belief that treatment of mental
disorders is subjective and imprecise is the reluctance of insurers to support parity of
mental health services with other medical services. The "fear [is] that if mental health
services were given parity with other medical services,. . . insurance funds will be
siphoned into a 'bottomless pit."' Sabin & Daniels, supra note 174, at 5.
177
"Despite evidence of improvements in treatment effectiveness, many people
believe serious mental illness is incurable and a drain on society's resources." Steven S.
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That many mental illnesses are highly treatable is overlooked. For example,
80-90% of treatment for depression is successful.178 In fact, treatment of some
mental illnesses has a higher success rate than treatment of physical illnesses.
For example, while treatment of manic depression is successful 80% of the time,
and treatment of schizophrenia is successful 60% of the time, "commonly
reimbursed procedures such as angioplasty and arthrectomy have only a
41-percent and a 52-percent ratio.' 179 One study revealed that alcohol and
substance abuse-behavioral disorders, not mental diseases-were the
primary areas of escalating mental health care costs, while the costs for
"inpatient psychiatric services for adults (with serious mental illnesses) grew
less rapidly than did overall health care costs."180
The reasons for disparity in coverage for mental illness arise from several
sources. First, the lingering social stigma against mental illness thrives on the
idea that one whose character weakness has led to mental illness should take
responsibility to improve his character to achieve a cure.181
Many members of the public and the insurance industry still view
individuals with mental illness as causing their own mental problems.
Consequently, this segment of the public believes that persons with
mental illness should be able to overcome their illness simply by their
own efforts.... In addition, remnants of outdated propositions that
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia are mythical and do not exist
still haunt current mental health law and policy.
18 2
Sharfstein, Articulating the Case for Equitable Mental Health Coverage, 42 HosP. &
ComuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 453 (1991).
1 78 01sen, supra note 176, at 174. It should be noted, however, that "as many as
two-thirds of people with depression do not seek proper treatment." Id. at 175.
1 79 Shannon, Parity in Health Insurance, supra note 30, at 68-68 n.19 (quoting statistics
used in congressional debate over Mental Health Parity Act. 142 CONG. REc. S3591 (daily
ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
18 0 Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick Too, supra note 162 at 373 n.29 quoting ANNE MARIE
O'KEEFE, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, ADVOCATING FOR INSURANCE
REFORM 14-15 (1991). ("Many members of the public and the insurance industry still
view individuals with mental illness as causing their own mental problems.
Consequently, this segment of the public believes that persons with mental illness
should be able to overcome their illness simply by their own efforts." Id. at 371.) See also
Cook, supra note 173, at 345. One commentator's criticisms of proposed EEOC
regulations implementing the ADA includes pervasive bias and stigma against mental
illnesses. See Mary T. Giliberti, The Application of the ADA to Distinctions Based on Mental
Disability in Employer-Provided Health and Long-Term Disability Insurance Plans, 18
MENTAL & PHYS. DISAB. L. REP. 600 (1994).
1 8 1Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick Too, supra note 162, at 372.
18 2 1d. at 371. Shannon continues,
[A]ttitudes that the patients somehow caused their own problems or
should just will themselves to get better are as ludicrous as suggesting
that sufferers of brain tumors, lung cancer, diabetes, or Parkinson's
disease could be cured if they simply tried hard enough or wanted
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Similar expectations and restrictions on treatment would not be tolerated for
physical illnesses. One commentator noted that "[tihe EEOC recognized that
limitations in coverage for impairments such as AIDS, cancers, and blood
disorders are disability-based distinctions that insurers must justify to avoid
violating the ADA. At the same time [the EEOC] allows insurers to limit
coverage for mental conditions without providing any justification or actuarial
evidence." 183 It is clear that insurance for mental illness is "mired in continuing
stigma, expectations that the public sector should care for the mentally ill, and
irrational beliefs about the nature of mental illness...,184
A second reason for the disparity in coverage for mental illness is that,
although it is now widely understood that serious mental disorders such as
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder are biologically caused, 185 they are grouped
by insurers with so-called "adjustment disorders."186 They are both subjected
to highly restricted coverage, even though "behavioral disorders, . . . not
neurobiological brain diseases, have accounted for the largest portion of the
escalating costs." 187 The ironic consequence is that those with the most serious
to be well. Ignorant stigmatization, however, should not serve as a
barrier to appropriate insurance coverage for medical illness, even
if that illness affects the patient's brain.
Id. at 372.
183Giliberti, supra note 180.
184Sharfstein, supra note 177, at 453. See Ramage, supra note 156. ("A recent survey
reported that forty-three percent'of Americans still view depression as a personal
weakness rather than a true health problem." Id. at 973).
185Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick Too, supra note 162. ("In the past several years, medical
researchers have made numerous findings establishing that serious mental illnesses
such as schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, and depressive illness are
biologically-based diseases of the brain." Id. at 367).
186Insurance companies have tended to use vague clauses to provide
benefits for "mental health coverage" or for "mental/nervous dis-
orders" without further definition of what was intended to be cover-
ed by the language. By using terms that employ broad rubrics such
as "mental health" or "mental/nervous disorders," insurers have
tended to include biologically based serious mental illnesses in the
exact same category as all other mental, emotional, and behavioral
problems. Accordingly, the exact same policy limits and exclusions
apply across the board, regardless of the nature of the "mental" prob-
lem or illness involved.
Shannon, Parity in Health Insurance, supra note 30, at 68.
See also, Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick Too, supra note 162. ("Despite the
overwhelming medical findings that serious mental illnesses are in fact organic diseases
of the brain, health insurance policies tend to treat these illnesses differently from other
physical ailments." Id. at 370).
187Shannon, Parity in Health Insurance, supra note 30, at 70.
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illnesses, which may be highly treatable, 188 can be excluded from treatment
because of being classified by insurers with less serious, less predictably
treatable behavioral disorders. 189 This result has been justly criticized:
[T]hrough the use of overbroad terms setting policy limits or
exclusions . . . insurance companies are covering serious mental
illnesses in the same manner as the purely emotional or coping
problems of the "worried well." This results in unfair, discriminatory
insurance treatment against persons whose mental illnesses are, in fact,
organically- or biologically-based brain diseases.
190
188In the debates on the recent health care reform bill, Senator Domenici
pointed out statistics revealing that treatment success rates for serious
mental illnesses are often better than for commonly reimbursed treat-
ments for other physical ailments, yet the insurance limitations com-
monly apply only to the mental illnesses. See [142 Cong. Rec. S3591
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Domenici).] (observing that
"[tireatment for schizophrenia has a 60 percent success rate; manic
depression, 80 percent; major depression, 65 percent. Yet commonly
reimbursed procedures such as angioplasty and arthrectomy have
only a 41-percent and a 52-percent ratio..
Id. at 68 n.19.
It has been pointed out that while treatment is not essential for people with
emotional or coping problems, for those with serious mental illnesses "there is no choice.
Treatment is not a means for personal insight or self-fulfillment . Anne Marie
O'Keefe, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, ADVOCATING FOR INSURANCE
REFORM 15 (1991).
Mental illness can be fatal. The suicide rate for persons suffering a major
affective disorder is fifteen percent, up to three times greater than that
in the general population. The suicide rate among schizophrenics varies
from five to ten percent, and longevity is reduced by approximately ten
years in comparison to the general populations.
Mental illness is also dangerous to others. While most mentally ill
people are non-violent, mental patients on the whole have consistently
higher arrest rates and higher rates for certain types of violent crime
than the general population.
Ramage, supra note 156, at 953-54.
189 Although serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar
affective disorder, and depressive illness are not curable, they are
treatable diseases.... Treatment for serious mental illnesses includes
a number of medications that can alleviate or reduce the symptoms
of the diseases. For example, lithium has proven very helpful to a
number of persons suffering from bipolar affective disorder. Similarly,
psychiatrists have found that a number of antipsychotic medications
can help alleviate the biochemical imbalances present in persons suffer-
ing from schizophrenia.
Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick Too, supra note 162, at 369-70.
1901d. at 374. The result is difficult to justify on either a policy or an economic basis.
A study by the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand opined that
a full [mental health] parity measure could reduce public sector
spending on mental health 'by $16.6 billion or about 33% of current
public expenditures for mental illnesses" and that the privatizing of
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A third reason for disparate coverage relates to the difficulty of predicting
when mental illness will strike an individual: "It is not feasible to predict
mental illness with enough accuracy to classify the risk of contracting those
mental illnesses. Therefore, insurers create across-the-board limitations to
avoid the expenses incurred by those few who are at high risk for mental
illness."191
Insofar as risk classification is possible, high and low-risk individuals may
be placed in different pools or charged different premiums. These practices
raise issues about the purposes of insurance. "Health insurance is premised, in
part, on notions of mutual aid and social pooling-the common effort to
ameliorate each person's risk of catastrophic medical expense. But in the United
States it has also come to mean 'a person's self-centered calculations to protect
himself against loss."' 192 Such argument could be (improperly) based on the
claim that sick people "deserve" or "earn" less. 193 The idea that insurance pools
should be created to reflect the relative risks of the members, rather than
combining all members in a community pool, has been harshly criticized. 194
When mental health insurance coverage is limited or too expensive, whether
one is able to secure medical care depends either upon personal or family
resources or upon one can gain access to funding from welfare programs.195
mental health would create efficiencies that could "lower national
expenditures on mental health by $5.5 billion dollars [sic] or about
7.6% of total mental health costs."
Shannon, Parity in Health Insurance, supra note 30, at 71 n.27 (citing Coopers & Lybrand,
An Actuarial Analysis of the Domenici-Wellstone Amendment to S.1028 "Health
Insurance Reform Act" to Provide Parity for Mental Health Benefits Under Group and
Individual Insurance Plans 1 (Draft, Apr. 8, 1996) (emphasis omitted)(on file with
Shannon)).
191Cook, supra note 173, at 360.
192 Jacobi, supra note 67, at 312 (citing William A. Glaser, HEALTH INsURANCE IN
PRAcTIcE: INTERNATIONAL VARIATIONS IN FINANCING, BENEFITS, AND PROBLEMS 14 (1991)).
193 See Schmall, supra note 58, at 785.
194 [H]owever... [tihe answer, not to put too fine a point on it, is that is
what insurance is for. High risk people are lumped together in an in-
surance group with a vastly greater number of low-risk people...
All insurance, is virtually by definition, a system of cross-subsidies:
The lucky people who don't get sick subsidize, with their premium
payments, the unlucky ones who do get sick. The lucky ones tend
not to resent this arrangement very much because they'd rather be
healthy than sick, and because they understand that someday they
too might get sick, in which case the insurance subsidy would run
in their favor.
Schmall, supra note 58, at 785 n.17 quoting Peter Scheer, A Fatal Flaw in Free-Market
Thinking, THE RECORDER, Dec. 8, 1992, at 8.
195
"Only patients with acute illnesses susceptible to short-term care or ample private
resources are treated in the private sector. The remainder, including most of the chronic
mentally ill, are relegated to often-overburdened public-sector facilities." Paul S.
Appelbaum, Litigating Insurance CoverageforMental Disorders, 40 Hosp. AND COMMUNITY
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Personal or family resources are often insufficient to pay for needed care. 196
One commentator has summarized the situation in this way:
Unless they are personally wealthy, individuals seeking mental health
care quickly run out of viable alternatives. If insured, they quickly
expend their mental health care benefits. If uninsured, the high cost of
mental health care quickly consumes their private resources. If
destitute, they face the shortage and delay of public facilities. Many
people needing treatment thus must go without.
197
The impact of mental illness on the family is more than economic. Studies
indicate that mental illness of an adult family member can jeopardize the
physical health of other family members. In one study, "25 percent of families
reported a physical illness due to problems associated with living with a
mentally ill person."'198
Where insurance is not available, the issue becomes one of access to health
care.199 The question of access to health care has ethical implications that are
PSYcHIATRY 993 (1989.)
196
'The family, the basic building block of American society, also is affected by mental
health problems. Families of the mentally ill often bear the initial burden of care, and
soon collapse under it. Mental illness has more than one victim." Ramage, supra note
156, at 975. "[S]erious mental illness is one disease that can easily drive [a family] into
bankruptcy .... Simply because a [neurological brain disease] attacks the brain instead
of the liver or heart, families face financial ruin when a child or other family member
develops [the disease]." O'Keefe, Reforming Insurance Law, supra note 171, at 101-02. See
also, Rubin, supra note 168, at 144.
197Ramage, supra note 156, at 958.
On the subject of exhaustion of personal resources in the course of payment of
medical bills, an interesting article by Doyle and Mahfood shows that where an
insurance plan contract agrees, for instance, to pay eighty percent of allowable medical
expenses, the insurer actually pays less because of an undisclosed discount arrangement
with the service provider. As a result, the insured actually pays more than his agreed
percentage of the cost of treatment, and so exhausts personal resources sooner than
should have been necessary. Ellen M. Doyle & George G. Mahfood, The 80/20 Percent
Solution: Enforcing Medical Coverage Promises, TRIAL, October 1996 at 32.
198Jeffrey Rubin, Discrimination and Insurance Coverage of the Mentally Ill, in 8
ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERvIcEs RESEARCH 195,201 (Thomas G.
McGuire & Richard M. Scheffler (eds.) 1987).
199Issues involving access to health care often seem to raise the specter of rationing.
It has been argued that health insurance cost control and coverage limits cannot be
thought of as true rationing of health care, inasmuch as the care is still available if the
patient, rather than the insurer, is willing to pay for it (at least theoretically.) "As long
as the patient remains free to purchase noncovered care out of pocket, the charge that
care itself is being rationed should not finally stick ... [Any program that limits the
freedom of individuals to spend their own resources as they wish.., are most plausibly
challenged as rationing." Havighurst, supra note 166, at 1761-62.
On the other hand, it has been noted that "patients with 'substandard' third-party
reimbursement rates have difficulty commanding the attention, much less the loyalty,
of many physicians." Capron, supra note 125, at 747.
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especially complex where health insurance purchased privately, or received as
a benefit of employment, is involved. 200 The complexity arises because of the
way in which intimate life and death issues are juxtaposed with a private
industry that exists primarily to generate a profit.201
It is not unusual to find that denial of insurance coverage results in a denial of care,
not only in the mental health area, but also for physical illnesses. See, e.g., Richard A.
Hinden & Douglas L. Elden, Liability Issues for Managed Care Entities, 14 SEToN HALL
LEGIS. J. 1, 54 et seq. (1990). The often-made argument that the insurer is merely declining
to pay for a particular treatment and not keeping the insured from obtaining the
treatment at his own cost is disingenuous because insurers are trying to affect patterns
of health care usage by enforcing cost-containment policies against individuals.
The ethical implications of various health-care reform measures, cost containment
schemes, and reconfigurations of the way in which health services are delivered and
paid for, have occupied many legal and medical scholars. See,fe.g., Brock, supra note 125;
Capron, supra note 125; James V. Garvey, Note, Health Care Rationing and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990: What Protection Should the Disabled Be Afforded, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 581 (1993); Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 9; Kralewski, supra note 125;
Mellas, supra note 125; Morreim, supra note 125; Robert A. Padgrig & Gerald M.
Oppenheimer, AIDS, Health Insurance, and the Crisis of Community, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHIcs& PUB. POL'Y 35 (1990). Seealso Tamar Lewin, A Loss of Confidence: A Special Report.
Questions of Privacy Roil Arena of Psychotherapy, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 1996) § 1 at 1.
200 1n an article addressing the ethical foundations of health care reform, the authors
recognized that:
The more uncertain or compromised the choices among values, the
more likely the [health care] scheme will exhibit high levels of insti-
tutional complexity. For complex institutional arrangements often
are devices for managing conflict and uncertainty. In this sense, a
health care plan can be viewed as a design for the conduct of further
struggles over both the "right" and the "good." A system that has re-
solved more of these struggles in a relatively straightforward way
can have a simpler institutional design. More importantly,... no
ethically acceptable system is likely to have wholly coherent ethical
commitments. Hence, institutional complexity is a necessary price
for ethical acceptability.
Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 9, at 93.
201Commentators are no more satisfied with the ethical quality of the actions taken
by those who develop social policy with regard to disabled persons. Drimmer argues
that virtually all social progress of disabled persons is linked to their individual ability
to work as productive members of the workforce:
During the twentieth century, Congress enacted several laws which
focused on people with disabilities. Most of these laws authorized
services to help "cure" what are considered "ailments" within indivi-
duals who have disabilities in order to increase national production
and decrease welfare spending. The few recent laws seeking to pro-
vide rights and remedies to people with disabilities have consistently
failed to recognize them as complete citizens, acknowledging them
only as "flawed" individuals not at fault for shortcomings that society
must endure. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990...
considered a comprehensive bill of rights for people with disabilities,
merely continues this begrudging treatment. In pursuing this course,
Congress has issued a message that people with disabilities do not
deserve full citizenship or equal participation in the community and
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Currently, Americans' health care access disparities take many
forms ... Inadequate health care and the imposition of excessive
burdens to obtain health care are included as problems resulting from
a lack of insurance and resources. The issue becomes: to what extent
are these ethical problems? This issue has been addressed by
recognizing that in American society many goods and services are
distributed unevenly without concern that an injustice is being done.
Yet health care is regarded differently, and its distribution is governed
by principles of fairness that dictate equitable access to an adequate
level of care.
202
The complexity increases with the recognition that while the extent and
duration of insurance coverage is determined as a matter of contract, usually
in association with employment, the expectations of the insured employee are
often framed by other factors, such as unrealistic but widely-held general
expectations about access to reimbursed medical care. One thoughtful
commentator concluded that these expectations may have moral and legal
significance when these expectations are for "continued access to moderate
levels of care when they have been encouraged by employers or insurers. ''2°3
Perhaps the most important set of patient expectations ... are
expectations about economic access to medical services. Patients have
expectations about the extent to which their care will be paid for by
insurance or other sources. In the United States, these expectations are
largely employment-related. Generous health benefits are surely
incentives to many peoples' choices of employers or even
occupations.. . .Job mobility is discouraged significantly when
employees who have employment-based insurance must risk
insurance exclusions when they shift to new employers .... 204
are merely tolerated when they become economic participants.
Drimmer, supra note 28, at 1344-45.
Another commentator asserts that various federal laws which have the ostensible
purpose of protecting employees are "infused with our collective legal and social
commitment to the preservation of capitalistic notions of profitability and productivity,
none of them can protect us from being sick and broke." Schmall, supra note 58, at 782.
202 Capron, supra note 125, at 742.
203 Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1881, 1883 (1992).
2041d. at 1887-88. Similar expectancies arise in regard to retirement benefits:
Retirement benefits are another area in which expectations may extend
beyond explicit contractual commitments. Promises to continue to pay
health insurance premiums, particularly before Medicare eligibility
begins, have been used as inducements for early retirement; a hotly-
litigated issue has been the extent to which these promises can be modi-
fied in light of rising insurance costs.
Id. at 1888.
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Limitations on coverages for certain illnesses, including mental illnesses,
have legal, as well as ethical, implications. The vast majority of non-elderly
people who have health insurance obtain it as a benefit of employment.205
The terms and costs are negotiated by the employer and the insurer.
"Americans largely obtain their coverage from employment-based sources,
either insured or self-funded. Americans primarily rely on a 'system' of health
coverage that is a patchwork of market-driven actors providing 'catch as catch
can' coverage dependent not on citizenship or residence, but on the apparently
unconnected accident of employment status."206 This reality has led some to
conclude that employer-provided health insurance contracts may sometimes
have the characteristics of contracts of adhesion,207 though a contract
negotiated by a sophisticated employer may not comfortably fit in this
category.208 The fact that employers and insurers are setting national health
205
"In 1993, 61.1% of non-elderly Americans were covered by employment-based
health insurance and 7.7% were covered by "non-group" (that is, individually
purchased) private insurance; 14.1% were covered by Medicaid or other government
program and 16.8% had no insurance." Jacobi, supra note 67, at 315 n.16 (citing John
Holahan et al., A Shifting Picture of Health Insurance Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995,
at 253-55).
In numerical terms it has been found that:
Employer-sponsored health insurance plans are the single largest source
of private insurance coverage among nonelderly Americans. In 1991,
140 million Americans under age sixty-five-including nearly eighty-
nine million workers-had coverage from an employer-sponsored health
plan. Approximately three-quarters of employer-insured workers are
covered as a benefit of their own employment; all others-some twenty-
one million workers-are covered as the dependent of an employer-in-
sured worker...
Chollet, supra note 107, at 315.
206Jacobi, supra note 67, at 317.
20 7The argument is made:
Many private insurers limit coverage for mental illness to a certain
number of days or a set monetary limit. Courts traditionally have
considered these limitations to be valid contractual provisions.
Under contract theory, the insurer and the insured have bargained
freely, and the insurer's responsibilities are limited to the contract's
terms....
Benefits-limitations clauses may be subject to attack as contracts
of adhesion due to the unequal bargaining power between individuals
and insurance companies. This argument is most effective when the
individual is privately insured. Since the difference in bargaining
power is lessened when the insurance company bargains with the
employer, the final result may depend on whether the court focuses
on the individual employee or the employer. Even a large employer,
however, still may be in an unfair bargaining position if the insurance
company dominates or monopolizes the local market. In many circum-
stances, the employer's options are limited to substantially similar
plans with restricted mental health care coverage.
Ramage, supra note 156, at 963.
208Havighurst, supra note 166, at 1767 n.27.
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policy should be borne in mind as this article continues to investigate the
relationship between mental illness and the ADA.
While long-term disability insurance is much less commonly provided as a
benefit of employment than is health insurance, disability insurance typically
provides vastly inferior benefits for mental, as compared to physical,
disabilities. Limitations that accompany long-term disability coverage for
mental (but not physical) illness, such as caps on the number of visits to the
treating physician, limits on the duration of coverage, or requirements that
treatment be provided in an institutional setting, have serious consequences
on the individual and family of the insured. In some cases, "[ajfter years of
paying for insurance benefits, they find themselves without any income
following as little as twenty-four months of coverage.' 20 9 The policies against
such limitations and the implications of those policies on access to care, are
identical for both health insurance and long-term disability insurance.
V. TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. Language of the Statute
Title I of the ADA provides as a general rule that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to . .. the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation . . .and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
210
Commentators agree that courts tend to construe insurance contracts as if they
were negotiated individually by the insured, rather than by the probably more
sophisticated employer. One consequence of this is the application of the doctrine of
contra proferentum to construction of the terms of the contract. Contra proferentem
("against the proffering party") interprets an ambiguous term in the manner most
favorable to the insured.
[T]he contra proferentem rule is followed in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia, and with good reason. Insurance policies are almost always
drafted by specialists employed by the insurer. In light of the drafters'
expertise and experience, the insurer should be expected to set forth any
limitations on its liability clearly enough for a common layperson to
understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to take advan-
tage of the very ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater
diligence.
Ramage, supra note 156, at 964 n.89 quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d
534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990).
Whether this doctrine is appropriately applied in ERISA cases (where state law has
been preempted) or in ADA cases is a matter of dispute.
209Giliberti, supra note 180, at 603.
21042 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990).
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The term discriminate includes:
[Plarticipating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship
that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified . . .
employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this
subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with . .. an
organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered
entity...)211
A qualified individual with a disability is:
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.
212
B. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
1. Facts
When a person with a total disability brings a Title I claim against an
employer which provides long-term mental disability benefits that are inferior
to physical disability benefits, the weight of current authority is that the
complaint will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Typical reasoning for this result is set forth by the Western District
of Tennessee in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 213
Ouida Sue Parker became an employee of Schering-Plough Corporation in
1981. As a benefit of employment, Parker participated in a long-term disability
plan administered at least in part by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the
terms of which (with exceptions not relevant at this point) provided two years
of medical benefits for mental or nervous disorders, 2 14 but benefits until age
21142 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2).
21242 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
213875 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
2 14The exceptions extend long-term benefits under certain conditions where the
individual was hospitalized for the disorder. In this case the long term disability plan
provided:
MENTAL OR NERVOUS DISORDERS. If you are totally disabled due
to a mental or nervous disorder your LTD [long term disability] bene-
fit is payable for up to twenty-four (24) months. At the end of twenty-
four (24) months of LTD benefit payments, benefits will continue only
if you are confined in a hospital or other institution qualified to pro-
vide care and treatment for your mental or nervous disorder. Further,
if you are confined for at least fourteen (14) consecutive days, your
LTD benefit is extended to provide benefits for an additional ninety
(90) days after the confinement. If during the additional ninety (90)
day period you are again confined in a hospital or institution for four-
teen (14) days or more, your LTD benefit will be paid during the con-
finement and the ninety (90) day period following your release.
Id. at 1324.
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65 for physical disorders.215 In October 1990, Parker became disabled due to
major depression.216 As a consequence of this illness she had several
hospitalizations, electroshock therapy, and various treatments with Lithium,
Elavil, Ativan, and Tegretol.217 When she became eligible under the long-term
disability plan,218 she received two years of benefits. Thereafter, the disability
benefits were terminated although she continued to be disabled, "primarily due
to 'major depression,' and secondarily due to 'generalized anxiety
disorder."' 219 One of the reasons for the termination of her benefits was that
she was not confined to a hospital at the time the claim for extended benefits
was made.220
Parker sued both her employer, Schering-Plough, and the insurer,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, alleging they were in violation of Titles
I and III of the ADA,221 and of ERISA.222 Parker alleged that Title I of the ADA
was violated because the long-term disability plan provided less benefits for
people with mental disabilities than for those with physical disabilities.223 She
alleged that Title III of the ADA was violated because she was denied "full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations of a place of public accommodation .... "224 Parker alleged
that ERISA was violated when she was denied benefits due under the terms of
the disability plan since her disability was of a physical, not mental, origin and
that this denial was a violation of defendants' fiduciary duties to her.225 Parker
The same plan provided that persons who were totally disabled due to physical
disorders would receive benefits until the age of sixty-five. Parker, 99 F.3d 181, 184 (6th
Cir. 1996).
215875 F. Supp. at 1324.
216 Her physician wrote, "Sue continues to show signs of major depression with a great
deal of anger, pity, and some suicidal ideation, decreased psychomotor activity,
obsessional concern to the point of rumination, which has hindered life efficiency...
Id.
2 17 1d. (correspondence from Parker's physician).
218The plan required a twenty-six week waiting period. Parker, 99 F.3d at 184.
2 19 Id. In other communications, Parker's physician opined that she "has a chronic
major depression and all evidence indicates that this is a chemical disorder of a
deepseated nature." Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1324-25; see also 99 F.3d at 184.
220875 F. Supp. at 1330.
22142 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, 12181-12189 (1990).
22229 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
22 3 Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1323.
2241d. at 1327.
22 5 1d. at 1323.
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also alleged several common law tort claims. 226 In the district court, she lost
on every claim.
2. Analysis: United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discriminatory employment practices,
requires that "[njo covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability.., in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment. "227 Title I is directed toward discrimination in employment.
An employer is clearly a covered entity.
There is also authority that an insurer which administers an
employer-funded insurance benefit is a covered entity.228 Metropolitan Life
disputed the claim that it was a covered entity. The district court was not
required to decide this issue because the court found that Parker was not a
qualified individual with a disability.
A qualified individual with a disability is "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."229
The district court held that Parker was not a qualified individual with a
disability because, although she had a disability her disability was so severe
that she was not able to perform the essential functions of her job .230 The court
consulted legislative history to determine that while Parker was a qualified
individual at the time she was enrolled in the long-term disability plan, the
term qualified refers to "whether the individual is qualified at the time of the
job action in question"231 -in this case at the time of termination of disability
benefits.
In short, the very circumstances that qualified Parker to receive disability
benefits disqualified her from the protections of the ADA. 232 Parker's major
depression made her disabled in a way that rendered her unable to perform
22 61n addition to the ADA and ERISA claims, Parker initially alleged state common
law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims
were voluntarily dismissed. She also alleged other federal and state civil rights claims
which were dismissed prior to the district court's decision. 875 F. Supp. at 1323.
22742 U.S.C.§ 12112(a) (1990).
228Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1325 n.4. See also, David Manoogian, With Suits Mounting,
Courts Face the Question of Whether a Managed Care Organization Can Be an Employer Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, NATL L. J. at B6 (March 17, 1997).
2294Z U.S.C. § 12111(8).
230 Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1326.
23 11d. at n.5.
232!d. (court compiles legislative history to show the ADA was intended to protect
only those disabled persons who could perform the job function.)
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her job function. Since she could not perform her job function, the benefits of
her employment were not protected by Title I of the ADA. 233
3. Analysis: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Parker appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. 234 The three-judge panel rejected each of Parker's Title I arguments.
Parker argued that she could sue her employer and insurer under Title I. She
relied upon decisions of the First Circuit and the District of Colorado.235 The
three-judge panel declined to recognize the two cases as authoritative because
neither dealt with the issue of standing to assert a Title I claim. To the contrary,
the panel pointed to an Eleventh Circuit case 236 and several district court
cases 237 to support its interpretation of the language of Title I to deprive Parker
of a Title I claim.
233The court states,
it may seem undesirable and perhaps unpalatable that a totally disabled
individual is not entitled to relief under Title I of the ADA. However,
the plain language of the Act clearly indicates that the ADA was designed
to afford relief only to those individuals with disabilities who can perform
the essential functions of the job that they hold or seek.
Id. at 1326 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) & 12111(8)).
The court found support for its holding in Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys'
Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987), a Rehabilitation Act case in which the issue was
whether an employee on disability leave who could not perform essential job functions
could claim the protection of the Act. The Eighth Circuit held that she could not.
Although plaintiff was disabled, she was not otherwise qualified to meet all of a
program's requirements. The Parker district court noted, "Because provisions under the
ADA are to be interpreted consistent with similar requirements under the Rehabilitation
Act, the Beauford court's analysis is instructive in the present case." Parker, 875 F. Supp.
at 1325.
234Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996). The developing
importance of this case is evident from the fact that an amicus brief was filed by several
AIDS and mental health interest groups, New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, New
York City AIDS Action Council, American Foundation for AIDS Research, American
Public Health Association, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, National Association
of Protection and Advocacy Systems, National Minority AIDS Council. An amicus brief
was also filed by the EEOC which is charged with enforcement of Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117. Id. at 183.
235Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England,
37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994), and Schroeder v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 93-M-2433,
1994 WL 909636 (D. Colo. April 22, 1994).
236 Parker, 99 F.3d at 187, relying on Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d
1523 (11th Cir. 1996). The court also relied on McNemar v. The Disney Store, Inc., 91
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) and Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996).
237See Parker, 99 F.3d at 187, relying on EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., No. 95 C 5835, 1996
WL 26879 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1996), and Esfahani v. Medical College of Pa., 919 F. Supp.
832 (E.D. Pa. 1996). (The district court in EEOC v. CNA was affirmed. See 96 F.3d 1039
(7th Cir. 1996)).
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Parker urged the panel to reconsider the meaning of the statutory language
of Title I which was read by the district court to deprive her of standing to
proceed. She argued that the critical language of "qualified individual with a
disability" should not be read to require a claimant to be able to perform
essential job functions at the time the benefit is sought. Rather, she argued, the
language should be read to mean that an employee who has qualified for a
benefit by becoming employed, participating in a benefit plan, and paying
premiums, has a right to retain the employment position of a benefit recipient
after becoming disabled.238 The panel found this argument to be an
unpersuasive and convoluted construction of the statute.23 9
Similarly, the panel characterized Parker's argument that adoption of the
plain language interpretation suggested by the district court would have the
result that "virtually no employee could ever challenge discrimination in the
provision of long-term disability benefits,"240 as circular.24 1 The panel found
that the plain meaning of the statute was clear even if this produced results that
undermined the purpose of the Act and perhaps never were considered by its
drafters.242
Thus the Sixth Circuit three-judge panel agreed with the district court's
interpretation of the plain meaning of Title I that:
Ms. Parker was at no time a "qualified individual with a disability." At
the time she could "perform the essential functions" of her job, she was
not disabled for purposes of her long term disability claim, and
therefore was not covered by the Disabilities Act, and at the time her
insurance benefits were terminated, she could no longer perform her
job."243
Plaintiff did not seek an en banc rehearing of the decisions on her Title I claim.
238Parker, 99 F.3d at 186-87.
2 3 9 1d. at 187.
2401d. at 186. In its brief, the EEOC argued that
because "most long-term disability benefits are reserved for those who
are unable to hold any substantial employment for which they are qua-
lified," under the court's interpretation of the term qualified, "virtually
no employee could ever challenge discrimination in the provision of
long-term disability benefits.... [T]he fact that this approach would bar
most employees from challenging discrimination in the provision of
long-term disability benefits strongly suggests that it is incorrect,"
because the Disabilities Act's express prohibition against discrimina-
tion in fringe benefits would be significantly undermined.
Id.
2411d.
2 4 2 parker, 99 F.3d at 187. The Circuit Court continued, "Such an oversight, however,
is for Congress to remedy. We should not try to rewrite the statute in a way that conflicts
with what appears to be fairly clear language." Id.
2 4 3 1d. at 186.
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C. Supporting Title I Decisions
In Parker a three-judge panel held that a person who is totally disabled is
unable to perform the essential functions of the job and, therefore, is not a
qualified individual with a disability entitled to the protection of Title I of the
ADA.244 The consequences of the holding is that a person who becomes totally
disabled while employed can never challenge the unequal terms of a disability
plan.245 That the Title I claimant was at one time a qualified individual who
was eligible for, and may have contributed in part to, the benefits in question,
was held not to change the fact that the plain language of Title I extends its
protections only to those who can perform the essential functions of the job at
the time the discrimination claim is made.246
The Seventh Circuit held similarly in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. CNA Insurance Companies.247 Plaintiff Valladares-Toledo was
employed by Continental Casualty Company through which she opted to
participate in a long-term disability insurance plan funded by employee
contributions.248 Originally the plan provided long-term disability benefits
until age 65, but it was modified to limit benefits for mental disability to two
years.249 Several years after the modification plaintiff was "diagnosed with
severe depression and bipolar illness."250 Pursuant to the plan she received
benefits for two years before they were terminated. 251 Valladares-Toledo filed
a discrimination claim with the EEOC alleging the plan discriminated against
employees with mental disabilities in violation of the ADA. The EEOC
investigated the claim and later filed a suit on her behalf against CNA.252
The primary substantive issue was whether Valladares-Toledo, an employee
who was totally disabled, had standing to sue under Title 1,253 even though she
was "unable to hold an 'employment position."' 254 The court first rejected the
argument that Valladares-Toledo filled an employment position by virtue of
2441d. Parker did not seek en banc review of this issue.
24599 F.3d at 186.
246See id. at 186-87.
24796 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
2481d. at 1041.
249ld.
2501d.
2511d.
252EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d at 1041. The EEOC's authority to bring the case on
behalf of this plaintiff is discussed. Id. at 1041-43.
253The court suggested that while the parties phrased the issue in terms of standing,
"the real question here is whether the statute reaches this kind of claim." Id. at 1043.
254Id.
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being a recipient of disability benefits. "An 'employment position' is a job,' 255
the court stated, and it is only to those who apply for or currently hold a job
that Title I applies. It is only to current employees that Title I assures equal
access to terms, conditions and privileges of employment, including access to
a pension plan. Thus, because Valladares-Toledo's disability made her
incapable of holding an employment position, she was not entitled to the
protection of Title I.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit continued, CNA's plan did not
discriminate against disabled employees:
It did not charge higher prices to disabled people, on the theory that
they might require more in benefits. Nor did it vary the terms of its
plan depending on whether or not the employee was disabled. All
employees-the perfectly healthy, the physically disabled, and the
mentally disabled-had a plan that promised them long-term benefits
from the disability until age 65 if their problem was physical, and
long-term disability benefits for two years if the problem was mental
or nervous. This may or may not be an enlightened way to do things,
but it was not discriminatory in the usual sense of the term.
256
A similar holding is found in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Gonzales v.
Garner Food Services, Inc.257 In that case, Bourgeois was an employee of a
Hardee's restaurant who received health insurance up to a $1,000,000 lifetime
limit. He was diagnosed with AIDS in 1991 and was fired a few months later
by his employer who wished to avoid paying future health insurance claims.258
However, Bourgeois continued to receive benefits pursuant to the
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985.259 In part because of this,
defendants changed the health plan in October 1991 to cap benefits for
AIDS-related illnesses to $10,000 annual and $40,000 lifetime maximums.
Bourgeois had exhausted the limits available and had remaining expenses of
$90,000 at the time of his death.260 Gonzales, the administrator of Bourgeois'
estate, brought an action alleging that the modification of the plan was
prohibited under Title I of the ADA.
The substantive issue of the case revolved around the meaning of the phrase
"qualified individual with a disability."261 The court quickly determined that
255 d. at 1044.
256/d.
25789 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). This case had a large number of amicus curiae filings
including those of the ACLU, AARP, and the EEOC.
2581d. at 1524.
25929 U.S.C. § 1161-68 (1986).
260 Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1525.
261There were other threshold issues in the case. For instance, the benefit plan at issue
was modified prior to the date the ADA went into effect but remained in effect thereafter.
The ADA states that Title I is not retroactive as to private employers. The court assumed,
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although Bourgeois was disabled, he was not a qualified individual with a
disability because his disability made it impossible for him to hold an
employment position. Relying on the legislative history of the Act, the court
concluded that Congress intended to protect only those employees who could
perform the tasks required of them by their employment.
The court discussed at length plaintiff's argument that by the terms of Title
VII and its related cases, 262 the term employee should be extended to include
former employees. The argument was rejected on the ground that the plain
language of Title I extends protection only to job applicants and current
employees capable of performing essential job functions. Since Bourgois was
not able to do that, he could not seek the protection of Title I.
Several district courts have come to the same conclusion. For example, in
Esfahani v. Medical College of Pennsylvania,263 the plaintiff was a professor who
had been employed by the medical college and the university since 1978. Since
1981 the defendants had been aware that Esfahani was diagnosed as suffering
from "bi-polar affective disorder (formerly known as manic depression)." 264 As
a benefit of employment Esfahani received the opportunity to participate in a
long-term disability plan by making monetary contributions to it. The medical
college provided him with a document describing the plan and stating that, in
the event of long-term disability, participants would be covered until age 65.265
In 1993 Esfahani became completely disabled as a result of his mental disorder
and became eligible to receive long-term disability benefits. Shortly thereafter
he was notified that he would continue to receive benefits only for two years
because his disability was a mental or nervous condition.266
Esfahani filed a complaint against defendants under ERISA, the ADA, and
state civil rights law.267 Defendants' motion to dismiss argued that Title I of the
ADA did not apply because Esfahani's total disability made him unqualified
to work and thus unable to meet the prerequisites for Title I protection. Esfahani
countered that before he became totally disabled he was a qualified employee
for purposes of its analysis, that a violation that began before the Act went into effect,
but continued after it became effective could constitute a continuing violation. Id. at
1525.
262Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is relevant because the EEOC, which enforces Title
I, suggests in Interim Guidance that Title I should be construed by analogy to Title VII
and the term employee should have the same meaning in Title I and Title VII. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(a)-(f) (1991).
263919 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
2641d. at 834.
265While other employee benefit documents were referred to, plaintiff was not able
to acquire them and he alleged they did not exist. Id.
2661d. at 835.
2 6 71d. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims except the claim which alleged that its
failure to provide plaintiff with an adequate description of the benefit plan violated
ERISA duties. Id.
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with a disability and that during this period the discriminatory policy was put
into effect. This argument, if accepted, would establish that he possessed the
three qualities that are required by Title I: disabled, able to perform the
functions of his employment position, and treated differently.
The court easily held that when Esfahani became totally disabled he lost his
classification as a qualified individual with a disability and also the protection
of Title I. The court also found that while Esfahani was a qualified individual
with a disability-before he became totally disabled-the plan in which he
participated had a disability-based distinction which could be challenged
under the ADA. Whether that disability-based distinction came within the
safe-harbor provisions of the Act could not be determined on a motion to
dismiss.268
D. Conflicting Title I Decisions
There is authority contrary to the Title I decisions set forth in the preceding
section. For example, in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England,269 Senter, the insured individual, was sole
shareholder and president of Carparts Distribution Center. Carparts provided
insurance to its employees by participating in the Automotive Wholesaler's
Association of New England Health Benefit Plan, a self-funded medical
reimbursement plan.270 Senter was enrolled in the plan beginning in 1977. In
1986 he was diagnosed as infected with HIV virus and in 1991 he was
diagnosed with AIDS.271 In 1990 the insurance plan was amended to limit
lifetime benefits for AIDS-related illnesses to $25,000 while maintaining a
$1,000,000 lifetime benefit for other physical illnesses.272 As a consequence of
this change in the plan, much of the treatment Senter received during his last
illness273 was not paid by the plan. Senter and Carparts brought suit against
268Efahani, 919 F. Supp. at 836. Several other issues were presented in the case,
including whether ERISA preempted the state human relations claims. In resolving this
issue, the court explained the scope of ERISA preemption and why the ADA applies to
ERISA plans. ERISA preempts state law that relates to an employee benefit plan that
comes within ERISA's scope. State law relates to an employee benefit plan if the state
law directly or indirectly regulates the plan. If the state law only regulates the insurer
then the state law does not relate to an employee benefit plan. On the other hand, ERISA
does not exempt federal laws. Some federal laws, including the ADA, specifically
preserve nonconflicting state laws. "[S]tate laws that are co-extensive with federal laws
are not pre-empted under ERISA. By the same token, 'state laws [that] prohibit
employment practices that are lawful under' federal law are properly pre-empted.
Further, a state law can have portions of it pre-empted and portions of it
non-preempted." Id. at 837.
26937 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
270Id. at 14.
2 7 11d.
272dd.
273Senter died in 1993 while the suit was in progress. Td.
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the plan and the association alleging that the reduction in benefits, made with
knowledge of his illness, was a violation of Title I and Title III of the ADA. 274
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire had
dismissed the claims, holding that Title I did not apply because neither the
benefits plan nor the association that authorized it was an employer within the
meaning of that title. It also dismissed the Title III claim, finding that neither
defendant was a public accommodation. 275
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district
court's "dismissal was erroneous as a matter of law," and undertook to provide
guidance on the scope of the ADA.276 The First Circuit determined that the
provisions of Title I are not limited to the direct employer of a qualified
individual with a disability. By consulting parallel language in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act,277 as well as Interpretive Guidance issued by The EEOC for
Title 1,278 the court determined that both the plan and the association would be
274Carparts, 37 F.3d at 14-15. This is a simplified statement of the procedural course
of this case. The case originally had been filed in state court alleging only state claims.
The ADA went into effect ten days after the complaint was fied. The claim was that the
plan breached its contractual obligation insofar as it failed to provide benefits to cover
Senter's non-AIDS related treatments. Carparts' claim was that the plan's
"discriminatory provision.., rendered Carparts responsible for payments to health care
providers on Senter's behalf and effectively put Carparts out of compliance with
anti-discrimination laws, subjecting Carparts to potential liability." Id.
The defendants removed the case to federal court because the issues raised were
preempted by ERISA. In the federal court, plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to
allege ADA violations. Defendants' objection to this motion was treated by the district
court as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal was granted even
though the district court did not give plaintiffs an opportunity to address the potential
dismissal.
The First Circuit held "[t]he [district] court's failure to give such notice alone
justifies reversal of this case." Id. at 15. The circuit court vacated the order dismissing
these claims and remanded them to the district court for reconsideration in light of its
determination that the ADA must be construed more broadly. Id. at 21.
2751d. at 15. "The district court interpreted the term'public accommodations' as'being
limited to actual physical structures with definite physical boundaries which a person
physically enters for the purpose of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services therein."'
Id. at 18.
276Carparts, 37 F.3d at 15. The court stated,
[wie also find, however, that the court's dismissal was erroneous as a
matter of law. The district court erred by interpreting Title I and Title
III of the ADA to have excessively limited applications. Questions re-
garding the proper interpretation of the ADA are sure to arise on
remand. Therefore, we feel that timely guidance is appropriate.
Id. (citations omitted).
27742 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 - 2000e-17 (1964). Title I of the ADA states that the remedies
and procedures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act shall apply to Title I discrimination
claims.
278While the interpretive guidelines are not binding on the court, they do "constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance," Carparts, 37 F.3d at 16, quotingMeritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
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considered Title I employers under several circumstances. If, for instance, "with
respect to his employee health care coverage.. . they exercised control over an
important aspect of his employment, 279 the defendants would come within
the definition of employer. This issue was remanded to the district court for a
factual determination of whether defendants came within the definition of
employer in Title I.
The Third Circuit, in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.,280 further supports the
position that Title I allows review of disparate treatment of physical and mental
illness in regard to employer-provided long-term disability insurance benefits.
On facts remarkably similar to those of Parker, the court rejected assertions by
the employer, Schering-Plough, and the carrier, Metropolitan Life Insurance,
Co., that plaintiff had no standing to bring a discrimination claim. The court
concluded that plaintiff had standing because she was injured by the
termination of benefits, her injury could be redressed by a favorable decision,
and her interests were within the protective zone of the ADA. The court
recognized that the term "qualified individual with a disability" creates a
"disjunction" between Title I rights and the statutory language.281
The court found that the statutory language was ambiguous and resolved
the ambiguity through reliance on Title VII decisions.282 The Third Circuit
reasoned that:
[Tihe ADA's proscription of discrimination in fringe benefits generates
the need for disabled individuals to have legal recourse against such
discrimination and exposes the temporal ambiguity in the ADA's
definition of "qualified individual with a disability[,]" We resolve this
ambiguity in favor of a broad temporal interpretation of [the term] that
disabled former employees, no longer able to work.., can sue their
employers concerning alleged discrimination in their package of
disability benefits.283
With the crossing of this threshold issue, the court moved to the substantive
question of whether the disparate treatment constituted Title I discrimination.
Regrettably, the court determined that the inferior benefits provided for
disability related to mental disability was not actionable discrimination.
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
279 Carparts, 37 F.3d 12 at 17. Moreover, "If [the association and the plan] exist solely
for the purpose of enabling entities such as Carparts to delegate their responsibility to
provide health insurance for their employees, they are so intertwined with those entities
that they must be deemed an 'employer' for purposes of Title I of the ADA." Id.
280145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
281Id. at 606.
282 d. at 607, relying on Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), while rejecting
the reasoning of cases such as EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996), and
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). Id. at 606-08.
2831d. at 608.
[Vol. 12:205
TITLE I AND TITLE III OF THE ADA
Despite the two year recovery limitation, the court reasoned that, as this term
applied to all employees, it was non-discriminatory.284 The ADA "does not
contain parity requirements" and Congress has not enacted any change in the
ADA to impose such requirements. 285
In Schroeder v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 286 plaintiff was an
employee of defendant General Tire Company, and a participant in an
employee welfare benefit plan which provided various insurance programs.
He enrolled in a long-term disability plan offered by the Equitable Life
Assurance Society under which he made all premium payments through
payroll deduction. Equitable delegated administration of the policy to Equicor,
Inc., which, in turn, delegated administration to Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co. (CIGNA).
Schroeder was hospitalized in 1990 with a heart condition and had not
worked since. CIGNA paid disability benefits for two and a half years then
terminated benefits because it determined that because Schroeder's was a
mental, not a physical, disability. The policy limited mental disability benefits
to 30 months. Schroeder requested reconsideration, saying any mental
condition he had was secondary to a physical problem with his heart. When
CIGNA refused to extend benefits, Schroeder sued the employer and all three
insurers alleging that all defendants were in violation of Title I of the ADA and
alleging related state law claims.287 The defendants moved for summary
judgment.
Defendants' first defense was that the ADA did not apply to them. The
United States District Court for the District of Colorado disagreed and held that
Title I applied to General Tire because the disability insurance policy was part
of the package of benefits it made available to its employees. Title I applied to
the remaining defendants because of their contractual arrangement with
General Tire.288
Defendants then argued that Title V, which provides a safe harbor provision
for insurers,289 precluded the Title I claim. The district court held to the
contrary. Citing legislative history and regulatory language, the court held that
2841d. at 608-10.
285Ford, 145 F.3d at 610.
Discussion of the court's treatment of plaintiff's Title III claim is set forth infra Part
VII (D).
286Civ. Action No. 93-M-2433, 1994 U.S. Dist. WL909636 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 1994).
287Again this is procedurally simplified. Plaintiff originally sued in state court
alleging various contract claims and ADA claims, but not making any ERISA claim. The
defendants removed the case to federal court on authority of ERISA. Id. at *2. As a
preliminary matter, the court determined that claims related to the disability plan were
preempted by ERISA and they were dismissed. Plaintiff was given leave to amend his
complaint to state an ERISA claim. Id. at *2-3.
288 d. at *3.
28942 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1990).
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Title V requires insurers to provide equality of treatment to disabled persons
unless actuarial principles or reasonably anticipated experience justify
disparate treatment.29 0 Thus, Title V provides an affirmative defense, not an
exemption from suit.
The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the state
actions but granted plaintiff permission to amend the complaint to include a
violation of ERISA. The final outcome of the ADA and ERISA claims is not yet
known.
In the preceding section of this article, the Eleventh Circuit's Gonzales
decision was discussed. The majority in that case held that the plain meaning
of Title I limits its scope, but a vigorous dissent in Gonzales disagreed with the
majority that the plain meaning of the statute29 1 limits Title I protection to
current employees and "excludes retirees and other former employees.' 292 The
dissent noted that the general section of the Act refers to individuals, rather
than employees.293 It also noted that while a section listing actions which are
considered discriminatory includes some actions that are typically carried out
by employees, the list is "expressly nonexclusive [and] the focus of the
subsection is on the description of actions that constitute discrimination, not
on the persons protected by the Act. In any event, not all of the descriptions
refer to employees."294
The dissent noted the broad remedial purpose of the ADA and that its scope
includes fringe benefits such as profit-sharing plans and health benefit
plans.295 The dissent further detailed legislative history, EEOC regulations,
Title VII and case law to support its conclusion that Title I does protect former
employees. Finally, the dissent appealed to common sense:
A retired or former employee ... has already performed all of the
functions expected of him with respect to the job he occupied before
retirement. Under the company's plan, the only additional "functions"
expected of ... former employees [are] to make the appropriate
election, pay the premiums, etc. Fringe benefits ... are all part of the
overall compensation package provided for employees as
consideration for their service during their active years with the
29 0Schroeder, 1994 U.S. Dist. WL 90936, at *3.
291The dissent also "clarified" the conduct of the defendant, stating that defendant's
actions "would clearly be unlawful now that the ADA is in effect." 89 F.3d 1523, 1531
(11 Cir. 1996)(Anderson, J., dissenting). The dissent makes clear that at the time the
defendant should have been taking steps to come into compliance with the ADA, it was
taking discriminatory action against a disabled employee.
The dissent suggested that "the majority sees 'plain meaning' when there is none."
Id. at 1536.
292 d. at 1531.
29 3 1d. at 1532 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
294 d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)&(6)).
295Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1532 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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company. Post-employment benefits are like deferred compensation,
and are expected to be enjoyed during the post-employment years ....
[Flormer employees.., are not expected to perform the functions of
the jobs they previously held before retirement. Rather, they are
expected to meet whatever criteria are mandated by the fringe benefit
plan for the accrual and continuation of coverage ... .2
An earlier case held out some promise to Title I plaintiffs. In Northen v. City
of Chicago,297 former police officers who were retired and receiving disability
pensions claimed violations of the ADA because the benefits they received were
changed to require them to pay for their health insurance, while officers who
were not retired were not required to pay for their health insurance.
The City of Chicago moved to dismiss on the ground that Title I does not
apply to former employees. The court denied the motion on the ground that
the Seventh Circuit had held "that retirement benefits are within the
'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' covered under
Title VII."298 The court also noted that the Seventh Circuit had "held that being
an employee is not a sine qua non for maintaining a suit against an employer;
rather there must be an "employment relationship" in order to maintain a
suit."299 The district court noted that while the cases upon which it relied were
Title VII cases, the almost identical language of Title I and Title VII, and the fact
that Title I incorporates parts of Title VII by reference make the reliance
justified.300 Finally, the court concluded that "because it granted the plaintiffs
the right to sue, the EEOC apparently viewed plaintiffs' claims as covered
under the ADA."301 The court said it was too soon to tell whether the ADA
applied to disability retirees.
A broad reading was given to the phrase "otherwise qualified employee" in
Graboski v. Guiliani, decided by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.30 2 The case was brought by disability retirees who
claimed state legislation, which allowed only service retirees to have access to
supplemental pension benefits, violated Titles I and II of the ADA and the
ADEA. In defense to the Title I claim, defendants argued that because plaintiffs
were disability retirees they were not able to perform the essential functions of
employment and hence were not qualified individuals with a disability. In
296 d. at 1535.
297841 F. Supp. 234 (ND. Ill. 1993).
298 d. at 236 (citing Bartmess v. Drewrys, 444 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 1971)).
299Id. (citing Doe on behalf of Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 788 F.2d 411, 422-25 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
300 d. at n.2.
301 d. at 236.
302937 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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addition, the defendants argued that former employees were excluded from
coverage. The court did not agree. It noted,
[Tihe City argues that once plaintiffs retired on the basis of disability,
the ADA no longer requires that they be treated even-handedly
Such a crabbed view of the ADA's coverage would undermine the
statute's unambiguous remedial purpose. As certain fringe benefits
(such as pensions and health insurance continuation) are meaningful
only post-employment, it is only logical that the statute's coverage
reaches the period when the employment benefits are to be reaped.303
The court then elaborated upon its reasoning, recognizing that the term
employee is used both in Title I of the ADA and in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. The court noted that Title VII is incorporated by reference into sections of
Title I, including the definition of employee. Regulations and legislative history
demonstrate that the term employee is to have the same meaning in both Acts.
Title VII litigation has established that "discrimination in connection with
post-employment benefits is actionable by former employees under Title
VII,' 304 and the use of the words otherwise qualified in Title I does not place
its protection beyond the reach of former employees 3 05 The court expressly
declined to follow the holdings of the Eleventh Circuit in Gonzales and the
district court in Parker which held a former employer has no standing to sue
under Title I. However, while the Court recognized that the former employees
in Graboskihad standing to sue, they failed to make a showing of discrimination
prohibited by the ADA.
Prohibited discrimination was found, and damages were awarded, in Lewis
v. Aetna Life Insurance, Co., 306 where, at trial, the defendant employer, KMart
Corporation, did not contest plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment in benefits
for physical and mental disabilities and acknowledged the absence of any
sound actuarial practices which would support the disparate treatment,307 but
claimed that there was no liability under Title V's safe harbor provision as the
disability plan had been approved by the Virginia Department of Insurance.308
A second line of defense asserted that because defendant offered disability
benefits prior to enactment of the ADA, it could not be liable under Title 1.309
Both arguments were rejected. The court determined that, in the absence of
3 03 1d. at 266.
3 04 1d. (collecting cases). The court noted that the Fourth and Seventh Circuits reject
this view.
3 0 5 The court also noted that former employees may also challenge post-employment
benefits under the ADEA. Id. at n.11.
3067 F. Supp.2d 743 (E.D. Va. 1998).
307 d. at 746-47.
3 08 1d. at 747-48.
3 09 1d. at 748.
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actuarial or other justification for the disparate and inferior treatment, the safe
harbor provision was not applicable as the plan violated Title I "by offering
Lewis a benefit plan which discriminates against him on the basis of his mental
disability."3 10
This decision is notable not only because a totally disabled former employee
was successful in overcoming the threshold standing issue, but also because
plaintiff prevailed at trial. This decision will hopefully support similar results
where proof of discrimination can be established. 311
E. Analysis of Title I Issues
An individual with a long-term disability who claims to have been
discriminated against in violation of Title I of the ADA must first demonstrate
he is an intended beneficiary of the Act. As has been demonstrated in the
preceding section, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and the United
States District Court for the Eastern District Pennsylvania have held that a
person with a total disability who can no longer work, cannot bring a
discrimination claim under Title I because only qualified individuals with
disabilities may do so: individuals who can perform the essential functions of
the job. However, Northen, Graboski, and the Gonzales dissent provide more
persuasive reasons why, as a matter of law and common sense, Title I must be
available to challenge long-term disability benefits. Furthermore, the EEOC
appears to believe that Title I does protect totally disabled persons and appears
to be pressing that claim.312
Arriving at the correct interpretation of the scope of Title I starts with the
language of the Act.313 The courts which have excluded totally disabled
individuals who cannot continue to work from the protection of Title I have
concluded that the plain language of the statute requires the claimant to be able
to perform the essential functions of the job at the time the claim of
discrimination is made. Once a court has decided that the language -of the
statute is clear, there is no need to consult additional authority.
3101d. at 749.
311As an appeal is pending, the persuasiveness of this decision remains problematic.
3121t has been reported that the EEOC sued Chase Manhattan Corporation in
September of 1997 alleging that the benefit plans it offers its employees provide
dramatically inferior benefits for mental disabilities as compared to physical disabilities.
The case seems to be a Title I case because the argument being pressed by the EEOC is
reported to be "that because a person is technically still employed while he or she is on
disability, early termination of mental-health benefits is effectively the same as early job
termination," and because the employer is named as one of the defendants. On the other
hand, the case may be a Title III case insofar as the issue is reported to be a direct
challenge to Parker v. Shering-Plough. Glenn Burkins, Chase Faces Suit over Benefits to
Mentally Ill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1997 at B14.
313See supra that accompanying notes 210-12 for statutory language of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12212(a), 12112(b)(2), and 12111(8).
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The position of this article is that, contrary to the majority view, the language
of the statute is ambiguous with respect to long-term disability benefits. The
ambiguity arises from several sources. First, the language of the Act itself does
not limit its scope to employees. The ADA is intended to protect individuals,
not only employees. 314 In at least some circumstances Title I specifically
protects individuals who are not, strictly speaking, employees. For example,
although job applicants are not employees, Title I clearly prohibits
discrimination against disabled job applicants who can perform the essential
functions of the position they seek.315 Although individuals who have been
discharged are not employees, those who have been terminated for
discriminatory reasons are expressly protected by Title 1.316
The employee who receives long-term disability benefits upon becoming
disabled is not a stranger to the employer. The benefits were earned, and often
partly paid for,317 by the employee while in an employment relationship with
the employer. This kind of employment relationship should be enough to draw
the protection of Title I. The claimant should not have to be a current
employee,3 18 especially where the benefits involved are intended to be used
after employment. Graboski held that plaintiffs who were retired due to their
disabilities could sue under Title I when their employer refused to allow them
31442 U.S.C. § 12101(a) refers repeatedly to individuals who have experienced
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) defines employee as "an individual employed by
an employer."
315
"No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures..." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
316
"No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to... discharge of
employees..." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
The dissenting judge in Gonzales concluded that former employees are not
excluded from the scope of Title I:
The majority emphasizes the language of § 12112(b) which sets out
a nonexclusive list of actions (or types of action) which constitute
discrimination .... The majority takes comfort in the fact that many
of the actions described refer to employees or applicants. Not only
is this list expressly nonexclusive, but the focus of the subsection is
on the description of the actions that constitute discrimination, not
on the persons protected by the Act. In any event, not all of the des-
criptions refer to employees or applicants. See § 12112(b)(4)&(6).
89 F.3d at 1532 n.2.
317While 41% of the employees in medium and large private businesses receive
long-term disability insurance as a benefit of employment, 27% of the employees
contribute to the plan. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 431 (116th ed. 1996) (Table 671: Employee Benefits in Private Establishments:
1993 and 1994) Among the 30% of state and local government employees who receive
long-term disability insurance as a benefit of employment, 23% contribute to the plan.
318Northen, 841 F. Supp. 234, 236.
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supplemental benefits that were allowed to employees who retired for
nondisability-related reasons. 3 19
It is significant that by disallowing such claims, it is the insurer who benefits.
Often both the employer and the employee have contributed to long-term
disability insurance. To deny the employee/beneficiary of the insurance the
opportunity to collect on it, for reasons not related to the genuineness of
disability, creates a windfall to the insurer.
A second source of ambiguity in the definition of qualified individual with
a disability lies in matters of timing. In the context of long-term disability
insurance, courts have read the term to mean that the claimant must be able to
perform the essential functions of the job at the time the claim of discrimination
is made. The definition could just as easily be read to mean that the claimant
must have been able to perform the essential functions of the job at the time
the insurance was granted as a benefit of employment.
Certainly, this construction is implicit in the way in which a disabled
employee who is afforded health insurance is viewed. Such a person may
contract an illness or require surgery that causes him to be absent from work
for an extended period of time. No one can logically assert that such a person
has no standing to challenge the terms of the insurance coverage because he
cannot work while he recovers from his illness or surgery. Even though it is
true that most employees drawing health insurance benefits are expected to
return to work, while most employees drawing long-term disability insurance
benefits are expected not to return to work, future expectations should not
determine standing to challenge the terms of a benefit awarded while one was
a qualified individual with a disability.320
Whether an employee who has received long-term disability insurance as an
employment benefit can seek the protection of Title I after he develops a
disability and is unable to continue to work, is simply not clearly indicated in
the statute. Insofar as the language of the statute is unclear or ambiguous, it is
appropriate to turn to the purpose and legislative history of the Act and to
agency actions for guidance. When one does that, it becomes difficult to deny
totally disabled individuals the protection of Title I.
The findings and purposes of the ADA are so prominently articulated in the
statute that it is beyond question that the ADA is a remedial statute intended
to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 321 Like any
319 Graboski, 937 F. Supp. 258, 266.
320 1f the long-term disability contract itself made reference to prospects of rejoining
the workforce in the future, then the claimant's employment status at the time the benefit
is demanded and the courts' interpretation of the qualified individual with a disability
language of Title I would make more sense. But the obvious reality is that the premiums
for long-term disability insurance are calculated in anticipation of the insured not
returning to work.
32142 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1990).
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remedial statute, it should be liberally construed.322 As was noted by the
Gonzales dissent, "the denial of claims of former employees with respect to
fringe benefits would seem to intrude more severely on the obvious
congressional intent to protect employer-provided fringe benefits. As a matter
of common experience, fringe benefits are designed and provided primarily
for the post-employment years."323
It is also understood that the ADA was enacted, in part, because prior
statutory schemes intended to redress discrimination against the disabled were
not effective.324 Therefore, care should be taken not to force the ADA into the
parameters of less effective earlier efforts to provide civil rights to disabled
individuals. 325
The close relationship of Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, with respect to powers, remedies, procedures, and enforcement 326 further
argues for understanding the scope of Title I to include totally disabled
employees. The relationship of the two statutes, which is established by the
ADA,327 allows courts interpreting aspects of Title I to refer to Title VII cases
for persuasive authority.328 As the court in Graboski showed, Congress intended
322See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
32389 F.3d 1523, 1534 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
324McFadden, supra note 25.
Unlike other current disability statutes, such as the Rehabilitation Act,
the Air Carrier Access Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act,
which only ban specified discriminatory acts in narrowly defined
areas such as employment, air travel, and housing, the ADA is de-
signed to provide the disabled with comprehensive protection against
discrimination in all arenas of life.
Id. at 485. See also Amey, supra note 28. (While ADA is modeled after Rehabilitation Act
and Fair Housing Amendments Act, courts have inconsistent interpretations.); David
Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination
Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 49 (1996) (Courts have not interpreted
anti-discrimination statutes in a way which fulfills congressional intent.)
325This problem is manifested where cases decided under the earlier statutes are used
more like controlling authority than persuasive authority in ADA cases. Thus, while it
is appropriate to consider the meaning of the term subterfuge by reference to the ADEA
in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) and to take
Alexander v. Choate, 496 U.S. 287 (1985) or McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1991), into account in various disparate benefit situations, they should be
considered to interpret standards inferior to those established by the ADA.
326"The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act] shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides ...
Agencies with enforcement authority for actions which allege employment
discrimination under [Title VII of the Civil Rights Act] shall develop procedures..." 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a)&(b).
32742 U.S.C. § 12117.
328 Gonzales, 89 F.3d 1523, at 1527-29 (discussing appropriate degree of deference when
statutory language seems plain). See also, Carparts, 37 F.3d 12; Graboski, 937 F. Supp. 258;
West v. Russell Corp., 868 F. Supp. 313 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
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both Title I and Title VII to share the same definition of employee. In Title VII
cases, former employees have been held to be statutory employees. 329
The Gonzales dissent noted that the Eleventh Circuit has held Title VII allows
a former employee to sue a former employer even though the statute refers
only to employees and applicants for employment.330
It is significant that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990. Congress is
deemed to legislate against the background of the federal common law.
When Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, it was clearly established
Title VII case law that the term "employee" includes former employees.
Congress is deemed to be familiar with such case law. In the ADA,
Congress used the same definition of "employee" that it used in Title
VII. The text of the ADA expressly refers to Title VII, and the legislative
history clearly indicates a congressional intention to incorporate the
established Title VII meaning for the term "employee.'
3 31
The Gonzales dissent also pointed out that the term employee is broadly
interpreted to include a former employee under both the ADEA 332 and the
Rehabilitation Act.333 Given this statutory and decisional background of terms
used in common, the dissent concluded that Title I challenges could be brought
by former employees-those who became totally disabled while employed.
In addition, agency action supports the more expansive reading of Title I.
EEOC regulations provide that the ADA should not apply a lesser standard
against discrimination than does the Rehabilitation Act.334 The regulations
provide definitions of terms such as employee ("an individual employed by an
employer")335 and qualified individual with a disability ("an individual with a
disability who satisfies the skill, experience, education and other job-related
requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires
..").336 While the regulations do not address the question of whether an em-
329 Graboski, 937 F. Supp. at 266.
330 Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1533 (Anderson, J., dissenting) relying on several Title VII cases
including Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).
3311d. at 1534.
332Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1533 (Anderson, J., dissenting) relying on EEOC v. Cosmair,
Inc., 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).
333Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1534-35 (Anderson, J., dissenting). The Rehabilitation Act is
significant in this context because the ADA was intended to be interpreted with
reference to section 504 of that Act which prohibits discrimination against otherwise
qualified handicapped individuals in federally funded programs.
33429 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(1) (1991).
33529 C.F.R. § 1630.2(f).
33629 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
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ployee who has become totally disabled can claim Title I protection, EEOC
Interpretive Guidance does provide some help:337
The determination of whether an individual with a disability is
"qualified" is to be made at the time of the employment decision. The
determination should be based on the capabilities of the individual
with a disability at the time of the employment decision, and should
not be based on speculation that the employee may become unable in
the future or may cause increased health insurance premiums or
workers compensation costs.
338
This Guidance establishes that the Act provides protection at the time an
employee is hired. Changes in ability do not disqualify an employee from the
protection of Title I.
Third, common sense and intuition require that employees who become
totally disabled must be able to claim the protection of Title I:
It would be counter-intuitive, and quite surprising, to suppose.., that
Congress intended to protect current employees' fringe benefits, but
intended to then abruptly terminate that protection upon retirement
or termination, at precisely the time that those benefits are designed to
materialize. The structure of the statute, in clearly extending protection
to fringe benefit plans, indicates that Congress intended protection for
those routinely and commonly covered by such employer-provided
plans.
33 9
Generally, disability insurance is available only to current employees, not to
employees who have been terminated. Becoming disabled (unable to work)
3 3 7 See supra note 278. On the subject of the inferior persuasive weight of the EEOC's
informal guidelines, compared to formal regulations, one commentator has written,
No doubt the EEOC's hand would be strengthened if it adopted the
Interim Guidance as a formal regulation. Under the Chevron doctrine,
"if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). This
requirement of deference to agency interpretation has less strength,
however when the agency has spoken through relatively informal
means.
Jacobi, supra note 67, at 360 n.207 citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,257
(1991).
An article based on comments to the EEOC from the Judge David L. Bazelon Center
for Mental Health Law, expressing concerns about the ADA interim guidelines related
to disability-based distinctions in health insurance received as a benefit of employment,
criticizes the interim guidance as fostering stereotypes and unjustified unequal
treatment of people with mental disabilities. Giliberti, supra note 180.
33829 C.F.R. Part C. ADA TrITLE I INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE FOR SECnON 1630.2(M) OF
TrrTLE I OF ADA. The guidance expressly pertains only to health insurance provisions. It
does not apply to other employer-provided insurance plans. Id. at § 1630.16(f).
339 Gonzales, 89 F.3d 1523, 1532 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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does not, as a matter of insurance law, cause the employee to lose his status as
an employee entitled to the benefits of a disability policy. It could hardly be
otherwise: if one became a terminated employee as soon as one became unable
to work because of a disability, no disability insurance policy would ever have
to pay.
The purpose of disability insurance is to protect the income of the insured
employee if he becomes disabled. In the event an insured employee does
become disabled-that is, when sickness or injury cause him to be unable
perform substantially all the material acts of an occupation-he has a legal right
to recover some predetermined portion of his wages under the insurance
contract.
Furthermore, an employee can recover disability insurance even if there is
hope for recovery where it appears that his total disability will continue for an
uninterrupted period of time (or the time set by the contract). If the disability
is cured and the insured becomes able to perform substantially all the material
acts of an occupation, the disability benefits will cease. 340 In this sense,
employees who receive disability benefits remain employees just as employees
who receive health insurance benefits remain employees, although they may
be hospitalized for some period of time during which they cannot perform the
essential functions of the employment position. An employee who is
hospitalized for hip-replacement surgery and spends several months
recuperating often qualifies to receive health insurance even though he is not
able to perform the essential functions of the employment position during the
treatment and recovery period. While the anticipated period of inability to
work may be different, the relationship of the individual to the employment
position is the same in both cases: neither the individual claiming health
insurance benefits nor the person claiming disability benefits can perform the
essential functions of the employment.
Title I should afford no less protection against discrimination to an employee
who cannot work because he had a hip replacement (which might be covered
by health insurance) and an employee who cannot work because of a long-term
illness (which might be covered by disability insurance). Both received access
to the benefits at a time they were qualified individuals who could perform the
essential functions of the employment position. Both forms of insurance were
provided in anticipation of a time when the employees might not be able to
work. Both employees became unable to perform those functions when they
had surgery or developed the long-term illness. The potential length of time
the employee might be unable to work (temporarily, in the case of the employee
who had the surgery-permanently, in the case of the employee who had the
long-term illness), is not relevant to measuring the scope of Title I. When the
benefits were conferred, the rights and expectations with respect to the
insurance were created or vested. At that time the insured was able to perform
the essential functions of the employment position.
34015 ANDERSON & RHODES, supra note 130, § 53:114 at 162.
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It may be argued that treating mentally and physically disabled employees
differently is justified for one reason or another-for instance, mental illness is
hard to define, or the success of treatment is difficult to assess, or the cost of
equal coverage would be prohibitive. But these arguments address matters that
arise in application of the safe harbor and subterfuge sections of Title V, not the
threshold requirements of Title I. The "legality" of discrimination in disability
insurance based on mental, as opposed to physical, illness should not be based
on the employee's lack of status as a qualified individual with a disability.
It must be kept in mind that the issue being discussed here is a threshold
issue: one of access to the courts under Title I of the ADA. The majority view
is that claimants who have become totally disabled and cannot work after being
employed are not protected by Title I. Such persons are precluded from
presenting claims that long-term disability insurance benefits impermissibly
discriminate on the basis of type of disability. Only if courts accept the
argument put forward here, that Title I should be extended to cover totally
disabled employees who can no longer work, will such claimants then be
allowed to argue the second issue: that the long-term disability policies which
provide inferior benefits for mental disabilities are discriminatory in a way that
is prohibited by the ADA.
This second issue presents separate problems to a totally disabled employee,
especially one who has a mental disability. The language of the ADA and of
case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act and other statutes seems to
approve disparate benefits for physical and mental illnesses in health insurance
policies offered by employers under circumstances where the disparity can be
supported by actuarial analysis and where the disparity is not an intentional
subterfuge of ADA policies. It is here that the differences between health
insurance and long-term disability insurance are important. While actuarial
analysis and the creation of risk pools might be relevant in projecting the likely
cost of an employee's health care, and while the projected likely cost of an
employee's health care might be relevant in underwriting health insurance, this
is not true of long-term disability insurance. Long-term disability insurance
protects against loss of income regardless of actual loss of the insured.
[Llong-term disability insurance benefit awards are not based on the
type of disability. That is, regardless of an eligible employee's
condition, that person receives a specific income based on a percentage
of the employee's previous wages. Variations in symptoms or
treatment regimens are irrelevant to the insurer, who does not vary the
amounts paid based on any factors related to the disability.
Accordingly, insurers cannot justify limits for persons with mental
disabilities based on the cost of the benefit.
34 1
The EEOC has taken action with respect to disparate health-insurance
benefits, creating large hurdles for the claimants in the disparate benefit claims.
In Interim Policy Guidance, the EEOC notes that some employer-provided
34 lGiliberti, supra note 180, at 603-04.
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health insurance provides inferior coverage for mental, compared to physical,
conditions:
[Siuch broad distinctions, which apply to the treatment of a multitude
of dissimilar conditions and which constrain individuals both with
and without disabilities, are not distinctions based on disability.
Consequently, although such distinctions may have a greater impact
on certain individuals with disabilities, they do not intentionally
discriminate on the basis of a disability and do not violate the ADA.
This Interim Guidance, though lacking the force of regulations, presents a
significant barrier to individuals with mental disabilities who wish to challenge
the terms of a health insurance contract.
Notice, however, that the Interim Guidance applies only to health insurance.
It does not apply to disability insurance. The EEOC has taken no action with
respect to the latter, except, significantly, to challenge disparate long-term
disability benefits in court. Neither can the logic of the Interim Guidance be
transferred to disability insurance, because in disability plans, all the covered
individuals are disabled. Selecting for inferior treatment only those with
mental disabilities is intentional discrimination on the basis of a disability. This
is a violation of the ADA. 343
VI. EMPLOYEE REIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT AND PARKER V.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
A. United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
Parker's ERISA claim against MetLife was that its refusal to pay her disability
benefits was a violation of the terms of the plan344 inasmuch as her disability
was physical, not mental, in nature. Applying a deferential standard of review
to the insurer's decision to terminate benefits, the district court determined that
MetLife's decision that Parker's disability was at least partially mental or
nervous, and its consequent denial of benefits beyond the twenty-four month
period, was not unreasonable. 34 5
342EEOC: INTERIM POuCY GUIDANCEON ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE (JUNE 8,1993);
AMERiCANS WITH DISABILmIES ACT MANUAL (BNA) 70:1051 No. 18, FAIR EMPL. PRAC.
MANUAL (BNA) 405: 7115.
343 Because this second issue, involving "fair discrimination" and subterfuge, is also
related to Title III claims, further discussion is found supra Part VII.
34429 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1974) allows a plan participant or beneficiary to bring a
civil action to enforce rights under the plan or to clarify the right to receive future
benefits.
345 Parker, 875 F. Supp. 1321. Although the district court was responding to MetLife's
Motion for Summary Judgment, a deferential standard of review was said to be proper
for the following reasons. Under ERISA, a claim that benefits were improperly denied
is "reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan." Id. at 1328 (citation omitted). If discretionary authority is retained,
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The district court recognized an ERISA decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 346 in which
the claimant argued that the biological causes of her affective mood disorder
removed it from the definition of mental illness and placed it within the
definition of physical illness. However, The Eighth Circuit declined to consider
the possibility of biological causes. Instead, it emphasized that the terms of an
ERISA plan should be given their ordinary meanings. Even though laypersons
might understand that some mental illnesses are biological in origin, these
laypersons would classify a disease by its symptoms, not by its origins. Since
laypersons would characterize the claimant's symptoms as a mental illness, the
court would also do so for purposes of an ERISA claim.347
The Parker district court similarly concluded that defendant MetLife's
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
Based on a thorough review of the record that was before MetLife...
MetLife's decision was reasonable in light of . . . the plan['s]
provisions ... The provision says nothing about what the origin or
cause of the mental disorder must be, and under Brewer, MetLife
properly determined that regardless of the origins of plaintiff's
depression that plaintiff should be reimbursed under the
nervous/mental illness clause of the policy.'
3 48
Defendant Schering-Plough was also successful in its Motion for Summary
Judgment on the ERISA claim. The district court recognized that under some
circumstances an employer may be a proper party under the ERISA section
relied upon by Parker.349 Under the particular circumstances of this case,
however, whether Schering-Plough was a proper defendant was found
immaterial because the administration of the plan did not violate ERISA.
then a deferential standard of review is appropriate. In the benefits plan in this case,
MetLife had such discretionary authority and was consequently entitled to a deferential
standard of review.
Under this standard, "an 'ERISA benefit plan administrator's decisions on
eligibility for benefits are not arbitrary and capricious if they are rational in light of the
plan's provisions.'" Id. at 1330 (citation omitted). While thepossible existence of a conflict
of interest must be taken into account as a factor in determining whether discretion has
been abused, a conflict of interest does not change the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review. Id.
346921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990).
347Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1331. The district court concluded, "Thus, in determining
whether the condition could be classified as a 'mental illness' under the policy, the
Brewer court did not focus on the condition's etiology." Id.
3481d. at 1332.
349Parker's ERISA claim against her employer was a wrongful denial of benefits claim
under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA.
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B. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit three-judge panel affirmed the district court's conclusion
that Parker had no ERISA claim because the benefit plan retained discretionary
authority which was not exercised arbitrarily or capriciously in determining
that Parker's illness should be classified as nervous/mental rather than
physical. The panel added, however, that "[i] f the standard of review were de
novo, perhaps there would be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
chemical imbalances which lead to depression are 'physical' or 'mental'
disorders."350
The ERISA claim was not presented to the en banc Sixth Circuit.
VII. TITLE III OF THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILrTES AcT
A. Language of the Statute
Title III of the ADA prohibits public accommodations from discriminating
against persons with disabilities. A person who as a benefit of employment
receives long-term disability benefits for mental disabilities that are inferior to
benefits for physical disabilities may challenge the disparity under Title III of
the ADA 351 by suing the insurer. There are two major issues in Title III litigation
in such cases. The first is a threshold issue: whether the insurer, which has
contracted with an employer to offer disability coverage to the employees, is a
public accommodation. The second issue is whether the disparity between
physical and mental benefits comes within the safe harbor or subterfuge
provisions of Title V of the ADA.352
All courts begin the analysis of the threshold issue with consideration of the
language of the statute. Title III is governed by a general rule:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accomodation.
353
The statute goes to some lengths to elaborate what constitutes
discriminatory conduct under the general rule. For example, the statement of
35099 F.3d 181, 185.
35142 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1990).
352Title V, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1990), addresses diverse miscellaneous matters,
including provisions for attorneys fees, requirements that various federal agencies
develop technical assistance plans to assist covered entities to comply with the Act, and
exclusions of certain conditions and disorders (such as sexual behavior disorders,
compulsive gambling, and illegal use of drugs) from the definition of disability. Title V
is implicated in Title III cases of the type discussed in this article because it includes a
section related to insurance.
35342 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
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the general rule is immediately followed with activities that come within the
general prohibition, including denial of participation in a benefit, participation
in an unequal benefit, or provision of a separate benefit.354 Specific examples
of discrimination under the general rule are then set forth such as imposition
of eligibility criteria that screens out individuals from equally enjoying
services, privileges, or advantages.355
The threshold issue arises over the meaning of the phrase place of public
accommodation as it appears in the general rule. Does the phrase mean that a
disabled person merely must be provided non-discriminatory access to the
3541t shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals
on the basis.of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class,
directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements,
to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to partici-
pate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of an entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual ... on the basis of
a disability... of such individual... directly, or through contractual,
licensing, or other arrangements with the opportunity to participate
in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).
It shall be discriminatory to provide an individual ... on the basis
of a disability,... with a good, service, facility, privilege, advan-
tage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that pro-
vided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide
the individual or class of individuals with a good, service, facility,
privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other opportunity that
is as effective as that provided to others.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
For purposes of clauses (i) through (iii) of this subparagraph, the
term "individual or class of individuals" refers to the clients or cus-
tomers of the covered public accommodation that enters into the
contractual, licensing, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv).
It is made clear that the general rule is to be construed to apply to administrative
methods:
An individual or entity shall not, directly or through contractual
or other arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of
administration-
(i) that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability;
or
(ii) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject
to common administrative control.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(D).
355Discrimination includes:
the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out an individual with a disability.., from fully and
equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations...
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
[Vol. 12:205
TITLE I AND TITLE III OF THE ADA
places-the physical structures-in which goods and services are offered to the
public? Or does the general rule mean that disabled persons must be provided
non-discriminatory access to the goods and services that are offered to
non-disabled members of the public, not only when they present themselves
at the physical place of business, but also when they access the goods and
services in some other way (for example, by telephone or as a result of contract
obtained as a benefit of employment)? Courts have held both ways, using the
definitional sections of Title III to demonstrate the correctness of their decisions.
Title III defines public accommodation by providing a non-exclusive list of
examples. The listed examples frequently make use of the word "place" (as in
place of lodging, place of exhibition, place of public gathering, or place of
education),356 especially to extend the examples of the subsection to similar
entities.357 The term "establishment" is also used (as in rental establishment or
social service establishment).358 The use of these terms seems to support the
view that the term public accommodation is limited to physical structures. But
consider subsection (F):
The following private entities are considered public accommodations
for purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect
commerce-
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop,
travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station,
office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office,
professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
service establishment. 359
Unlike other sections of the statute, subsection (F) mixes entities which
principally might present a disabled person with problems of physical access
(in order to wash clothes one must be able to get into and maneuver about the
laundromat) with entities which principally might present a disabled person
with problems of access to services (the significant aspect of a travel service is
not access to the physical office, it is planning and arranging the vacation).
While this distinction cannot be taken too far, it is useful in understanding how
courts read this subsection.
What is the plain meaning of the statute? A majority of the courts which have
addressed the issue have held that the plain meaning requires an expansive
reading of the statute. However, other courts have believed that the plain
meaning of the statute requires the restriction of Title III to access to physical
356 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
357 For example, the statute lists as public accommodations: "a park, zoo, amusement
park, or other place of recreation" 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(1) (emphasis added). The word
place is presumedly used to extend the example to such things as playgrounds,
swimming pools, or golf courses.
358See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
35942 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
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structures. The plain meaning is ambiguous. This ambiguity has led to conflict
among the federal circuits with respect to the threshold issue which is the
subject of this article.
B. Cases Related to Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
The conflict in the circuits over the Title III threshold issue is best understood
by first having familiarity with related Title III holdings. The following sections
examine those related cases.
1. Cases Limiting Title III to Physical Structures
In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.,360 the court was presented with Ford's claim
that defendants Schering-Plough, the employer, and Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (MetLife), the carrier, violated Title III of the ADA by
providing plaintiff with a policy containing inferior long-term mental
disability benefits. The court determined that the "plain meaning of Title III is
that a public accommodation is a place."361 Thus, neither defendant could be
pursued under Title III as neither was a place of public accommodation. "Since
Ford received her disability benefits via her employment at Schering, she had
no nexus to Metlife's 'insurance office' and thus was not discriminated against
in connection with a public accommodation." 362
The court recognized that its holding conflicted with the First Circuit's
decision in Carparts,363 but criticized that opinion for its failure to interpret the
Act through application of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis.364 Rather, this court
determined that "we do not find the term 'public accommodation' or the terms
in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) to refer to non-physical access or even to be ambiguous
as to their meaning."365 As a result of this reasoning, plaintiff's claim under
Title III was defeated. This, combined with the determination that there was
no Title I discrimination, 366 left a disabled person with no ADA protection
despite the obvious disparate and inferior treatment provided for persons with
mental disabilities.
Pappas v. Bethesda Hospital Ass'n.,367 was decided by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Pappas sued her employer, Bethesda
360145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
36 1Id. at 612.
3621d. at 612-13, relying on Title II of the Civil Rights Act, Department of Justice
regulations, and the en banc majority opinion in Parker.
363Carparts, 37 F.3d 12. For further discussion see infra notes 377-78 and accompanying
text.
3641d. at 614.
365/d.
366See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
367861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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Hospital, which offered a health insurance plan, and Benefit Services Agency,
Inc. (BSAI), which administered the plan, because members of her family were
denied health insurance coverage due to their pre-existing medical
conditions.368 She claimed that both defendants were in violation of Titles I and
HI of the ADA369 inasmuch as both were covered entities under Title 1370 and
public accommodations under Title III.
Pappas' Title III claim was premised on the argument that the sale of
insurance contracts was within the plain language of Title III, which includes
in the list of public accommodations both insurance offices and hospitals.371
She also asserted that the sale was within Department of Justice regulations
which state that insurance contracts discriminating on the basis of disability
are prohibited by Title 111.372
In opposition, both defendants claimed that Title III was limited to physical
structures. The district court agreed because Congress "unambiguously
expressed its intent with respect to the applicability of Title IIH as it relates to
the physical use of a place of public accommodation. 373 Although Bethesda
Hospital was a physical place within the definition of public accommodation,
plaintiff was not denied access to its facility. Obviously, she had access when
she went to work. With respect to BSAI, the court reasoned that "because
plaintiff did not enter its physical structure, it is not a public
accommodation.' 374 Further, the district court found the plaintiff's claim did
not involve an inability "to make physical use of the services of a place of public
accommodation .... [Therefore] there is no nexus whatsoever between the
alleged discrimination and any public accommodation."375 This nexus
language has proven to be attractive to other courts.376
3 6 8 plaintiff's son was a paraplegic and her husband was being treated for
hypertension and hyperlipidemia. Id. at 617.
369Plaintiff also asserted civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C § 1985(3). Id. at 617-18.
370The court concluded that plaintiff did not state a Title I claim against BSAI. It
reached this conclusion by relying in part, on the district court decision in Carparts, 826
F. Supp. 583, (D.N.H. 1993), rev'd 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994). Because plaintiff did not
allege that BSAI was her employer, or that Bethesda had delegated any responsibilities
regarding employee benefits to BSAI now that BSAI was controlled by Bethesda in a
way that could create an agency relationship, plaintiff did not state facts sufficient to
state a claim under Title I. Thus the court held that "the administrator of employee
benefits for a statutory employer under the ADA is not an agent of that employer and
therefore may not be held liable for benefits that discriminate based on disability." Id. at
619.
371Typically, plaintiff relied on the language of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). Pappas, 861 F.
Supp. at 618.
372 Pappas, 861 F. Supp. at 620, citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 App. B at 600 (1993).
3 73 Pappas, 861 F. Supp. at 620.
3 741d. at 619.
3 751d. at 620.
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2. Cases Applying Title III More Expansively
a. Circuit Courts
Carparts,3 7 7 a First Circuit opinion, is the principle case for an expansive
reading of the phrase "place of public accommodation."378 In its analysis of Title
III, the court began at the familiar starting point of examining the language of
the statute. In the statutory definition of a public accommodation the court
found an illustrative list of private entities that are considered to be public
accommodations if they affect commerce. Included in the list are such entities
as a travel service, a shoe repair service, the office of an accountant or lawyer,
an insurance office, and a professional office of a health care provider.379 The
First Circuit held "[tihe plain meaning of the terms do not require 'public
accommodations' to have physical structures for persons to enter.' 380 The plain
meaning understood by the court came from the variety of listed entities that
can be classified as "service establishments"381 which can provide business
services by telephone or correspondence without requiring the customer or
client to enter a physical structure. "It would be irrational to conclude that
persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but
persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are not.
Congress could not have intended such an absurd result."382
The court further explained that even if the meaning of public
accommodation is not plain, "it is at worst, ambiguous,"383 but the ambiguity
is easily resolved by consultation of agency regulations and public policy
concerns demonstrated in the legislative history. The court recognized that the
statutorily stated purposes of the ADA include invocation of congressional
authority to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities in their
day to day lives by bringing them into the social mainstream,384 and referred
to a Senate Report that showed the intent to provide equal access to goods and
services to persons with disabilities.38 5 Specifically, with respect to the
376plaintiff's Title VII claim was also rejected by the court which held that the Civil
Rights Act would not be so broadly interpreted as to include a claim that more readily
fits under the ADA. Id. at 622.
377 Carparts, 37 F.3d 12.
378See supra notes 269-79 and accompanying text for discussion of Carparts related to
Title I.
379 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
3 80 Id.
381Id. at 19. This use of the term may be unique to the court.
3 821d.
383Id.
384 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
385 Id. citing H.R. REP. No. 485, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382.
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purposes of Title III, the court found that "Congress intended that people with
disabilities have equal access to the array of goods and services offered by
private establishments and made available to those who do not have
disabilities."38 6
While the First Circuit understood the plain language of Title III to extend
the protections of the Act beyond physical structures, the court acknowledged
that there is less clarity in sections of the statute guaranteeing a person with a
disability the opportunity "to participate in or benefit from the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity."387 These
sections do not clearly state whether the ADA intends to regulate the contents
of the products and services offered or only to provide access to existing
products and services. The safe harbor provision is also identified as containing
an ambiguity: Is the provision merely intended to assure that Title III is not
applied to direct the content of insurance plans, or is the provision intended to
clarify language contained in Titles 1, 11 and ImI applying to insurance?388
There is additional, though less persuasive, authority that Title III should not
be construed to be limited to physical structure in an important Seventh Circuit
case, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. CNA Insurance Companies.389
This case was decided on Title I grounds: the plaintiff was not a qualified
employee with a disability because her disability made it impossible for her to
continue to work.390 CNA has become important for that proposition. It is most
interesting, however, that the court emphasized that its ruling was limited to
Title I claims, adding that "different considerations come into play when
discrimination based on disability is alleged for programs or services
addressed by other subsections of the Act."391 Perhaps wisely, the court did not
elaborate. The court's remark is notable for its unequivocal quality. The court
did not say that there "may" be different considerations, or that other
subsections of the Act "might" generate a different result. Instead, the court
seemed to recognize two very important principles. The first is that the other
subsections of the ADA (Title II, which applies to public services, and Title III,
which applies to public accommodations) provide protection to disabled
persons that differs in scope from that provided by Title I. The second is that
the other subsections apply to programs or services. Apparently, when the
Seventh Circuit read Title III in 1996, it did not understand it to be limited to
physical structures.
38637 F.3d at 19, citing S. REP. No. 116, at 58 (1989).
3871d., citing 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
3881d. at 20, citing S. REP. No. 116, at 84 (1989).
38996 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
390 See supra notes 247-56 and accompanying text for discussion related to Title I.
39 1EEOC v. CNA, 96 F.3d at 1045.
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b. District Courts
Other courts have also reached the conclusion that Title III is not limited to
physical structures. In Baker v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.,392 the plaintiff was a
minor with a history of seizure disorder which had been controlled by
medication for several years. In 1993, the defendant made a telephone
solicitation to plaintiff's father, offering him the opportunity to apply for major
medical insurance. Plaintiff's father made the application. For the next year
and nine months he endeavored to get an authoritative answer as to whether
his application had been granted.393 Eventually, defendant's agents said that
the application was denied because plaintiff's medical history presented a
greater risk than allowed by the company's guidelines.394
Plaintiff filed suit under Titles III and V of the ADA alleging (a) denial of
major medical insurance coverage on the basis of his disability denied him full
and equal enjoyment of defendant's services; (b) denial of insurance denied
him the opportunity to benefit from the defendant's services; (c) denial of
benefits was based on disability not on state law; (d) defendant's failure to
conform with its own procedures for appeal denied a service to an individual
with a disability that it provided to non-disabled individuals; and (e) the
grounds given for denying coverage-greater risk and reference to vague
guidelines-was an intentional subterfuge of ADA policies.395
Defendant's responses to these claims were, first, that it was not a public
accommodation under Title III, and second, that Title V provides insurers an
exemption from ADAliability.396 Again, the meaning of public accommodation
was contested with defendant claiming the scope of the term is limited to
physical structures and plaintiff claiming the term encompasses companies
that solicit business by mail or telephone.397
The court easily found the plaintiff to be a disabled person entitled to the
protections of the ADA. The court as easily found that "[tihe place from which
defendant's telephone communication with plaintiff's father took place was an
insurance office, so it was a public accommodation." 398 Still considering the
language of the statute, the court elaborated:
The statute's use of the word "place" does imply a physical location
but, contrary to defendant's argument, the ADA does not require a
392No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995).
393The court sets out in detail plaintiff's father's efforts to provide requested
documentation, accurately determine the defendant's response to his application and
conform to the reconsideration process established by the defendant. Id. at *1-2.
394 d. at *2.
395Id.
3961d.
397Baker, 1995 WL 573430, at *2.
3981d.
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plaintiff to be physically present at the place of public accommodation
to be entitled to non-discriminatory treatment. What the statute
forbids is discrimination against an individual in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, and so forth, of a place of public
accommodation, which discrimination can occur... when a plaintiff
is not physically present at the place of public accommodation and
only has contact with that place through his father by telephone and
correspondence.
399
The district court further held that the safe harbor provision is not a blanket
exemption of insurance companies from the requirements of the ADA.
Whether coverage was denied to plaintiff on the permissible basis of
underwriting or classifying risks, or whether actuarial reasons were given
merely as a subterfuge to deny plaintiff coverage on the basis of disability, 400
was said to be a question of fact to be established at trial.
In Sharrow v. Bailey,401 the plaintiff, who was HIV positive, sued a doctor
who delayed surgery on the plaintiff for one day because the doctor was not
provided with requested protective equipment. Plaintiff's complaint contained
ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and intentional and negligent infliction of mental
distress claims.
The doctor argued he was outside the scope of Title III of the ADA because
he treated and operated on the plaintiff not at his private offices, but at a
hospital at which he was neither an employee nor in a position of authority.40 2
The district court cited cases from other jurisdictions which held that it is not
necessary for a plaintiff to show that a doctor "holds a position of authority
with the hospital to establish that he owns or operates a public
accommodation.' 403 It was not significant that the defendant never examined
the plaintiff at his private office.404 Instead, the district court emphasized the
remedial intent of the ADA and impliedly extended the scope of Title III beyond
mere physical structures.
ITihe obvious intent [of Title III] is to preclude the denial of services
available to the public generally by reason of an individual's disability.
To superimpose on the statute a requirement that the plaintiff must
present himself or herself at the defendant's place of business and there
3 9 9 1d. at *3.
4 0 0 d. at *34.
401910 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
402id. at 192.
403Id.
404Id.
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be denied service or receive unequal service would be illogical and
contrary to the underlying intent of the Act.
405
In Kotev v. First Colony Life Insurance Co.,406 the plaintiff attempted to
privately purchase life insurance from the defendant. His application was
denied on the ground that his wife was HIV-positive, which placed him in a
high-risk category.40 7 Plaintiff filed suit against the insurance company
alleging that the denial was based solely on his relationship with his wife
without actual assessment of the nature and degree of risk the relationship
actually posed to him.408 Plaintiff's complaint stated claims under Title III of
the ADA, under a state civil rights act, state tax and insurance codes, and for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.409
Defendant argued that Title III was limited to circumstances of denial of
access to physical structures and that consequently plaintiff's Title III claim
should be dismissed because the plaintiff "was not denied physical access to
S. . any of its facilities by reason of any purported disability."4 10 The district
court disagreed and held that the plain language of Title III extends the Act's
protection beyond physical structures.411 However, because the court
recognized that other courts had read the plain language of the Act to restrict
Title III to physical structures,4 12 the court explained its rationale.
The district court first examined the statute and found "Title III's plain
language does not refer to access to physical structures. '4 13 To read the statute
that narrowly would be to contradict the broad purpose of the ADA, which is
to provide a national mandate to eliminate discrimination against people with
405 d. The court relied in part on the holding of Carparts, elaborating on the idea of
ADA applicability to telephone communication:
Here the result is no different than a situation in which a patient tele-
phones a dentist or physician, informs him of his disability,... and
is denied treatment on the basis of that disability. The fact that the
denial did not take place on defendant's premises does not mean
that no violation occurred and no cause of action exists.
Id. at 192.
406927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
4 0 7 d. at 1317.
4 0 8 d.
4 0 9 Kotev's state civil rights, tax and insurance code claims survived a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 1320. His intentional and negligent infliction of mental distress claims
were dismissed for failure to make proper allegations of relationships sufficient to give
rise to the claims, but he was granted opportunity to amend his complaint on these
matters. Id. at 1324.
4 101d. at 1320.
4 1 1 Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1321.
4 12 The court cited Pappas, 861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994) and the district court
opinion in Parker. Both cases were decided by district courts in the Sixth Circuit.
4 13 Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1321.
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disabilities414 by addressing the "major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities."415
The court pointed out that the ADA protects not only people who are
disabled, but also people who are able-bodied but who are related to, or
associate with, those who are disabled.416 The court reasoned that if Title III is
limited to providing access to physical structures, then the able-bodied would
only have a Title III claim "if the public accommodation took affirmative steps
to block such person physical access. The Court does not believe that Congress
intended such an anomalous result."417
The definition of discrimination also argues for the more expansive
application of Title III. Discrimination includes the use of criteria that prevent
the enjoyment of goods, services and facilities and the failure to make
accommodations in policies and practices. 418
Furthermore, the court noted the safe harbor and subterfuge provisions of
the Act and stated the defendant "has not explained why insurers would need
this 'safe harbor' provision under Title III if insurers could never be liable under
Title III for conduct such as the discriminatory denial of insurance coverage.' 419
Finally, the court considered Department of Justice Regulations and
legislative history and concluded, as has every court that has considered this
authority, that Title III applies to insurance policies. 420
C. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
1. United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
Title III of the ADA provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
4 14 Id.
4 15Id.
4 161d. at 1320, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E) (1990).
4 171d. at 1322.
418 Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1322.
4 19 1d. This problem arises because the referenced section, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c),
specifically states that it is relevant to Titles I and II. In a related ruling, the court rejected
the defendant's contention that the safe harbor provision bars a Title III claim altogether,
and declined to rule whether the defendant's action in this case is protected by the safe
harbor provision. Id. at 1323. °
4201d. at 1322-23. Accord Attar v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, No. CA
3-96-CV-0367-R, 1997 WL 446439 (N.D. Tex. July 19,1997), holding that Title III applies
to the insurance industry and rejecting the holding of McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., No.
3:95-DV-0382-G (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 1996) (denial of coverage was not a denial of any
physical use of services).
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operates a place of public accommodation. 421 The Act elaborates that "[i]t shall
be discriminatory to afford an individual.. . on the basis of a disability... with
the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good.., that is not equal to
that afforded to other individuals."422 Furthermore, "[i]t shall be discriminatory
to provide an individual... on the basis of a disability ... with a good .. that
is different or separate from that provided to other individuals..." 423
In Parker plaintiff argued that the plain language of these sections
demonstrated that defendants, Schering-Plough and Metropolitan Life,
discriminated against her when they provided less long-term disability
benefits for mental disabilities than for physical disabilities. The district court
rejected the argument quoting the reasoning of Pappas424 that the ordinary
common meaning of the words in the statute make it clear that "its scope is
limited to discrimination in the provisions of goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations based on a disabled person's
physical ability to make use of those goods, services, etc."425
The court said Parker failed to state a claim against MetLife because she did
not allege that she was denied use of the goods and services at a place of public
accommodation. Though MetLife did admit having public offices that might
be within the scope of Title III, Parker was not denied access to those offices.
Rather, she received disability insurance as a benefit of employment. After
consulting the ADA's legislative history the court also dismissed Parker's Title
III claim against her employer, Schering-Plough. The court held that Title I, not
Title III, governs the employment relationship. 42 6
In short, Parker's Title III claim against her employer failed because Title III
does not apply to employers, and her Title III claim against MetLife failed
because Title III only requires access to physical structures.
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit-Three-Judge Panel
Parker appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.427 The developing importance of this case is evident from the fact that
amicus briefs were filed by several AIDS and mental health interest groups,
and the EEOC.428 The Sixth Circuit three-judge panel429 reversed the district
42142 U.S.C.12182(a).
42242 U.S.C § 12812(b)(1)(A)(ii).
42342 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
424pappas v. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n., 861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
425Parker, 875 F. Supp. 1321 at 1327 (citing Pappas).
4 2 6 1d. at 1327-28.
427Parker, 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996).
428The EEOC is charged with the duty to enforce the ADA. See supra note 234.
429The three-judge panel consisted of Circuit Judges Merritt and Milburn and Judge
O'Malley, United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting
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court's Title III decision by recognizing Parker's standing to bring the claim.430
This court remanded the case to allow Parker to prove that the physical/mental
distinction is, as a substantive matter, discrimination under the ADA.431
In deciding whether it is a violation of Title III to provide long-term mental
disability benefits that are less than physical disability benefits, the three-judge
panel first considered whether the ADA "prohibits discrimination in the
contents of the goods and services offered at places of public accommodation,
rather than just discrimination in terms of physical access to places of public
accommodation."432 Beginning from the principle that statutory language
must be interpreted according to its common or ordinary meaning, the
three-judge panel examined the relevant language of the "general rule" of Title
III to determine whether the ADA prohibits discrimination beyond access to
physical places. The court focused on the same language as had the district
court.4
33
The panel found that giving common and ordinary meaning to the terms of
the statute, Parker could establish all the elements for a Title III claim: Parker
was disabled; MetLife434 was a public accommodation specifically included in
the statute; provision of insurance coverage is within the common and ordinary
meaning of "service"; insurance products are included within the common
meaning of "goods"; and the good or service that Parker received was different
from what other individuals received. 435 Moreover, the panel found that to
interpret the Act to be limited merely to physical structures would render parts
of the statute superfluous, a result that would be in contravention to Supreme
Court direction. 43 6 The panel added that even if the statutory language were
not so clear, its interpretation was consistent with the principle that remedial
by designation.
43099 F.3d at 184. Parker's Title III claim was that defendants denied her the
opportunity to have access to a good or service on the basis of her disability. The panel
affirmed the district court's decisions on Parker's Title I and ERISA claims. Id. at 183.
431Id. at 184.
4321d. at 187.
433See supra notes 421-26 and accompanying text.
434Whether Parker's employer, Schering-Plough, was a proper defendant under Title
III was not determined by the panel. The issue is in doubt since Title I applies to terms
and conditions of employment while Title III applies to public accommodations, goods
and services.
435 Parker, 99 F.3d at 188.
436Id. (citing Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 145 (1991)). It appears that if
defendants and the district court were correct, the general rule of Title III could be more
clearly written to say: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of access to any place of public
accommodation." In essence the court recognized that proper wording would have
made -it unnecessary to mention anything at all about goods, services, facilities, or
advantages.
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statutes should be interpreted broadly, in a matter consistent with their stated
goals. 437
The three-judge panel compared several cases which reached the same
conclusion, particularly approving of language in Carparts,438 which held that
Title III is not limited to physical structures.
Many goods and services are sold over the telephone or by mail with
customers never physically entering the premises of a commercial
entity to purchase the goods or services. To exclude this broad category
of businesses from the reach of Title III and limit the application of Title
III to physical structures which a person must enter to obtain goods
and services would run afoul of the purposes of the [Americans With
Disabilities Act] and would severely frustrate Congress's intent that
individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges
and advantages available indiscriminately to other members of the
general public.
439
The panel found the Rehabilitation Act cases relied on by the district court
to be unpersuasive. Such reliance was misplaced, in part, because the ADA was
intended to redress the inadequacy of such laws as the Rehabilitation Act which
had failed to alleviate the discrimination experienced by disabled persons. To
limit the scope of the ADA to the terms of the Rehabilitation Act would be to
frustrate the very purpose of the ADA. The conclusion that protection of Title
III extends beyond mere physical structures to goods and services answered
the threshold question affirmatively and allowed the panel to proceed to the
substantive second issue which was whether insurance products are exempted
from Title III by the safe harbor provisions of Title V to the extent that they are
drafted in conformity with state law.440
4 3 7 1d.
43837 F.3d 12. The panel impliedly criticized the district court which "declined to
follow [Carparts] without discussion." Parker, 99 F.3d at 188-89.
439parker, 99 F.3d at 189-90 (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20).
4 40Title V of the ADA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1990), contains the safe harbor and
subterfuge provisions:
(c) Insurance
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and Title IV of this Act shall
not be construed to prohibit or restrict:
(1) an insurer... from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent
with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are
based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws
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The panel found the safe harbor provision to be "totally ambiguous on its
face."44 1 Citing United States Supreme Court authority to do so, the panel
consulted legislative history for guidance in interpreting the provision. 442 The
legislative history enabled the panel to find that the Congress did not intend
to completely insulate the insurance industry from the ADA. Instead, it found
that "insurance practices are protected by the 'safe harbor' provision, but only
to the extent that they are consistent with 'sound actuarial principles,' 'actual
reasonably anticipated experience,' and 'bona fide risk classification."' 443 The
panel added that
[ilt seems unlikely that Congress would leave the insurance industry
virtually untouched by a statute that is designed to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
There could hardly be a "good" or a "service" more central to the
day-to-day life of a seriously disabled person than insurance-for it is
often insurance coverage that will determine a disabled person's
ability to pvent the disability from limiting his or her participation
in society.
Although it recognized that agency interpretations of statutes are not binding
on the courts,445 the panel found it informative that the EEOC considers
insurance products to be covered by the Act.446
Concluding there is no complete exemption, the panel's analysis proceeded
to the last issue which was whether the ADA offers protection to insurance
products in two circumstances: when the insurance product contains terms
which are disparate but which are not intended as a subterfuge to avoid the
purposes of the ADA, and when the insurance product was adopted before the
ADA was enacted.
that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade
the purposes of subchapter [sic] I and III of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
44 1Parker, 99 F.3d at 190. The Court complained that the drafters of the statute made
it "purposely vague" in order to reach political compromise among conflicting interest
groups. "One provision [of the statute] attempts to appease the insurance industry; the
other provisions attempt to help the large group of disabled people. In doing so,
Congress has again left this Court in a position to give meaning to conflicting statutory
language designed as a political compromise." Id.
4421d. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,896 (1984)).
443Parker, 99 F.3d at 191.
4441d. at 192-93 (citations omitted).
445 Id. at 193.
4 4 6 1d. (citing Department of Justice, AMEsscANs wih DISABILITIES ACT TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 111-3.11000).
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Again relying on legislative history, the three-judge panel found that the safe
harbor section was not intended to exempt plans adopted before the ADA was
enacted. It, therefore, rejected the holding of Modderno v. King,447 a
Rehabilitation Act decision which held to the contrary. The panel concluded
that "the subterfuge language would apply to the coverage limitation imposed
on the Plaintiff in this case if it qualifies as an attempt [to] evade the purposes
of the Act, regardless of when it was first instituted.' 448
The question of whether the disparity between the mental illness benefits
and physical illness benefits at issue came within the safe harbor provision, 449
or whether it constituted a violation of Title III would have to be determined
on remand. A final result could not be reached because the case was disposed
of by the district court on summary judgment which provided no opportunity
to develop a record showing the reasons for the disparity of benefits.
At the end of the panel's opinion, two points are made, almost casually, that
become significant at the next level of review. The first point raises the question
of whether long-term disability benefits are in some way different from health
insurance benefits and should therefore be treated differently under the ADA.
The defendants had argued that EEOC regulations sanction a lower level of
benefits for treatment of mental illness than physical illness in health insurance
benefits.450 The panel reports that the plaintiff's response to this argument was
that
long-term disability, unlike health insurance, is a 'wage replacement'
benefit, not medical coverage. Thus ... the differentiation between
mental and physical ailments may be justified in the health insurance
context, but there is no similar basis for the distinction in the long-term
disability realm because of the nature of the coverage.
451
The panel offered no additional comment.
The second casually mentioned point comes from an alternative argument
offered by defendants to the effect that the ADA prohibits discrimination
against the disabled as compared to the non-disabled, but does not prohibit
44782 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This case held that a limited maximum lifetimebenefit
for mental illness, but not physical illness, fell within the safe harbor provision of the
ADA and was not subject to the subterfuge exception because the coverage limitations
were adopted before the ADA was enacted.
448Parker, 99 F.3d at 192, applying 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
44 9 1n other words, if the disparate treatment of mental disabilities can be justified by
any of the reasons set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1), and if the justification is not simply
a subterfuge to avoid the purpose of the Act, then defendants would not be in violation
of the Act.
4 50 EEOC: INTERIM POLIcY GUIDANCE ON ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE, June 8,1993,
reprinted in AMERICANS wrrH DisABnrlEs ACT MANUAL (BNA) at 70:1051-1056; Fair
Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 405:7115.
451 Parker, 99 F.3d at 193-94.
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differentiation between groups of disabled persons.452 Again, the panel offered
no comment. Yet this argument was found to be significant at the next level of
review.
3. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit-En Banc Majority
The defendants petitioned for a rehearing en banc of the three-judge panel's
decision on Parker's Title III claim.453 Rehearing was granted 454 and the case
was reargued before thirteen judges. Once again the importance of the case was
underscored by the filing of amicus briefs. Representatives of the insurance
industry offered additional assistance to the court.455 Upon rehearing, eight
circuit court judges joined an opinion reversing the three-judge panel's
decision on Parker's Title III claim and affirming the district court's decision.
Five judges dissented in two separate opinions.
a. Place of Public Accommodation
The en banc majority started its analysis at the same place the three-judge
panel had begun: consideration of the statutory language to determine
whether Title III only prohibits discrimination in access to physical structures
or whether it also prohibits discrimination in the contents of goods and
services. The en banc majority examined the ADA's general rule which prohibits
discriminatory treatment of a person with a disability by a place of public
accommodation, 456 which lists the private entities that are considered public
accommodations, 457 and which specifically prohibits a place of public
accommodation from providing unequal or separate benefits.458 The majority
concluded that while an insurance office is a place of public accommodation,
Parker
did not seek the goods and services of an insurance office. Rather,
Parker accessed a benefit plan provided by her private employer and
4521d. at 194.
453Rehearing on the ERISA claim was not sought by either party. Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1009, n.1 (6th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Plaintiff did
not seek rehearing of the district court's decision on her Title I claim. Id. at n.2.
454The Order states, "A majority of the judges in regular active service have voted for
rehearing of this case en banc." Parker, 107 F.3d 359, at 359. The effect of the Order was
to stay the mandate and restore the case on the docket as a pending appeal.
Supplemental briefs were ordered from all parties.
455Parker, 121 F.3d at 1007-08.
45642 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1990). See supra text accompanying note 353 for statutory
language.
45742 U.S.C. § 12181(7), which states: "The following private entities are considered
public accommodations for purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities
affect commerce-... (F) ... insurance office..."
458E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iv). For text see supra note 354.
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issued by MetLife. Abenefit plan offered by an employer is not a good
offered by a place of public accommodation. As is evident by
§ 12187(7), a public accommodation is a physical place .... 459
In support of the conclusion that the term public accommodation refers only
to a physical place, the majority relied on the authority of a case decided by the
Sixth Circuit, Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc. 460 In
Stoutenborough, the plaintiffs were hearing-impaired individuals who
complained that the NFL's blackout rule discriminated against them because
when telecasts were blacked out the plaintiffs had no other means to access the
games. The court in Stoutenborough found the plain language of the ADA
showed that the NFL did not fall within any of the categories of public
accommodation set forth in Title 111.461 That court also found that Department
of Justice regulations which further define the terms place and facility,462 limit
Title III to physical structures.
The majority found an analogy in the way in which a Department of Justice
regulation includes wholesale establishments within the scope of places of
public accommodation unless they sell exclusively to other businesses and not
to individuals.463 To the extent that the wholesaler does sell to an individual,
it is governed by the ADA. The court concluded that therefore, "the offering of
disability policies on a discounted rate solely to a business is not a service or
good offered by a place of public accommodation. "464
b. Goods and Services
In a second level attack on the three-judge panel's opinion, the en banc
majority held that the contents or terms of an insurance product are not
governed by Title 111.465 Again referring to Department of Justice regulations,
the court found a general regulation directed to accessibility of goods to be
persuasive. That regulation states:
The purpose of the ADA's public accommodations requirements is to
ensure accessibility to the goods offered by a public accommodation,
459Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
46059 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
4611d. at 583.
4 6 21d. relying on 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1991) which provides that a place of public
accommodation means a facility and defines facility as "all or any portion of buildings,
structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads,
walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property... and cited in
Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
463Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011-12, citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 App. B. at 604 (1996).
464Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012. This conclusion and its supporting rationale is criticized
by the dissent.
4651d. at 1012.
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not to alter the nature or mix of goods that the public accommodation
has typically provided. In other words, a bookstore, for example, must
make its facilities and sales operations accessible to individuals with
disabilities, but is not required to stock Brailled or large print books.
466
The language of Title V which is directed to the matter of insurance (and
which was extensively analyzed by the district court, especially with regard to
its safe harbor and subterfuge provisions) was merely noted by the Sixth Circuit
as a secondary citation to the DOJ regulation.467
The en banc majority held, "Title IV [sic] does not address the contents of a
long-term disability plan offered by an employer because it is not a place of
public accommodation."468 Yet the court recognized, in a footnote, that in
apparent contradiction to its holding, the Department of Justice's Technical
Assistance Manual applies Title III to the contents of insurance products.469
Interestingly, the language of the Technical Assistance Manual largely tracks
the provisions of Title V of the ADA addressed to insurance, including the safe
harbor provision. The court noted, "As this interpretation is inconsistent with
its regulations and the statutory text of Title IV, we decline to adopt it. '470
The Sixth Circuit en banc majority also rejected the decision of the First Circuit
in Carparts,471 which the three-judge panel had found persuasive. The First
Circuit had held that the provider of an employer-provided health benefit plan
which placed a cap on AIDS related illnesses, but not other physical illnesses,
was a place of public accommodation which may be in violation of the ADA.
The First Circuit had reviewed the definition of public accommodation in 42
USC § 12181(7) and concluded that its plain meaning included "providers of
services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical
structure. "472
The en banc majority derived from 42 USC § 12181(7) a plain meaning directly
opposite that derived from the statute by the panel and the First Circuit. The
majority rejected the First Circuit's plainly-derived meaning as a violation of
the canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, which states that the
meaning of ambiguous terms should be ascertained by reference to
surrounding words or phrases. Because the majority found the language of the
statute so clear, it did not resort to consultation of legislative history.473 The
4661d. (quoting the Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B. at 630).
467 1d.
4681d. at 1013. The court must mean to refer to Title V, not Title IV.
469Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 n.5 (citing DOJ TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
§ 111-3.11000, reprinted in AMRmICANs wrrH DiSABILITIEs ACT MANUAL (BNA) at 90:0917).
4 70 1d. (citations omitted).
47137 F.3d 12.
472 Parker, 121 F.3d at 1013 (citing Carparts). The three-judge panel had agreed that this
was the plain meaning of the statute.
4 73 1d. at 1014-15. The three-judge panel had to resort to legislative history in its
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court held that "the provision of a long-term disability plan by an employer
and administered by an insurance company does not fall within the purview
of Title 111.474
C. Disparity Between Mental and Physical Disability Benefits
At this point in its opinion the en banc majority fied up loose ends. First, it
determined that the district court was correct in dismissing Parker's employer,
Schering-Plough, from the Title III claim. 475 The court pointed out that
complaints about discriminatory employment practices are within the scope
of Title 1, not Title 111.476
construction of the safe harbor and subterfuge provisions of Title V. Title V became
relevant only when the insurance product was found to be within the definition of place
of public accommodation under Title III. Because the majority found that an insurance
product was not a place of public accommodation under Title III, it did not have to
consider the terms of Title V in reaching its decision. However, the majority provided
an analytical footnote related to Title V:
Title IV [sic] and its accompanying regulations only require that an
insurance policy offered by a place of public accommodation be con-
sistent with state law and not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
the ADA to fall within the safe harbor provision. However, it is the
opinion of both the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission that disparities in insurance policies must
be supported by sound actuarial principles.
The discrepancy between the statute, the regulations, and the
agency interpretations is due to Congress' failure to define the term
"subterfuge" in Title IV [sic] of the ADA. The EEOC and the Justice
Department, in certain writings, have expressed the view that, in
order for a policy to not be a subterfuge, it must be based on sound
actuarial principles. This definition is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's definition of the term subterfuge contained in the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act.... [which requires] a specific intent
to discriminate.
We leave the resolution of the proper definition of subterfuge in
Title IV [sic] for another day because we conclude that a long-term
disability plan provided by an employer is not covered by Title III;
the safe harbor provision is, therefore, not implicated.
Parker, 121 F.3d at 1013 n.7 (citations omitted).
4741d. at 1014.
475Id. at 1008-09. The three-judge panel had reversed the district court's dismissal of
Schering-Plough and remanded the question of whether an employer who provides, and
perhaps partly administers, an employee insurance plan is a proper Title III defendant.
4761d. at 1014. The majority recognized EEOC regulations and case law which
prohibited discrimination against disabled persons in benefit plans such as health
insurance but did not comment upon them except in a footnote elaborating upon a
district court decision which found that "it would make no sense to construe Title III as
including employment practices within its scope. Indeed to do so might wreak havoc
with the careful balance that Congress attempted to strike in Title I between the rights
of employers and the rights of workers with disabilities." Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015 n.12
(quoting Motzin v. Trustees of Boston Univ. 938 F. Supp. 983, 996 (D. Mass. 1996)).
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The court then went on to decide a question which had not been fully
discussed by either the district court or the Sixth Circuit three-judge panel. The
issue was raised by defendants before the panel as an alternative argument
asserting that "the Disabilities Act does not protect against differentiation
between different groups of disabled persons, only against discrimination
against the disabled versus the non-disabled."477 While it is clear that resolution
of this issue was not necessary to the disposition of this case, the en banc
majority unequivocally stated:
The disparity in benefits provided in the policy at issue is also not
prohibited by the ADA because the ADA does not mandate equality
between individuals with different disabilities. Rather the ADA
prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled;
specifically, the ADA mandates that the owners, lessors, and operators
of public accommodations provide equal access to the disabled and
the non-disabled. Because all employees at Schering-Plough, whether
disabled or not, received the same access to the long-term disability
plan, neither the defendants nor the plan discriminated between the
disabled and the able bodied.4 78
In support of this declaration, the court drew upon several cases interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act,4 7 9 including EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos.,4 8 0 which, like
4 7 7 parker, 99 F.3d 181 at 194.
4 7 8 Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015-16.
4 7 9 0ne of the cases, Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996), held a Foreign
Service Benefit Plan which limited mental health benefits to a lifetime limit of $75,000
without parallel limits for physical illnesses, was not a violation of the Rehabilitation
Act. This holding was based on the reasoning that across-the-board limits on one type
of illness were authorized by the Supreme Court's opinion in Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985), and that, therefore, partial limits was permissible. Id. at 1061-62.
The three-judge panel cited Modderno for a much narrower proposition: that the
coverage limitations at issue in the case fell within the safe harbor provision of the ADA
but were not subject to the subterfuge exception because they were adopted before the
ADA was enacted. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 191-92. The majority agreed "[tihe court in
Modderno also held that the cap on mental health benefits under the plan would not
constitute a subterfuge under Title IV of the ADA which applies to the Rehabilitation
Act," Parker, 121 F.3d at 1017 n.14. The court did not explain its conclusion.
48096 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996). This case is particularly relevant for two reasons. First,
as it addresses issues very similar to those presented in Parker and Carparts it illuminates
the split between the circuits.
Second, it took into account a proposed amendment to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 which had been defeated before that Act's
passage. The proposed amendment would have required mental and physical illnesses
to receive the same coverage. The Seventh Circuit took the defeat of the proposed
amendment to mean that "the issue of parity among physical and mental health benefits
is one that is still in the legislative arena." Id. at 1044. What the Seventh Circuit could
not have known was that a mental health amendment would soon be enacted. For
further discussion of EEOC v. CNA Ins., see notes 247-56 infra and accompanying text.
The court also cited Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996),
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Parker, involved long-term disability insurance benefits. The majority aligned
itself with the courts that hold that if the identical policy is offered to all
employees there is no discrimination under the ADA even if there is disparate
impact on people with disabilities.
The same policy is provided to all employees who, when they receive
it, are not disabled but working. The fact that some may become
disabled for different reasons does not amount to discrimination in
providing the policy. The ADA simply does not mandate equality
between individuals with different disabilities. Rather the ADA, like
the Rehabilitation Act, prohibits discrimination between the disabled
and the non-disabled.
This section of the en banc majority's opinion is particularly interesting
insofar as it takes into account the impact of The Mental Health Parity Act of
1996 (MHPA).482 An amendment to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act,483 the MHPA was enacted after all the cases cited in Parker
were decided, but before Parker was itself was decided.484 This Act strives to
achieve parity between mental or nervous and medical or surgical benefits: a
health insurance policy does not impose annual or lifetime benefits on physical
health insurance benefits, it must not do so for mental health benefits. The
majority, together with defendants and some amicus curiae, took enactment of
the MHPA to be evidence that the ADA did not generally mandate parity
between mental and physical benefits. On the other hand, the majority
emphasized that the MHPA could not have helped Parker.485 "lIlt appears that
Congress did not believe the necessity for parity between mental and physical
disabilities in long-term disability plans was sufficiently compelling to include
a Title I case in which an employee claimed her employer's exclusion from the medical
benefits plan of infertility treatments was discriminatory. The court held that the only
discrimination addressed by the ADA is between the non-disabled and the disabled.
"Insurance distinctions that apply equally to all insured employees, that is, to
individuals with disabilities and to those who are not disabled, do not discriminate on
the basis of disability." Krauel, 95 F.3d at 678. (To support this decision, the Eighth Circuit
was persuaded by EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance.)
48 1Parker, 121 F.3d at 1017.
48242 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (1996).
48342 U.S.C. § 300gg-1.
484The MHPA was enacted the day before the Seventh Circuit's EEOC v. CNA
decision was released, and two weeks after the Eighth Circuit's Krauel decision, see
Parker, 121 F.3d at 1017 and 1018 n.17. It was enacted after the Sixth Circuit three-judge
panel's decision. Id. at 1017 n.15.
485The court recognized that the HIPA specifically does not apply to disability income
insurance. Id. at 1018 relying on 42 USC § 300gg-91(c)(1)(A).
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them within the purview of the Act.' 486 The distinction between health
insurance benefits and long-term disability benefits has become significant
because of the majority's reasoning in Parker.
4. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit-En Banc Dissents
Five members of the en banc Sixth Circuit dissented in two opinions. One
was written by Judge Merritt, who had written the decision for the three-judge
panel. He was joined by Chief Judge Martin and Judges Moore, Daugherty and
Cole. The dissents show that five judges of the Sixth Circuit adopt the view of
Carparts, Baker, Sharrow and Kotev that the plain meaning of the term public
accommodation extends beyond physical structures.
Chief Judge Martin dissented in order to emphasize two points of
disagreement with the majority. First, he believed the majority incorrectly
interpreted Stoutenborough,487 an opinion he wrote. Second, he believed the
majority's opinion on the Title III claim conflicted with clear congressional
intent.
Chief Judge Martin's dissent criticized the majority's reliance on
Stoutenborough to reach the conclusion that Title III is limited to physical
structures. Indeed the opinion in Stoutenborough stated: "plaintiffs' argument
that the prohibitions of Title III are not solely limited to 'places' of public
accommodation contravenes the plain language of the statute.' 488 However,
Chief Judge Martin pointed out the statement was made in the context of
determining whether the defendants fell within one of the twelve categories
which Title III sets forth to define public accommodation.489 Because television
broadcast of football games does not appear among the categories included
within the definition of public accommodations, defendants were not
governed by Title 111.490 In contrast, the Parker case involves insurance. Title III
does include insurance offices within the categories of public
accommodation. 491 Consequently, since they are specifically mentioned by the
plain language of the statute, the defendants in Parker should be governed by
Title III.
Judge Martin's dissent further criticized the majority's limitation of Title III
to physical structures as inconsistent with the better-reasoned First Circuit
decision in Carparts492 and as "completely at odds with clear congressional
486parker, 121 F.3d at 1018.
4871d. at 1019 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
488Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d 580, at 583.
489 parker, 121 F.3d at 1019 (Martin, C.J., dissenting), relying on 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7)(A)-(L) (1990).
490Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583.
4 9 1 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
492parker, 121 F.3d at 1019-20 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
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intent.' 493 By limiting Title III's application to physical structures, the majority
deprives disabled persons of the "unprecedented freedom"494 that would have
otherwise been offered to them by technological advances, particularly
through communications media.495 This dissent concluded that a
contradictory consequence of the majority's opinion will be that "[a]s the
modem economy increases the percentage of goods and services available
through a marketplace that does not consist of physical structures, the
protections of Title III will become increasingly diluted. '496
The second dissent was written by Judge Merritt. He began by emphasizing
agreement with the three-judge panel's opinion that as a matter of clear
statutory language Title III applies to employer-sponsored insurance plans. He
pointed out that because the majority opinion conflicts with decisions in other
circuits, an "unnecessary conflict between these two views will now have to be
resolved by the Supreme Court."497
Judge Merritt's dissent focused primarily on the illogical consequences of
the majority's holding, both in terms of policy and of statutory interpretation.
For example, if the ADA does not cover employer-sponsored plans, why does
Title V under some conditions provide a safe harbor for insurance companies?
Judge Merritt's dissent acknowledges the fact that the vast majority of people
who have health and disability insurance receive it as a benefit of employment
and demonstrates the belief that Congress would not have intended the ADA
to provide protection only to those who can afford to independently purchase
health and disability insurance.498 Evidence that congressional intent was to
include employer-sponsored plans was provided by reference to Senate and
House committee reports which clarify the conditions under which limitations
on coverage based on classification of risk are permissible499 and to EEOC and
DOJ views that employer group health insurance is covered by the ADA. 500
4931d. at 1020.
494 Id.
4951d.
4961d. The dissent agreed with the First Circuit's view of the need to interpret Title III
to extend beyond mere physical structures: "'It would be irrational to conclude that
persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons
who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could
not have intended such an absurd result."' Id. at 1019, quoting Carparts.
497Parker, 121 F.3d at 1022 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
498
"It boggles the mind to think that Congress would include only the few people who
walk into an insurance office to buy health insurance but not the millions who get such
insurance at work. This distinction drawn by the court produces an absurd result." Id.
at 1021.
499Briefly, the Congressional reports state that such limitations on coverage are
permissible only where the classification is based on sound actuarial principles or
reasonably anticipated experience. See id.
500Id. at 1021.
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Furthermore, this dissent found it to be bad policy to make applicability of
Title III turn on whether a disabled person obtained insurance coverage from
her employer or whether she walked into an insurance office and purchased
it.501 Finally, this dissent pointed out that extending Title III to
employer-provided plans would not necessarily require equivalent benefits for
mental and physical disabilities. The extension would only require that the
distinction be based on sound actuarial principles and bona fide risk
classification.
D. Analysis of Title III Issues
1. Ambiguity of the General Rule of Title III
Whether an insurer of employer-provided long-term disability insurance is
governed by the requirements of Title III of the ADA must be determined by
the language of the statute. The general rule of Title III is: "No individual shall
be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."502
The general rule prohibits denial of participation, 503 as well as participation in
unequal benefit.504 When the statute uses the term individual or class of
individuals, it "refers to the clients or customers of the covered public
accommodation that enters into the contractual, licensing or other
arrangement."50 5
The simplest meaning of the general rule is that one who operates a place of
public accommodation may not discriminate in providing persons with
disabilities access to the goods and services it offers. Clearly the first part of the
general rule states that individuals with disabilities must enjoy full access not
only to physical structures (facilities) but also to goods, services and
advantages. If the statute ended there, it would be clear that an expansive
reading of the scope of Title III would be unambiguously correct and the
limitation of the protection of Title III to access to physical structure would be
clearly incorrect.
However, the general rule contains language that it is the goods and services
of any place of public accommodation to which full and equal enjoyment must
be assured. It is here that an ambiguity sets in. The use of the word place can
be understood as a convenient way in which to convey the concept that the
general rule applies to all different kinds of businesses or services that interact
501 d. at 1020.
50242 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1990).
50342 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). For text see supra note 354.
504 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). For text see supra note 354.
50542 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). For text see supra note 354.
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with the general public. Alternatively, use of the word place can be understood
to mean that the prohibition of the general rule is in some way limited to apply
only to physical structures. If place means only physical structures, then it can
be argued that a public accommodation is only governed by the general rule
when it interacts with a disabled person at some facility or physical place.
What is a place of public accommodation? The term place of public
accommodation is not defined by the statute. Instead the term public
accommodation is defined. The definition of public accommodation is divided
into categories or types of public accommodations such as those that provide
food, entertainment, shopping, recreation, education, or services. Each
category includes illustrative examples. Included in the recreation category of
public accommodation are parks, zoos, and amusement parks. Included in the
service category are offices of accountants, lawyers, insurance offices, and
travel services. In all, over thirty specific private entities, and similar entities,
are considered public accommodations for purposes of this subchapter if their
operations affect commerce.506
The definition of public accommodation includes more than physical
structures in which a public entity operates. It includes equal access to the
goods and services that the entity provides. This must be true as otherwise the
statutory definition of public accommodation would have been much more
easily (and briefly) written to state: "a public accommodation is a physical
structure in which recreation, entertainment, or services are offered to the
public."
Yet some courts have read the definition as merely a list of types of facilities
or physical structures. This construction is hard to defend given the ease with
which Congress could have utilized language stating that Title III is limited to
physical structures. This narrow definition also fails to recognize that other
terms are used in the definition, including establishment and service.507 It
seems to be a strained interpretation because a separate section in Title III, and
supporting regulations, address the problem of architectural barriers.508
Further, it is hard to see how else to express the various examples of public
accommodations except with the word place. Even if the limiting interpretation
is possible, so is the expansive interpretation. Again, the result is ambiguity.
Because the general rule refers not to any public accommodation, but to any
place of public accommodation, at least one court reasoned that a disabled
person must only be provided barrier-free access to the physical structure
which a public accommodation operates. In Pappas,509 the court agreed that
insurance offices are places of public accommodation to which Title III applies,
50642 U.S.C. § 12181(7). See also, discussion supra Part VII(A).
50742 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
508 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(v) and 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (1991).
509861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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but found that the claim was invalid because there was no nexus between the
alleged discrimination and the public accommodation.510
Other courts have held that the inclusion of the word place means the general
rule requires non-discriminatory access to goods and services only when the
disabled person presents himself at the physical structure at which the public
accommodation operates. This appears to be the holding that Judge Kennedy,
writing for the en banc majority, was defending in Parker, when she noted in a
footnote that:
Judge Merritt's dissent suggests that our opinion concludes that
Parker's disability plan obtained through her employer is not covered
by Title III because she physically did not access her policy from
MetLife's insurance office. We have not so held. The policy Parker
obtained is not covered by Title III because Title III covers only physical
places. We have expressed no opinion as to whether a plaintiff must
physically enter a public accommodation to bring suit under Title III
as opposed to merely accessing, by some other means, a service or good
provided by public accommodation.
511
This assertion stands in at least partial contrast to the main body of the opinion
where Judge Kennedy wrote:
the good that plaintiff seeks [long-term disability insurance] is not
offered by a place of public accommodation. The public cannot enter
the office of MetLife or Schering-Plough and obtain the long-term
disability policy that plaintiff obtained. Parker did not access her
policy from MetLife's insurance office. Rather, she obtained her
benefits through her employer. There is, thus, no nexus between the
disparity in benefits and the services which MetLife offers to the public
from its insurance office.
5 12
Obviously, MetLife does offer long-term disability insurance from insurance
offices. Apparently, if Ms. Parker had walked into an office and privately
purchased the insurance, she would have established the nexus Judge Kennedy
requires for creation of Title III protection from discrimination. It is unclear
what other conduct would have been sufficient, especially because the nexus
language comes directly from Pappas, in which the holding clearly limits Title
III to physical structures.
A slightly different rationale for the holding appears in another part of the
Parker en banc majority opinion.
While we agree that an insurance office is a public accommodation...
plaintiff did not seek the goods and services of an insurance office.
Rather Parker accessed a benefit plan provided by her private
510id. at 620. See also, supra notes 367-76 and accompanying text.
511Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011 n.3.
5121d. at 1011.
1997-98]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
employer and issued by MetLife. Abenefit plan offered by an employer
is not a good offered by a place of public accommodation.
513
This reasoning allows insurers to avoid all the requirements of Title III by
passing the insurance through a third party, the employer. The reasoning
supports, and possibly creates, a kind of subterfuge not sanctioned by the ADA.
When this reasoning is viewed as expressing the plain meaning of the statute,
rather than a resolution of an ambiguity in the statute, elaboration or discussion
comes to a halt. For example in Parker, the en banc majority held that the plain
meaning of Title III did not allow plaintiff to proceed against the insurer
because it was not a place of public accommodation. The opinion added, "We
have not referred to legislative history in our discussion of this issue because,
where the statutory meaning is clear, we do not resort to legislative history"514
On the other hand, surely the ADA's statutory purposes, duly enacted with the
substantive provisions of the Act, are highly relevant to its enforcement. In
terms of authoritativeness, this expression of intent is several cuts above
legislative history. The court's narrow interpretation is contrary to the
articulated statutory purposes of the ADA. Instead, the statutory purposes of
the ADA clearly intend for Title III to be applied broadly.
Other courts have not placed emphasis on the word place, but simply
interpreted the general rule in light of an expansive definition of public
accommodation. For example, in Carparts, the First Circuit held that any
ambiguity, properly placed in context, had to be resolved in the broader sense
and that to rule otherwise would frustrate congressional intent. 515 The same
interpretation was reached in Kotev516 and Sharrow.517
A great deal of the ambiguity that appears when one switches from the
substantive section of the statute to the definitional section of statute dissolves
if the rule and the definition are tied together to provide guidance in a specific
instance. One might hypothetically merge the two sections in the following
way:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of a disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an insurance office or
5131d. at 1010.
514 1d. at 1014 n.10. This illustrates the irony of seeing statutory language as clear: even
if the result is contradictory to the legislative intent, the language of the statute will be
enforced.
51537 F.3d 12, 19-20. The court warned that it did not determine more than this
threshold issue. For example, the court suggested that the meaning of § 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)&(ii), which prohibit denial of participation in goods and services and
participation in unequal goods and services, is both general and ambiguous. Id. at 19.
For further discussion see supra notes 269-79, 377-88 and accompanying text.
516927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Col. 1996).
517910 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
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other service establishment (place of public accommodation) by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates an insurance office
or other service establishment (place of public accommodation).
Placing the definition and the rule together in this way makes clear that the
general rule is directed at the conduct of persons toward disabled clients or
customers during operation of a public facility and that the non-discrimination
prohibition is directed toward the goods and services which constitute the
business, not the office or structure from which the entity operates. Note that
the prohibition takes effect if the person owns or operates a place of public
accommodation, not the place at which the disabled individual has presented
himself.
Confining the protections of the statute to those who enter a physical
structure is to underestimate the power of language to define. It is easy to select
a term for, and write a definition that identifies, physical structures. The
Department of Justice did so in the definition of facility, which means "any
portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment.., or other real
or personal property, including the site where the building, structure... is
located."5 18 That Congress chose other terms which in common parlance have
a broader meaning should be judicially respected.
It is interesting to see how three courts tried to decipher the meaning of place
of public accommodation by reference to common law rules of construction.
The en banc Parker majority understood the plain meaning of public
accommodation was directly opposite to the understanding of the three-judge
panel and the First Circuit. The en banc Parker majority rejected the First
Circuit's plainly-derived meaning as a violation of the canon of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, which states that the meaning of ambiguous terms
should be ascertained by reference to surrounding words or phrases. With
respect to the very same statute, the Sixth Circuit three-judge panel accused the
Western District of Tennessee of ignoring a Supreme Court rule of statutory
construction which requires interpretation of language in a way that does not
render remaining parts of a statute superfluous.5 19 One conclusion is obvious:
this statute has no plain meaning. It is ambiguous.
2. Department of Justice Regulations
The United States Department of Justice is charged with creating regulations
governing Title III. The regulations it promulgated include a restatement of the
general rule.
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
51828 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1991).
519Along these lines the Kotev court wondered "why insurers would need [the] 'safe
harbor' provision [of Title V] if insurers could never be liable under Title III for conduct
such as the discriminatory denial of insurance coverage." 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1322.
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privileges, advantages or accommodation of any place of public
accommodation by any private entity who owns, leases (or leases to),
or operates a place of public accommodation.
520
This regulation is nearly identical to the general rule of the statute, except
the regulation replaces the word person with the term private entity Because
the regulations define private entity to mean "a person or entity other than a
public entity,"521 the change is not significant for present purposes. Any
ambiguity that lies in the statute is continued in the regulations.
The regulations, like the statute, define public accommodation, but give it a
different meaning: "Public accommodation means a private entity that owns,
leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation."522 The
regulations also define place of public accommodation, giving to that term the
definition the statute provides for a public accommodation.523
The Department of Justice Regulations must be recognized to reflect an
expansive reading of Title III, and not to limit its prohibitions to instances where
the defendant operates from a physical structure. However, courts that view
the plain language of the statute to be more limited decline to adopt the
regulations. The Pappas court, for instance, drew upon United States Supreme
Court authority to the effect that an administrative regulation would only be
deferred to where "Congress has not expressed its intent with respect to the
question and then only if the administrative interpretation is reasonable."524
The Pappas court found that because the regulation was inconsistent with the
plain meaning of the statute, it would not be followed.
The Parker en banc majority acknowledged that the Department of Justice
Technical Assistance Manual interprets Title III to include prohibition against
discrimination in the content of insurance contracts, but declined to adopt that
interpretation, saying it is "inconsistent with [Department of Justice] regula-
52028 C.F.R. § 36.201 (a).
52128 C.F.R. § 36.104.
522Id.
523Again, tying the general rule and a specific example from the definition section
shows that the effect of this small change is to make even clearer that an expansive
reading of the rule is intended. So one might hypothetically link the two sections to say:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of a disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations of an insurance office or other
service establishment (place of public accommodation) by any insurance
company (private entity) who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates an
insurance office or other service establishment (place of public accom-
modation).
This general rule is directed at private entities who operate a public facility, but the
non-discrimination prohibition is directed toward the goods and services which
constitute the business, not the office or structure from which the entity operates.
524Pappas, 861 F. Supp. 616,620.
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tions and the statutory text of Title IV [sic]." 525 The Department of Justice
regulation with which the majority says the Technical Assistance Manual is
inconsistent is the definition of wholesale establishments. 526 This definition
appears, not in the regulations themselves, but in commentary which appears
in an appendix to the regulations.527 No mention is made of other Department
of Justice regulations other than those related to Title V.
On the other hand, the Kotev court, which found Title III to have a more
expansive scope, found support in Department of Justice regulations. 528 This
court found persuasive support for the more expansive reading of Title III in
the same document the Parker en banc majority found support for a narrower
reading: "The Department of Justice further notes that 'life and health
insurance are the areas where the regulation will have its greatest application.'
... This commentary is consistent with the legislative history" of the ADA.529
3. Department of Justice Technical Assistance Manual
The Department of Justice Technical Assistance Manual demonstrates that
the Department of Justice understands Title III to extend beyond assuring
access to physical structures.
Insurance offices are places of public accommodation and, as such,
may not discriminate on the basis of disability in the sale of insurance
contracts or in the terms or conditions of the insurance contracts they
offer.5
30
The broad range of title III obligations relating to "places of public
accommodation" must be metby entities that the Department of Justice
regulation labels as "public accommodations.-.
531
This Technical Guidance says insurance offices (which are undeniably places
of public accommodation because they are included as an example in the
service category of the statutory definition of public accommodation) must not
discriminate in the terms and conditions of insurance contracts. It also says that
525Parker, 121 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.5. The court must intend to refer to Title V.
5261d. at 1011.
52728 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B at 604 (1996).
528Kotev, 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1322-23.
529Id. at 1323.
530U.S. Dept. of Justice, THE AMERICANs wrTH DISABILITIES ACT TrrLE III TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL: COVERING PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES
(Nov. 1993) at § III-3.11000. The section explains that all types of insurance are covered
by Title III.
5311d. at § 111-1.2000. The entities referred to are the same as those referred to in the
statute and regulation. The Department of Justice considers places of public
accommodation to have a broad range of Title Ill obligations--not simply the obligation
to provide access.
1997-981
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
insurance offices are subject to a broad range of Title III obligations. So at least
it is clear that the Department of Justice believes that a person with a disability
who enters an insurance office must be provided non-discriminatory insurance
contracts,532 not simply an accessible entrance to the insurance office.
It can possibly be argued that these sections still do not clarify whether a
disabled person who seeks insurance by telephone or through his employer
also is entitled to a non-discriminatory contract. But surely it must be so.
Otherwise, to secure the protections of Title III, millions of persons with
disabilities would have to make a trek to the physical space in which the
insurer's representative sits. This has more than one element of absurdity to it,
especially since most insurance contracts are not drafted or even signed in
insurance offices. They are drafted in the insurers' home office and transmitted
to the insured by mail. The legal work of an insurance contract is done by an
employee of the insurer at a central location that may be hundreds of miles
from a disabled insured. Surely the validity of the contract terms cannot turn
on whether the insured showed up at a local office. Also it would be shockingly
poor drafting if this important threshold requirement were not clearly and
specifically set forth in the statute.
A further absurdity appears when one thinks that this would mean that
insurance companies would have to have two sets of insurance contracts to
cover individuals with similar actuarial characteristics and risks-one for
people with a disability who receive the insurance by telephone or as a benefit
of employment, and one for people with a disability who show up at an
insurance office. It would be permissible to discriminate against the former but
not the latter. Most non-elderly Americans would have the discriminatory form
of insurance because the majority of insured Americans receive their insurance
as a benefit of employment. Only those wealthy enough to afford to buy
insurance privately, and healthy enough to obtain it, would be covered by the
ADA, providing they were knowledgeable enough and ambulatory enough to
present themselves at the insurer's business facility. Title III, a comprehensive,
remedial, civil rights statute was not written or intended to exclude the majority
of Americans and those who are most severely in need of its protections.
532This section warns that because of the nature of insurance, disparities in coverage
of disabled persons are permitted so long as the disparities are justified by the use of
sound actuarial principles:
Because of the nature of the insurance business... consideration of
disability in the sale of insurance contracts does not always constitute
"discrimination." An insurer or other public accommodation may
underwrite, classify, or administer risks that are based on or not
inconsistent with State law, provided that such practices are not
used to evade the purposes of the ADA [and are] ... based on sound
actuarial principles or ... related to actual or legitimate actuarial con-
siderations...
Id. at § 111-3.11000.
The section also explains that all types of insurance, including disability insurance,
are covered by Title III. This part of the technical assistance tracks the language and the
policy of Title V of the ADA.
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4. Resolving the Ambiguity
The preceding sections demonstrate that an ambiguity exists in Title III of
the ADA with respect to whether its prohibitions are limited to physical
structures. When an ambiguity exits it is appropriate to consider the purposes
of the Act.
In the ADA, Congress intended to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by the 43,000,000 Americans with physical or mental
disabilities. Congress found that discrimination against individuals with a
disability persists in such areas as employment and health services and that
those who are disabled continually encounter various forms of discrimination
in benefits and jobs. Congress recognized census data which showed
individuals with a disability occupy inferior status vocationally and
economically. Because the general population is aging, the number of
individuals with physical and mental disabilities will increase.533 Congress
invoked the sweep of its authority to achieve the purpose of providing a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, including clear, strong, consistent, and
enforceable standards.53 4
To the extent that an ambiguity exists as to the scope of Title III, the ambiguity
must be resolved to achieve the purposes of the Act. An expansive reading of
Title III will achieve the congressional purpose of redressing the persistence of
discrimination in employment, benefits and health services. Insurers who
contract with employers to provide health or disability insurance to employees
must be required not to discriminate in the coverage offered. As a result, even
individuals with serious, totally debilitating illnesses will have the protection
of the ADA. A narrow reading of Title III will frustrate congressional purpose.
Americans who develop totally disabling mental illnesses will have no forum
in which to challenge the discrimination they experience.
The problem presented by this article is that employees who develop totally
disabling mental illnesses usually find that the long-term disability insurance
provided by their employers provide inferior benefits for mental disabilities
compared to physical disabilities. When they attempt to challenge the disparity
by suing their employers under Title I they find that courts usually hold that
their disability keeps them from coming within the definition of qualified
individual with a disability. Thus, the protections of Title I are unavailable to
them. When they attempt to challenge the disparity by suing the insurers under
Title III, they are confronted with a split in the circuits. Some individuals are
permitted to proceed under Title III. Other individuals are not permitted to
proceed because they obtained the insurance through their employers. Because
they did not obtain the insurance by walking into an insurance office the
protections of Title III are unavailable to them.
53342 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
53442 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
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It is important to note that resolving the threshold issue in favor of
application of Title III to insurers of employer-provided benefits does not
answer the substantive question of whether the disparity in benefits constitutes
discrimination under the ADA. Allowing a disabled person to proceed against
the insurer only provides the opportunity to persuade a court that unlawful
discrimination exists. Title V of the ADA gives insurers special defenses against
such discrimination claims in both Title I and III cases. The defenses do not
extend so far as to allow a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.535
A disability-based distinction in an insurance plan does not violate the ADA
if the distinction falls within the safe harbor provision and is not a subterfuge.
The meaning of disability-based discrimination, the point at which fair
discrimination based on actuarial classification becomes a subterfuge to evade
the policy of the ADA and then how to measure subterfuge, have not been
clearly identified. These issues have been heavily litigated and subjected to
frequent commentary and analysis.536
VIII. CONCLUSION
Disabling, serious mental illness can have catastrophic economic and social
consequences. The individual whose mental disability makes it impossible for
him or her to work may be faced with overwhelming medical expenses and
simultaneous loss of income. The family of the individual may experience not
only economic disaster, but also increased physical illness and familial
disharmony.
These facts are exactly the kind that make insurance necessary and attractive.
Insurance that provides wage security to a person with a disabling mental
illness is most likely to be obtained from the individual's employer as a benefit
of employment. Employers are the source of most private (non-governmental)
health insurance. Employers are also the source of most private long-term
disability insurance, though disability insurance is far less common than health
insurance.
Employers must select insurance benefits for their employees in a way that
allows for a satisfactory margin of profit. To do otherwise would help no one.
However, when most health and disability insurance is selected with an eye on
535For text of 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c), see supra note 440.
536For example, the subterfuge provision of the ADA has been closely linked with the
subterfuge provision of the ADEA. The question is whether cases decided under the
ADEA interpreting the term subterfuge, e.g., Public Employee Retirement System of
Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 164 (1989); United Air Lines Inc., v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977);
and McGann v. H & H Music Co., 496 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), should be authority for
interpreting the same term in the ADA. Some commentators argue that the history and
structure of the ADA demonstrates a rejection of the earlier cases. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra
note 67, at 355-59. (This article also includes an exhaustive collection of cases, articles,
and EEOC action). See also Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Insurance and the ADA, 46 DEPAUL L.
REV. 915 (1997); Bilimoria, supra note 28; McFadden, supra note 25.
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the bottom line, the scope of coverage may reflect unjustifiable stereotypes and
prejudices.
This is the situation for those with mental illnesses in the context of both
health insurance and long-term disability insurance coverage. In
employer-provided health insurance policies, physical illnesses typically have
generous or unlimited lifetime benefit limits-often up to a million dollars.
Employer-provided long-term disability insurance for physical disabilities
typically provide a benefit of sixty to eighty percent of the insured's salary. But
if the illness or disability is classified as mental, health insurance limits are
dramatically inferior and long-term disability benefits are often limited to as
little as two years. Insofar as these coverage limits are placed on serious mental
illnesses, such as organic brain diseases, the disparity of benefits between
physical and mental disabilities is the result of lingering stigma, stereotypes,
and uninformed views about the treatability of such mental illnesses.
Stigma, stereotypes and uninformed views about individuals with
disabilities are the target of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA was
intended to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, and economic
self-sufficiency of individuals with either physical or mental disabilities. Title
I of the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual
who has a mental or physical disability in the terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against an
individual who has a mental or physical disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of goods and services of any place of public accommodation.
The ADA seems to offer a means by which disparities in employer-provided
long-term disability benefits provided for individuals with mental disabilities,
compared with physical disabilities, can be evaluated and redressed. However,
the ADA has often been interpreted to bar individuals with mental disabilities
at the threshold of the Act, never allowing them the opportunity to demonstrate
that the disparity is unlawful discrimination. Title I is usually said to be
unavailable to an employee with a long-term mental disability because one
who has a long-term disability is unable to work and thus is not an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability, a status prerequisite to Title I protection.
Title III is sometimes said to be unavailable because an insurer who provides
insurance through an employer is not a place of public accommodation.
This insulation of both the employer and the insurer makes it virtually
impossible for any person with a disabling mental illness to challenge the
disparity in employer-provided long-term disability benefits. Thus,
individuals who are victims of discrimination based on disabilities are unable
to secure the protection of federal law that was enacted for them. This is not
the result contemplated by Congress. More important, this result is not
required by the language of this remedial statute.
This article has argued that Title I protects individuals in an employment
relationship, whether they are applicants, current employees, or former
employees. An employee who receives long-term disability insurance as a
benefit of employment does not lose the right to challenge the terms of that
insurance when he or she develops a serious mental disability. Similarly, Title
III prohibits an insurer who contracts with an employer to provide long-term
disability benefits to employees from engaging in unlawful discrimination on
the basis of serious mental disability. The fact that the insured employee has
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not entered a physical structure from which the insurer does business does not
deprive the employee of the protections of Title III of the Americans With
Disabilities Act.
